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After centuries of research, how subjective experience relates to physical phenomena remains un-
clear. Recent strategies attempt to identify the physical correlates of experience. Less studied is
how scientists eliminate the “spurious” aspects of their subjective experience to establish an “objec-
tive” science. Here we model scientists doing science. This entails a dynamics formally analogous
to quantum dynamics. The analogue of Planck’s constant is related to the process of observation.
This reverse-engineering of science suggests that some “non-spurious” aspects of experience remain:
embodiment and the mere capacity to observe from an intrinsic perspective. A relational view
emerges: every experience has a physical correlate and every physical phenomenon is an experi-
ence for “someone”. This may help bridge the explanatory gap and hints at non-dual modes of
experience.
To study your own self is to forget yourself. To forget
yourself is to have the “objective” world prevail in you.
To have the “objective” world prevail in you is to let go
of your “own” body and mind as well as the body and
mind of “others.”
Dogen
I. INTRODUCTION
There is mounting evidence that human experi-
ence is related to patterns of neural activity, the neu-
ral correlates. A variety of neural correlates of con-
cepts previously considered taboo, such as conscious-
ness [1–5] and the self [6–15], have been identified.
Brain stimulation techniques [11, 12, 16] can induce
a variety of subjective experiences, such as seeing
faces, movement, and colors, having heath sensations,
or feeling out of the body. Brain imagining tech-
niques [17] can directly “read out” thoughts. Such
techniques have allowed humans to navigate virtual
worlds without any traditional sensory input [18],
control avatars and robots by thought [19, 20], and
extend their capabilities via direct brain-machine [17,
21] and brain-brain communication [22, 23].
Despite such an outstanding progress, a question
persists: how does subjective experience relate to
physical phenomena? This is the so-called hard prob-
lem of consciousness [24]. “The problem is that phys-
ical accounts explain the structure and function as
characterized from the outside, but a conscious state
†Part of this work was developed while being Research Asso-
ciate at The University of Manchester.∗Electronic address: john.realpe@lrc.systems; Electronic ad-
dress: john.realpe@gmail.com
is defined by its subjective character as experienced
from inside” [25] (p. 222). At the root of the prob-
lem is that the intrinsic perspective is by definition
the opposite of the extrinsic perspective. It concerns
how “I” observe or experience something from “my”
own perspective, not how an external observer con-
siders “I” should experience it—if left implicit, such
external observers can become homunculi (see Ap-
pendix B and Fig. 3 therein).
Universal principles have often been discovered
through the study of specific instances of the phenom-
ena of interest—think, e.g., of gravity and falling ap-
ples. Similarly, we could in principle learn about the
intrinsic perspective by turning our attention to the
best and perhaps only instance we have access to: our
own. If “I” manage to capture the universal features
of how “I” experience something, “I” might capture
how any other system with an intrinsic perspective,
biological or artificial, would intrinsically experience
it.
However, scientists often study the intrinsic per-
spective through the analysis of other generic
subjects—usually non-scientists. It is said that sub-
jects report their (subjective) experiences, while sci-
entists report their (objective) observations. But
what if instead of generic subjects, scientists inves-
tigate other scientists with access to the same ex-
perimental resources? In this case the distinction
between experiences and observations effectively dis-
solves. Consider, for instance, an experiment where
a subject experiences an optical illusion, while the
scientist realizes it is an illusion thanks to his experi-
mental devices. However, if the subject has access to
the same experimental resources, he can also realize
that it is an illusion (cf. Ref. [26], p. 212, and Fig. 9.2
therein; see Appendix C 1 herein).
Furthermore, usually we take observations of mea-
suring devices as “public” and those reported by sub-
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2jects in psychological experiments as “private”. How-
ever, observations of measuring devices can also be
considered as “private” experiences scientists have.
From this perspective, since scientists cannot directly
access the experiences of each other, but only their re-
ports, there is no way for them to be certain that their
experiences of the measuring device are actually sim-
ilar (the problem of other minds). Strictly speaking,
we cannot rule out the possibility that they might be
lying to each other. It is that we take it for granted
that if scientists report the same “private” experi-
ence of the measuring device, then the corresponding
observations are the same [26] (pp. 221-222; see Ap-
pendix C 1 herein).
In generic subjects the intrinsic perspective is of-
ten associated with additional complexities, like cog-
nitive, perceptual and motivational biases, that may
obscure its most basic aspects. Scientists, instead,
have successfully bracketed out such additional com-
plexities through the constitution of an “objective”
science out of their multiple intrinsic perspectives.
Importantly, this does not necessarily imply that sci-
entists have eliminated the intrinsic perspective and
cognition altogether, but only those “spurious” as-
pects that prevent them from achieving “objectivity”
(see below). Scientists investigating scientists could
therefore help identify the most basic aspects that
remain.
Accordingly, the fundamental regularities we call
“laws of nature” might well in part reflect the most
fundamental, ineliminable aspects of the intrinsic per-
spective. In principle, such aspects could be revealed
by inferring from the “laws of nature” a model of
scientists doing experiments that is consistent with
such laws. If so, the very same equations we use
to reach agreement about physical phenomena could
therefore be used to reach agreement on the intrinsic
perspective. This might be the closest scientists could
get to learning about their own intrinsic perspective
through the indirect (“third-person”) methods of sci-
ence.
Here we build on recent insights from cognitive sci-
ence to develop a model of scientists doing experi-
ments. From a materialist perspective, we ask for
self-consistency: we should not neglect a priori the
physics or embodiment of scientists, as if they were
immaterial, but let a scientific analysis tells us a pos-
teriori whether we can do so. Our approach does not
contradict “objectivity” if by this we pragmatically
mean that: (O1) procedures are standardized and
explicit, (O2) observations are intersubjective and re-
peatable, and (O3) observers are dispassionate, accu-
rate and truthful [26] (p. 219; see also Refs. [27–29]
and Appendix C 1 herein). In this view, the scientific
method can be formulated in short as “if you carry
out these procedures you should observe or experi-
ence these results,” which can in principle apply to
the investigation of both subjective and physical phe-
nomena. This does not imply a priori that science is
observer-free as “objectivity” is often understood—
after all, science is actively performed by scientists
even if assisted by technology. It does not deny a pri-
ori either that effectively observer-free theories could
be established in certain situations.
Indeed, the dynamics of our model is formally anal-
ogous to quantum dynamics (see Appendices D 1 and
E). So, our approach is consistent with current scien-
tific knowledge and aligns with some prominent views
that advocate for the central role of observers in quan-
tum physics [30, 31] (see below). It could also be seen
as a potential reconstruction of quantum theory. Un-
like current reconstructions, though, by working at
the interface of cognitive science, artificial intelligence
(AI), and physics, our approach has the potential to
suggest new experiments, perspectives, and synthe-
sis. Furthermore, it may suggest alternative roads to
quantum gravity.
II. EXTRINSIC PERSPECTIVE:
IMAGINARY-TIME QUANTUM DYNAMICS
A. Embodied scientists doing experiments
Here we build on enactivism whose task is “to de-
termine the common principles or lawful linkages be-
tween sensory and motor systems that explain how
action can be perceptually guided in a perceiver-
dependent world” [27] (p. 173; see Fig. 1A and
Appendix F herein). However, this and related ap-
proaches describe embodied cognitive systems from
the perspective of an implicit, unacknowledged ex-
ternal observer (see Appendix B). Here we make such
external observers explicit, which will be key to tackle
the intrinsic perspective below. So, in line with the
relational interpretation [32] of quantum mechanics
(RQM), statements like “a scientist performs an ex-
periment” are considered relative to another scientist
who witnesses that (like Wigner in Fig. 1A; see Ap-
pendix D 2 and Fig. 5 therein).
Figure 1A illustrates the dynamical coupling be-
tween an embodied scientist and an experimental
system. This can be divided into four stages: (i)
scientist’s interventions on the experimental system,
e.g. via moving some knobs, for preparing the de-
sired initial state—this requires the physical interac-
tion between the knobs and the observer’s actuators;
(ii) experimental system’s dynamics—this is the main
process traditionally analyzed in physics; (iii) scien-
tist’s measurement of the experimental system—this
requires the physical interaction between the experi-
mental system and the observer’s sensors via the mea-
suring device; (iv) scientist’s internal dynamics which
correlate with her experience of the experimental sys-
tem.
In the related approach of active inference [33, 34],
experimental systems would be considered as gener-
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FIG. 1: Experiments as circular processes: (A) Wigner observes his friend doing an experiment. (B) Wigner’s model
of his friend doing an experiment in the spirit of active inference. The friend’s actions can always prepare the same
initial state, x = x0, effectively implementing an intervention (denoted here as [x = x0]; see Appendix F 1 and Fig. 7
therein). (C) Enactive model of Wigner’s friend and experimental system as two physical systems involved in a circular
interaction (see Appendix F 2 and Fig. 8 therein). (D) Modeling approach taken here. Arrows indicate the direction of
the circular interaction, not conditional probabilities as in Bayesian networks. Factors F` and G` = F2n−1−` correspond
to the same time step for Wigner and his friend. (E) Wigner and his friend can exchange perspectives [26] (p. 212; see
Appendix F 3).
ative processes which scientists can only access indi-
rectly via the data generated in their sensorium (see
Appendix F 1). Scientists can perturb such genera-
tive processes via their actions and have a generative
model of their dynamics, including the effect of their
own actions, which they can make as accurate as pos-
sible via learning. This is reflected in that, in Fig. 1B,
the topology of the Bayesian network representing the
scientist mirrors the topology of the Bayesian net-
work representing the experimental system. In par-
ticular, both internal and external dynamics flow in
the same direction (horizontal arrows in Fig. 1B; see
Appendix F 1 and Fig. 7 therein).
Following enactivism [25, 27, 35], instead, we give
more relevance to the dynamical coupling between
scientists and experimental systems. Learning sci-
entific lawful regularities is not so much about ex-
tracting pre-existent properties of the world as about
stabilizing this circular coupling and achieving “ob-
jectivity” (conditions (O1)-(O3) above). This may
include the development of new technologies, proto-
cols and concepts. The lawful regularities achieved
in the post-learning stage are our focus here. So, our
approach is independent of a specific theory of learn-
ing (see Fig. 1C; see Appendices F 2, F 3 and Fig. 8
therein).
Of course, the scientific process generally involves
many scientists and technologies. However, much
as the theory of relativity can be developed without
modeling all types of realistic clocks, our approach
aims at capturing some general underlying principles
valid beyond the particular model investigated. In-
deed, enactivism does not treat the observer and the
observed as two separate entities that are brought to-
gether. Rather, it treats them as co-emerging out of
the circular process of observation, which is consid-
ered more fundamental [35] (p., 139). For simplic-
ity, we focus here on a single scientist. However, ex-
periments generally comprise the four stages above.
So, ours can be considered as a model of a generic
process of “objective” observations—though ignoring
relativistic considerations. This process is embodied
4because all scientists and technologies involved are so
(see Appendix F 3 f).
B. Experiments as circular processes
We consider only the post-learning stage, when
“objectivity” has been achieved and the scientist is
just repeating the experiment a statistically signif-
icant number of times. We model this as the sta-
tionary state, P̃(x̃), of a stochastic process on a cy-
cle, which includes deterministic systems as a par-
ticular case—this allows us to establish a posteri-
ori which is the case, rather than forcing the model
to fit a priori our (possibly deeply ingrained) as-
sumptions. Here x̃ = (x0, . . . , xk−1) denotes a closed
path x0 → x1 → ⋯ → xk−1 → x0 which returns to
xk = x0 due to the scientist’s causal interventions—
experiments are not mere passive observations (see
Appendix F). This path could be divided into two
open paths x0 → ⋯ → xn and xn → ⋯ → xk, with
xk = x0, corresponding to the environment and the
scientist, respectively. Furthermore, P̃(x̃) denotes
the probability to observe a path x̃.
Since energy plays a key role in physics, we assume
that the stationary state is characterized by an “en-
ergy” function H`(x`+1, x`), where 0 ≤ ` ≤ k denotes
the time step. For the case of a particle in a non-
relativistic potential V we have
H`(x`+1, x`) = m
2
(x`+1 − x`

)2+1
2
[V (x`) + V (x`+1)] .
(1)
for the “external” path (` = 0, . . . , n − 1)—in princi-
ple, the “internal” path (` = n, . . . , k) can have a dif-
ferent functional form (but see below). Unlike the
traditional Hamiltonian function, H` is written in
terms of consecutive position variables, x` and x`+1,
rather than instantaneous position and momentum.
The potential V in Eq. (1) is symmetrized for conve-
nience, but this does not affect the results (see Appen-
dices D 4 a, D 5 a). In Appendix E we describe in de-
tail the free-particle case (V = 0). In Appendix D 4 b
we describe the case of a particle in an electromag-
netic field, which is an example of a non-trivial “non-
stoquastic” Hamiltonian.
We derive P̃ using the principle of maximum path
entropy [36], a general variational principle analogous
to the free energy principle from which a wide variety
of well-known stochastic models at, near, and far from
equilibrium has been derived [36] (see Appendix G 1).
To do so, we use the assumption, common in statis-
tical physics, that we only know the average energy
on the cycle Eav = ⟨ T ∑`H`⟩Pcycle (see below). Here
→ 0 is the time step size and T = (k+1) is the total
duration of a cycle.
After marginalizing over the “internal” path, this
yields (see Appendix G 1)
P(x) = ∑
xn+1,...,xk−1
P̃(x̃)
= 1
Z
F̃n(x′0, xn)⋯F1(x2, x1)F0(x1, x0), (2)
where Z is the normalization constant and we have
written x′0 = x0 for future convenience—here we use
sums to indicate either sums or integrals depending
on the context. The expression x = (x0, . . . , xn) de-
notes a path x0 → x1 → ⋯→ xn → x0 which returns to
x0, but where we disregard how it does so—following
physics tradition, here we focus on the environment
and ignore the observer, but the same results can be
obtained if, following cognitive science, we focus on
the observer and considered the environment as hid-
den to her. Furthermore,
F̃n(x′0, xn) = ∑
xn+1,...,xk−1
Fk−1(x′0, xk−1)⋯Fn(xn+1, xn),
(3)
summarizes the dynamics internal to the observer,
F`(x′, x) = e−H`(x′,x)/h̵Y/Z, (4)
for ` = 0, . . . , k, where Z = √2piη/m is introduced for
convenience, h̵Y = T /λ, and λ is a Lagrange multiplier
fixing the average energy Eav on the cycle—the use of
the subindex Y becomes clear later. As we are focus-
ing on the “external” dynamics, h̵Y effectively char-
acterizes the neglected environment (i.e., processes
external to the experimental system), much like a
temperature or a diffusion coefficient. The neglected
environment causes energy fluctuations, which is why
we only know the average energy—the deterministic
case is included in the limit h̵Y → 0. We could equally
focus on the “internal” dynamics, in which case h̵Y
would characterize neglected processes within the ob-
server. Either way, when we shift to the internal per-
spective, h̵Y would actually characterize the process
of observation.
C. Reciprocal causality and imaginary-time
quantum dynamics
If we neglect the embodied observer, F̃n(x0, xn) be-
comes a constant. In this case the cycle in Fig. 1D
turns effectively into a chain and we recover the most
parsimonious non-trivial case where the probability
distribution in Eq. (2) is Markov with respect to a
chain on variables x` [37] (p. 16; see Appendices G 2
and G 3 herein). In particular, by knowing only the
initial marginal p0 and the forward transition proba-
bilities P +` from time step ` to ` + 1, for all `, we can
readily obtain the probability for a path Pch(x) =
p0(x0)P+0 (x1∣x0)⋯P+n−1(xn∣xn−1). This implies in
particular that we can obtain the marginal p`+1 from
the previous marginal p` via a Markovian update
p`+1(x`+1) = ∑x` P +`(x`+1∣x`)p`(x`). That is, via a
5linear transformation specified by kernels P +`(x`+1∣x`)
satisfying the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation—i.e.,
where the transition probability from ` to ` + 2,
for instance, can be written as P +`+2∣`(x`+2∣x`) =∑x`+1 P +`+1(x`+2∣x`+1)P +`(x`+1∣x`).
In general, when we cannot neglect the observer,
we cannot write the probability of a path in the same
way due to the loopy correlations. This implies in
particular that we cannot obtain the marginal p`+1
from the previous one p` via a Markovian update as
above (see Appendix G 3). Indeed, it is possible to
show that P(x) = p(x0, xn)∏n−2`=0 P`(x`+1∣x`, x0) in
Eq. (2), which yields a Bernstein process where initial
and final states must be specified [38] (here the two-
variable marginal p and the transition probability P`,
respectively, plays the role of m and h in Eq. (2.7)
therein; see Appendix G 3 herein). Interestingly, the
need to specify initial and final states, so common in
physics, arises naturally here as this effectively turns
a cycle into two chains.
Alternatively, we can recover an effective
Markovian-like update if, instead of marginals,
we consider (real) probability matrices. For in-
stance, if we relax the condition x′0 = x0 in Eq. (2)
and marginalize all other variables we obtain a
probability matrix P0(x′0, x0) = ∑x1,...,xn P(x) with
P0(x0, x0) = p0(x0). Interpreting factors as matrix
elements, Eq. (2) yields P0 = F̃n⋯F1F0/Z. Similarly,
for ` = 1, P1 = F0F̃n⋯F1/Z and P1(x1, x1) = p1(x1).
This is obtained by removing the prime from x0
in Eq. (2), adding a prime to x1 in F0, moving
F0(x′1, x0) to the beginning of Eq. (2), and do-
ing the marginalization over all other variables,
P1(x′1, x1) = ∑x0,x2,...,xn P(x).
The probability matrix P1 = F0F̃n⋯F1/Z is ob-
tained from P0 = F̃n⋯F1F0/Z via the cyclic permu-
tation of matrix F0. Iterating ` times yields
P` = 1
Z
F`−1⋯F1F0F̃n⋯F`+1F`, (5)
where P`(x,x) = p`(x). If F` is invertible we can
write (see Appendix G 3 for the case of pure states
which, following Eq. (5), would be associated to non-
invertible matrices F`)
P`+1 = F`P`F −1` , (6)
for ` = 0, . . . , n−1, which is an effective Markovian-like
update in that it yields P`+1 via a linear transforma-
tion of P` alone, where the kernels F` satisfy the ana-
logue of Chapman-Kolmogorov equation—i.e., the
factor between time steps ` and `+2, for instance, can
be written as F`+2∣` ≡ F`+1F`. So, we can effectively
sidestep the circularity and keep the traditional de-
scription in terms of a causal chain, at the expense of
working with probability matrices—the off-diagonal
elements of such matrices contain relevant dynami-
cal information since, if we neglect them, we cannot
build P`+1 from P` and F` alone. We could obtain an
equation from ` = n . . . , k − 1, similar to Eq. (6), if we
focus on the observer rather than the environment.
When → 0, we can assume variables x` and x`+1 to
be typically close to each other, or F` = 1I+J`+O(2).
For discrete variables, the dynamical matrix J` has
non-negative elements. For continuous variables J` is
actually an operator. For instance, for H` in Eq. (1)
we have J` → −H/h̵Y, when → 0, where
H = − h̵2Y
2m
∂2
∂x2
+ V (x), (7)
is equivalent to the quantum Hamiltonian of a non-
relativistic particle in a potential V , and h̵Y plays
the role of Planck’s constant. This can be seen by
expanding the non-Gaussian factors in the integral[F`g](x) = ∫ F`(x,x′)g(x′)dx′, where g is a generic
smooth enough function, until the integral yields
terms O(2) (see Appendices G 2 b).
Either way, Eq. (6) becomes
∆P` = [J`, P`] +O(2), (8)
where ∆P` = P`+1 − P` and [J`, P`] = J`P` − P`J`.
After dividing by  and taking the continuous-time
limit (→ 0), Eq. 8 yields ∂P /∂t = [J,P ], which is von
Neumann equation in imaginary time—i.e. with time
t = ` replaced by it, where i is the imaginary unit (see
Appendix D 1). Imaginary-time quantum dynamics
already displays some quantum-like features [38] such
as , e.g., constructive interference (see Appendix F 3 e
and Fig. 9 therein for an example of this in the con-
text of the two-slit experiment).
Using belief propagation (BP) [39] (ch. 14) we
can obtain the imaginary-time version of wave func-
tions and their conjugate, given by the forward and
backward BP messages µ→` and µ`←, respectively, as
well as of the Schro¨dinger equation and its conju-
gate, given by the continuous-time limit of the for-
ward and backward BP iterations, µ→`+1 = F`µ→` and
µ`← = µ`+1←F`, respectively (see Appendices G 2 and
G 3, as well as Figs. 10 and 11 herein). The analogue
of the Born rule is given by the standard BP rule
p`(x) = µ→`(x)µ`←(x). Although BP is not exact on
cycles, we can in principle fix initial and final states,
p0 and pn, to turn the cycle into two chains and search
for BP messages that are consistent with these and
the BP iterations [40] (see Eqs. (2.6), (2.16), (2.22),
and (2.23) therein; µ→`, µ`←, and F` here correspond,
respectively, to θ∗, θ, and h therein).
In this sense, the Markovian and Markovian-like
updates above could be considered as examples of
linear and reciprocal causality, respectively. We can
in principle change the initial marginal p0 → p′0 of
a Markovian update without changing the “mecha-
nisms” P +` [37] (Sec. 1.3.1). Similarly, we can in prin-
ciple change the initial probability matrix P0 → P ′0
for our Markovian-like update without changing the
“mechanisms” F`. In particular, we could choose
6P0(x,x′) = ∑α λαµα→0(x)µα0←(x′), where the BP mes-
sages µα→0 and µα0← correspond to a pure state and its
imaginary-time conjugate, respectively, and λα ≥ 0
with ∑α λα = 1 yields the probability associated to
pure state α (see Appendix G 3).
D. Constraints from “objectivity”
The experimental system is observed by both
Wigner as an external observer and his friend as the
scientist doing the experiment. However, “objectiv-
ity” requires that both perspectives coincide (see Ap-
pendix F 3 d). From Wigner’s perspective, factors
F`, with ` = 0, . . . , n − 1, associated to paths tra-
versed from x0 to xn, characterize his friend’s en-
vironment (see Fig. 1D). Now, Wigner and his friend
can exchange roles [26] (p. 212), so they become the
scientist doing the experiment and the external ob-
server, respectively (see Fig. 1E). Standardization—
condition (O1)—requires that the models, and so the
factors F`, for ` = 0, . . . , k, in both cases are the same.
So, Wigner’s internal physical correlates of his expe-
rience of the environment is characterized by factors
G2n−1−` ≡ F`, with ` = n, . . . , k−1, associated to paths
traversed from xn to xk = x0, i.e., effectively in the re-
verse direction. Intersubjectivity—condition (O2)—
requires that, at each time step, what Wigner the ex-
ternal observer considers as his friend’s environment
is the same environment that Wigner the scientist ob-
serves. Faithfulness—condition (O3)—requires that
if the “internal” and “external” dynamics coincide,
no observer reports to the contrary.
To compare each time step, the “internal” and “ex-
ternal” paths have to be divided into an equal number
of bins, i.e. k = 2n. Under an exchange of roles, the
initial factor F0(x1, x0), for instance, characterizing
the environment observed by Wigner as an external
observer (see Fig. 1D), corresponds to the final fac-
tor G0 = F2n−1(x0, x2n−1) characterizing the environ-
ment observed by Wigner as the scientist performing
the experiment (see Fig. 1E). However, the latter has
to be transposed because it corresponds to paths tra-
versed in the reversed direction. More generally,
G` = F2n−`−1 = FT` , (9)
with ` = 0, . . . , n − 1. This implies that the two dy-
namics are related via the transpose operation since
P2n−` = F2n−`−1⋯FnF̃Tn F2n−1⋯F2n−`/Z = PT` —using
F̃n = F2n−1⋯Fn = FT0 ⋯FTn−1 in Eq. (5) (see Ap-
pendix F 3 d).
Intersubjective agreement therefore enforces the
“internal” and “external” dynamics to be described
by the same factors. This seems consistent with the
idea that there is a pre-given “external” dynamics
that the observer internally “mirrors”. In particular,
this seems to imply that both “internal” and “ex-
ternal” dynamics flow in the same direction rather
than in a circular fashion. However, this is not ex-
actly so because, following enactivism, the “internal”
and “external” factors co-emerge as a lawful regular-
ity out of the circular interaction between scientist
and world. Indeed, the direction of the circular dy-
namics and its reversal under an exchange of roles are
key in our approach to the intrinsic perspective (see
Appendix F 3 d).
III. INTRINSIC PERSPECTIVE:
REAL-TIME QUANTUM DYNAMICS
A. The mere capacity to observe “from within”
Equation (8) describes the dynamics of a scientist
(F ) doing an experiment (E), from the perspective of
another external scientist (W ; see Fig. 1A). We can
highlight this by writing P` in Eq. (8) as P
W→F→E
` .
But scientific knowledge is not given by some “god-
like” observer external to the universe. Rather, it
stems from sub-systems of it: scientists, who observe
the experimental systems from their own intrinsic
perspective. To do so, scientists do not necessarily re-
quire subjective experience in full, but just the mere
capacity to observe from an intrinsic perspective. By
“intrinsic perspective” we here refer to this kind of
minimal phenomenal experience [28, 41, 42].
The problem of describing how phenomena looks
from the perspective of the observer herself, rather
than how an external observer considers such phe-
nomena should look to the former observer, is self-
referential and can easily lead to the “homunculus
fallacy” (see Appendix B and Fig. 3 therein; see also
Appendix H). DNA molecules are examples of self-
referential systems (see Fig. 2A). These are composed
of two strands that mutually refer to each other by
playing complementary roles, i.e., active and passive
when participating in the replication of and when be-
ing replicated by the other strand, respectively. Like
DNA molecules, self-printing Turing machines (TMs)
are composed of two sub-machines that mutually re-
fer to each other, similarly playing complementary
roles when printing and being printed by the other
sub-machine (see Fig. 2B). Such an architecture is
formalized for general TMs in Kleene’s recursion the-
orem [43] (ch. 6.1; see Appendix H 1 d and Figs. 12-
14).
B. Self-referential or “conscious” observers
We now propose to model the intrinsic perspec-
tive in a similar way by coupling two “sub-observers”
that, in a sense, mutually observe each other (see
Fig. 2C). In our relational approach, observers like
Wigner’s friend in Fig. 1A are “unconscious”, or U-
observers, in the sense that, like philosophical zom-
bies, they “exist” only relative to an external, or E-
observer (like Wigner in Fig. 1A). In contrast, ob-
servers with an intrinsic perspective, or C-observers,
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FIG. 2: C-observers as a self-referential coupling of complementary “sub-observers”. Self-referential systems—like
DNA molecules (A) and self-printing programs (B)—are often composed of two subsystems that mutually refer to
each other (see Appendix H). (C) Similarly, C-observers are composed of two “sub-observers” that recursively refer
to each other. (D) Toy example of a C-observer (Alice+Bob) described by an E-observer (Wigner). (E) Alice and
Bob take and exchange pictures of each other. They cannot detect any extrinsic motion, only their relative motion in
opposite directions: outwards (⊙ in (D)) and inwards (⊗ in (D)). However, in their pictures they appear as moving
in the same direction (E). (F, G) Formal analogue of (E). Alice and Bob play complementary roles, acting both as
E-observers (i.e., like Wigner in Fig. 1A; big half-heads) and as U-observers (i.e., like Wigner’s friend in Fig. 1A; small
half-heads). However, under a shift of perspective the circular processes effectively reverse direction (see Fig. 1D,E).
From an external perspective, these two circular processes are one and the same, so this reversal has to be corrected.
(G) C-observer. Figures (C, E, F) are structurally similar to the symbol Y—for instance, if the black and white colors,
respectively, refer to Alice and Bob. This symbol is sometimes used to refer to the intrinsic perspective as defined
here—i.e., as the mere capacity to observe or experience (see discussion section). Image in (A) is derivative work from
Madeleine Price Ball (Madprime) [CC BY-SA 3.0]. Photos in (D,E) taken by Edwin Lemus.
are “conscious” in the sense that they “exist” also
relative to themselves.
Figures 2D,E show a simple analogy for a C-
observer, which highlights four key properties: (C1)
It is composed of two “sub-observers”, Alice and
Bob, which play complementary roles, acting both
as E- and U-observers that photograph and are pho-
tographed by each other, respectively. (C2) Alice and
Bob exchange the pictures of each other (MUA→B and
MUB→A in Fig. 2E), to obtain a picture of themselves
(MCA and M
C
B in Fig. 2E). In this sense the com-
bined system Alice+Bob observes itself. (C3) Alice
8and Bob can determine their relative velocities, vA∣B
and vB∣A, but not the extrinsic velocity, vC∣W , of
their centroid relative to an external observer. More
precisely, if Alice and Bob have velocities vA∣W and
vB∣W , respectively, relative to an external observer
(Wigner in Fig. 2D), the average or centroid velocity
is vC∣W = (vA∣W + vB∣W )/2. The corresponding veloc-
ities relative to the centroid are vA∣C = vA∣W − vC∣W
and vB∣C = vB∣W − vC∣W . For Wigner, the relative
velocities between Alice and Bob are vA∣B = 2vA∣C
and vB∣A = 2vB∣C , respectively. Alice and Bob can
determine the intrinsic velocities vA∣C = −vB∣C by ob-
serving each other, but not the extrinsic velocity vC∣W
which only makes sense for Wigner. (C4) While Al-
ice and Bob have opposite relative velocities, in their
pictures they seem to be moving in the same direction
(see Fig. 2E)—so, there is a minus sign that needs to
be corrected. This happens because, to observe each
other, they have to face each other. This is similar to
the left-right inversion that occurs when we look in a
mirror.
Following property (C1), we assume a C-observer
is composed of two complementary sub-observers, Al-
ice and Bob, that observe generic systems S2 and
S1, respectively (see Fig. 2F). The systems S1 and
S2 will later on refer to Alice and Bob, respectively,
effectively implementing the self-referential coupling
(SRC). Consider first symmetric dynamical matrices,
i.e., J` = JT` = Js,`, so Js,2n−`−1 = Js,`. Following
property (C2), Alice and Bob need to swap their de-
scriptions of each other (see Fig. 2C). Similar to prop-
erty (C4), there is a minus sign that needs to be cor-
rected. Indeed, for the system S1 to consistently rep-
resent Alice, i.e. for the purple arrow corresponding
to S1 (Fig. 2F, left), which points in a counterclock-
wise direction, to consistently represent the purple
arrow corresponding to Alice in Fig. 2F (right), which
points in a clockwise direction, they should actually
point in the same direction. So, the orientation of one
of the circles in Fig. 2F has to be reversed, leading to
an apparent time reversal. We assume the intrinsic
perspective has to be constructed at each time step.
Let us first provide some intuition. The change
in perspective and the corresponding apparent time-
reversal are associated to the transpose opera-
tion (see previous section). In other words, if
∆UP` = [Js,`, P`] is Alice’s dynamics from Bob’s
perspective—as U- and E-observers, respectively—
then ∆UPT` = −[Js,`, PT` ] is Bob’s dynamics from
Alice’s perspective—as U- and E-observers, respec-
tively (cf. Fig. 1D,E). Similarly, ∆CP` and ∆
CPT` ,
respectively, denote the dynamics of Alice and Bob
as the two halves of a C-observer. So, after Alice and
Bob exchange their descriptions of each other, we ob-
tain ∆CP` = ∆UPT` and ∆CPT` = ∆UP` for Alice
and Bob, respectively. We will see below that these
equations describe a quantum dynamics.
Let us now be more formal. Let PA→B→S1` be
the probability matrix that Alice, acting as an E-
observer, assigns at time step ` to U-observer Bob
observing system S1 (see Fig. 2F, left). Let P
B→A→S2
`
be defined similarly (see Fig. 2F, right). In our rela-
tional framework, the focus is on the corresponding
changes ∆UPA→B→S1` and ∆UPB→A→S2` , rather than
on the absolute quantities. The swapping of descrip-
tions and the correction of the minus sign, associated
to properties (C2) and (C4), respectively, lead to
∆CPA→S2` = −∆UPB→A→S2` = − [Js,`, PB→A→S2` ] ,(10)
∆CPB→S1` = ∆UPA→B→S1` =  [Js,`, PA→B→S1` ] .(11)
That is, Bob takes the change from Alice as is, while
Alice add a minus sign to Bob’s. Here the super-
scripts “C” and “U”, respectively, indicate that these
changes refer to a C-observer and a U-observer; the
latter are given by Eq. (8). If ∆UPA→B→S1 and
∆UPB→A→S2 are the analogues of MUA→B and MUB→A,
then ∆CPA→S2 and ∆CPB→S1 are the analogues of
MCA and M
C
B (see Fig. 2E,F).
In enactivism observers always imply observed ob-
jects since they are relational to each other (see Ap-
pendix F 3 f). Accordingly, to implement the self-
referential coupling, we now let system S1 refer to
observer Alice observing system S2, i.e., S1 = A→ S2
(see Fig. 2C). Similarly, S2 = B → S1. Iterating, S1
is Alice who is observing Bob (A → B), who is ob-
serving Alice (A → B → A), who is observing Bob
(A → B → A → B), and so on ad infinitum (cf.
Ref. [44], p. 126). Similarly for S2. Thus,
S1 = A⤾ B ≡ A→ B → A→ B → ⋯, (12)
S2 = B⤾ A ≡ B → A→ B → A→ ⋯, (13)
which aslo defines the mirroring operator ⤾. Us-
ing Eqs. (10) and (11) and the relationships
A→ B⤾ A = A⤾ B and B → A⤾ B = B⤾ A im-
plied by Eqs. (12) and (13) yields
∆CP
A⤾B
` = − [Js,`, PB⤾A` ] , (14)
∆CP
B⤾A
` =  [Js,`, PA⤾B` ] . (15)
A quantum experiment starts with classical in-
formation scientists have direct access too and can
agree on (see below). So, Following Eq. (5), the ini-
tial probability matrices can be chosen as P
A⤾B
0 =
P
B⤾A
0 = P0, where P0 = F̃nF̃Tn (see Eqs. (3) and (9))
is symmetric and its diagonal contains the probabili-
ties characterizing the initial state. Introducing P0 in
the right hand side of Eqs. (14) and (15) we can see
that these terms are the transpose of each other. So,
iterating Eqs. (14) and (15) yields P
A⤾B
` ≡ P` and
P
B⤾A
` ≡ PT` for all `. This is reasonable since the
transpose operation is related to time-reversal and
swapping A and B reverses the time direction of the
circular process (see Fig. 2G and Appendix F 3 d).
9Adding and subtracting Eqs. (14) and (15) we get
an equivalent pair of equations in terms of Ps,` = (P`+
PT` )/2 and Pa,` = (P`−PT` )/2, i.e., the symmetric and
anti-symmetric parts of P`. This pair of real matrix
equations can be written as (see Appendix D 3)
ih̵Y∆ρ` = [Hs,`, ρ`] (16)
where ρ` ≡ Ps,`+Pa,`/i = ρ†` and Hs,` ≡ −h̵YJs,` =H†s,`
are the analogues of the Hermitian quantum density
matrix and Hamiltonian operator, respectively, and
we have removed the superscript “C”—here † de-
notes the conjugate transpose. After dividing by 
and taking the continuous-time limit, Eq. (16) yields
ih̵Y∂ρ/∂t = [Hs, ρ], which is formally equivalent to
von Neumann equation for real Hamiltonians.
The dynamical matrices considered here do not
have negative entries, and so have a clear probabilistic
interpretation. This is not necessarily a restriction,
though, since effective negative entries can arise from
approximations of these kinds of dynamical matri-
ces. Consider, e.g., the derivation of a two-level atom,
whose Hamiltonian can have positive entries, from a
Hamiltonian as that in Eq. (7) [45] (Sec. 15.3). Fur-
thermore, negative numbers in probabilistic expres-
sions can sometimes have operational meaning (see
Appendix I 1).
Now consider dynamical matrices with an anti-
symmetric part, Ja,`—which is related to phenomena
with an extrinsic directionality as it encodes the dif-
ference between time-reversed trajectories (see above
and Appendix F 3 d). These sometimes can arise
from effective descriptions of systems with symmetric
dynamical matrices [46] (see Appendix I 2). More-
over, consider the real Hamiltonian in Eq. (7) with
V = 0, related to diffusion, which acquires an imagi-
nary part, related to drift, if we change to a reference
frame moving with velocity v (see Appendix E 2 and
Fig. 6 therein). The corresponding complex Hamilto-
nian H` =Hs,`+Ha,`/i can be obtained from Eq. (16)
via the corresponding change in the time derivative
∂/∂t → ∂/∂t + v∂/∂x. Equation (16) then yields the
pair of equations (see Appendix D 3)
∆P` − [Ja,`, P`] = −[Js,`, PT` ], (17)
∆PT` − [Ja,`, PT` ] = [Js,`, P`], (18)
where Js,` = −Hs,`/h̵Y = (h̵Y/2m)∂2/∂x2, Ja,` =−Ha,`/h̵Y = −v∂/∂x, and ρ` = (P` + PT` )/2 + (P` −
PT` )/2i.
Since the anti-symmetric term here arises from a
change of reference frame, it is analogous to the ex-
trinsic term vC∣W described in property (C3). This
example therefore suggests that, like in property
(C3), Alice and Bob cannot observe the part with
extrinsic directionality when they observe each other
since this only exists relative to an observer external
to them. So, we finally assume that when performing
the SRC associated to a general dynamical matrix
J` = Js,` + Ja,`, we first have to subtract the anti-
symmetric part, precisely as in Eqs. (17) and (18).
This leads to the analogue of von Neumann equa-
tion with generic complex Hamiltonians, i.e., Eq. (16)
with Hs replaced by H` =Hs,` +Ha,`/i.
C. Consistency with some aspects of quantum
theory
Let us check that an initial density matrix given
by ρ0 = P0 = F̃nF̃Tn , which is real and so sym-
metric, is consistent with a generic quantum den-
sity matrix. Indeed, a symmetric pure density ma-
trix has the form ρα0 (x,x′) = √pα0 (x)pα0 (x′), where
pα0 (x) is the probability assigned to x. A more gen-
eral symmetric density matrix is given by a mixture,
i.e., ρ0(x,x′) = ∑α λα√pα0 (x)pα0 (x′), where pα0 (x) is
the probability assigned to x in the pure state α,
and λα ≥ 0, with ∑α λα = 1, is the probability as-
signed to α. Since the function f(y, z) = √yz is
concave, we have ρ0(x,x′) ≤ √p0(x)p0(x′), where
p0(x) = ∑α λαpα0 (x) is the total probability assigned
to x in the mixture. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity guarantees that our initial density matrix given
by ρ0 = P0 = F̃nF̃Tn is consistent with this. Indeed,
P0(x,x′) = ∑y F̃n(x, y)F̃Tn (y, x′) ≤ √p0(x)p0(x′),
where p0(x) = P0(x,x) = ∑y [F̃n(x, y)]2 is the to-
tal probability assigned to x. We could in principle
extend our results to asymmetric initial probability
matrices, but these would not lead to consistent den-
sity matrices (see Appendix G 3).
Being real, ρ0 in principle has a standard proba-
bilistic interpretation (see Appendix G 4). This is not
necessarily a restriction, though, since actual quan-
tum experiments also start with classical information
scientists have direct access to. A generic “initial”
quantum state ρprep = Uprepρ0U †prep is prepared only
after applying a suitable quantum operation Uprep to
such classical information. In principle, we can write
Uprep = Um⋯U0, for a suitable number of time steps
m, where each U` = 1I − iH`/h̵Y is obtained from a
factor F` = 1I + J` via H` = −h̵Y(Js,` + Ja,`/i)—here
` = 0, . . . ,m.
Here we have mostly focused on one observ-
able, i.e., position. However, “all measurements of
quantum-mechanical systems could be made to re-
duce eventually to position and time measurements
(e.g., the position of the needle on a meter or the time
of flight of a particle). Because of this possibility a
theory formulated in terms of position measurements
is complete enough in principle to describe all phe-
nomena” [47] (p. 96; see Appendix J herein).
IV. DISCUSSION
We now discuss how our approach could potentially
impact our understanding of the phenomenal and the
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physical worlds and help us bridge the explanatory
gap in the science of consciousness.
A. Potential physical implications and quantum
gravity
Our approach may provide a fresh look at the fun-
damental laws of nature. When h̵Y → 0, the most
probable path in Eq. (2) satisfies Newton equation
in imaginary-time (see Appendix G 5). So, embodi-
ment might help explain why the fundamental equa-
tions of physics are typically second-order in terms
of a kind of variable, e.g., position only, instead of
the more parsimonious first-order equations. The
SRC effectively implements a Wick rotation that
turns imaginary-time into real-time. So, the intrinsic
perspective may help explain the actual (sympletic)
structure of such equations.
The Wick rotation also plays a role in relativ-
ity. Our approach focuses on modeling how scien-
tists do science, and scientists effectively measure
“time” by measuring the position of a pointer on a
measuring device [48]. Consider two free particles
with masses m and M , positions x = (x1, x2) and
y = (y1, y2), and “energy” function H = m(∆x21 +
∆x22)/22 +M∆y2/22 = E, where  → 0 and E are
constants. Assume ∆y = √∆y21 +∆y22 is used to mea-
sure “time” intervals. MultiplyingH by 22/m we can
write ∆x21 +∆x22 +C2∆y2 = ∆s2 with ∆s2 = 22E/m
and C2 =M/m. This expression has the same struc-
ture of an imaginary-time spacetime interval. After
a “Wick rotation”, y → iy, which can in principle
be implemented via a suitable SRC, this turns into a
real-time interval. A more realistic situation is where
the clock particle is not free, which could in principle
lead to the analogue of curved spacetime intervals.
So, our approach may suggest alternative roads to
quantum gravity.
Science is perhaps the best example of “intelli-
gence” we know of. So, our focus on how the gen-
eral structure of the “laws of nature” may emerge
from modeling scientists doing science could provide
a fresh perspective on cognitive science—for instance,
how to interpret the equations obtained if we relax
the “objectivity” constraints? It may also suggest
routes to build “machines that learn and think like
people” complementary to those of directly incorpo-
rating known physical laws into AI algorithms [49] or
developing scientist-like AI algorithms that can learn
laws already encoded in a dataset [50]. In particu-
lar, our results suggest that quantum models may be
relevant for “embodied intelligence”, which hints at
novel demonstrations of “quantum supremacy.” As a
side remark, since recurrent neural networks can both
encode TMs [51–53] and model biological neural net-
works, Kleene’s recursion theorem suggests that the
double-hemisphere architecture of the brain may be
related to self-reference—e.g., self-modeling or self-
awareness (see Appendix H 1 d).
There is a close relationship between our potential
reconstruction of quantum theory and QBism due
to the central role both give to the observer. Be-
cause this is the key aspect in most of the resolutions
proposed by QBism to the conceptual difficulties of
quantum theory, such resolutions would be valid in
our framework too. There are some significant dif-
ferences, though. In Appendix K, we compare our
approach to QBism and two other related approaches
to quantum theory.
It is in principle possible to test whether our poten-
tial reconstruction coincides with genuine quantum
theory. For instance, although our approach can nat-
urally accommodate (non-relativistic) Hamiltonians
with positive entries, it suggests that these arise as
approximations or truncations of Hamiltonians with
negative entries, which can be directly interpreted in
probabilistic terms (see Appendix I). Furthermore,
what would happen in those cases where the Hermi-
tian conjugate † may not coincide with the conju-
gate transpose? There are also some subtleties in our
approach that might contrast with the full quantum
formalism (see Appendices G 3 and J).
Finally, most prominent attempts to reconstruct
a quantum formalism usually stay mute about the
physical origin of Planck’s constant. This seems un-
satisfactory because, while most of quantum theory
might be read as an abstract theory of information,
Planck’s constant directly connects to the physics—
e.g., by setting the relevant energy scales. In con-
trast, the key role played by embodied observers in
our approach suggests h̵Y somehow characterizes the
physical process of observation (see below).
B. Potential phenomenological implications and
the hard problem of consciousness
Mathematics historically tried to avoid self-
reference and its puzzles by holding a strict hierarchy
where functions can operate on numbers but not the
other way around. In computation this is reflected in
the distinction between data and programs. However,
at least in arithmetics and computation, this does not
work. Incompleteness and undecidability, as well as
the power of formal systems and Turing machines,
are intimately related to self-reference [54] (ch. 7.2).
Indeed, λ-Calculus is a manifestly self-referential for-
mulation of computation, which dissolves the data-
program distinction: there are only strings operating
on strings [54] (ch. 7.4). Strings are both data and
programs and can operate on themselves. No string
is assumed to play a special role (see Appendix H and
Fig. 15 therein).
In science self-reference has been scrupulously
avoided by strictly relying on third-person methods.
Although scientists are considered physical systems,
they are implicitly assumed to play the special role of
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observing other physical systems from a disembodied
perspective. Generally, scientists investigate human
subjects different from themselves, but not the other
way around (see Appendix H 2).
Why not rather embrace self-reference? Much
as strings operating on strings dissolves the data-
program distinction, scientists investigating scientists
can effectively dissolve the distinction between ex-
periences and observations. This symmetric situa-
tion allows the subjects under investigation to achieve
“objectivity” and the role of scientists in the doing of
science to be acknowledged. Our approach indicates
that we can take experience as the starting point of
“objective” science and still be consistent with cur-
rent scientific knowledge. This is in line with neu-
rophenomenology [26–29] (see Appendix C).
Our approach aligns with RQM’s view that every
physical phenomenon is relative to an observer [32]—
an embodied observer with an intrinsic perspective,
though. This is analogous to the notion of “concep-
tual dependence” in neurophenomenology [28] (pp.
331-332; see Appendices C 1 and C 4 herein). Since
observers are embodied, every experience has a phys-
ical correlate. Since observations are made from an
intrinsic perspective, every physical phenomenon is
an experience for “someone”. This is not to suggest
that, e.g., rocks have phenomenal experiences, but
that rocks are rocks for “someone” who experience
them as such. However, here “someone” does not
necessarily refer to a “self” but to a kind of “aware-
ness” (see below).
If the quantum formalism—the foundation on
which the skyscraper of science stands—already in-
tegrates physical phenomena with a minimal form of
phenomenal experience, the question of how subjec-
tive experience “emerges” out of physics would be-
come more tractable. What would emerge is not ex-
perience as such but increasingly complex contents of
experience—some of which could refer to the experi-
ence of being a self. This would parallel the emer-
gence of increasingly complex physical phenomena—
some of which could correlate with the experience of
being a self—from the “basic constituents of matter”
(cf. Ref. [28], pp. xxxii, 63; see Appendices C 2 and
C 4 herein).
Scientists establish an “objective” description of
the physical world via refined third-person methods.
Such methods reveal that our ordinary conceptions
are only valid in a narrow “normal” range of obser-
vation, beyond which more fundamental, sometimes
highly counter-intuitive phenomena is observed. In
principle, it is also possible to establish an “objec-
tive” description of the phenomenal world via refined
first-person methods. Indeed, like λ-Calculus that
allows strings to operate on themselves, a manifestly
self-referential science should allow scientists to in-
vestigate themselves, i.e., their own phenomenal ex-
perience via, e.g., first-person methods [26, 55].
Neurophenomenology combines insights from re-
fined first- and third-person methods. Recent re-
search [28, 56] suggests that our ordinary concep-
tions of the phenomenal world are only valid in a
narrow “normal” range, beyond which our current
assumptions seem to lose validity (see Appendix C
and Table I therein). In particular, it suggests that,
instead of the usual taxonomy based on the uncon-
scious, access consciousness, and self-awareness [1],
a more appropriate taxonomy for consciousness is
based on “pure awareness”, contents of awareness,
and self-awareness. While the former assumes that
(access) consciousness is the outcome of a process
of increasing complexity [1], the latter assumes that
(phenomenal) consciousness is fundamentally devoid
of cognitive complexity [28, 41]. Indeed, here “pure
awareness” is just the mere potential to become aware
of something and the ability to apprehend whatever
appears [28, 41, 55, 57–59]. This could be considered
a more precise definition of what we are referring to
as the intrinsic perspective.
The experience of pure awareness is considered to
be non-dual [28, 41, 57, 59, 60]—i.e. such that per-
ceived dualities, like the distinction between subject
and object, are absent [61]—and can be contentless—
in this sense, it seems analogous to the physical
“vacuum” (see below). Being the very precondi-
tion for any phenomenal experience to manifest, pure
or non-dual awareness is said to be all-pervasive
and irreducible to lower level experiences (see Ap-
pendices C 2-C 4). Curiously, non-dual awareness is
sometimes represented by the symbol Y, wich has the
same structure of Fig. 2.
An analogy with lucid dreams is sometimes
made [28] (p. 143, 164, 174; Appendix C 2 b and
Fig. 4 herein). In normal dreams, dreamers usu-
ally identify with their dream body. This frames the
dreaming experience as “I am here and the world is
there”. However, this I-world distinction is some-
how inaccurate as the dream state is composed of
both. In lucid dreams, dreamers can in principle re-
alize that they are dreaming and that they are not
the dream body—no matter how real this appeared
before reaching lucidity. Their sense of self encom-
passes the whole dream state, in a rather “non-dual”
way. There is evidence that the state of lucid dream-
ing can be paralleled by a form of lucidity in deep
and dreamless sleep [28, 41, 42, 62], a state which is
not only devoid of the self-other distinction required
for experiencing oneself as separate from the world,
but also from any kind of content altogether. So, it
is in principle possible to experience a form of non-
dual awareness during lucid deep and dreamless sleep.
This is said to be possible also in deep meditative
states [28, 41].
From a mainstream neuroscience perspective, the
experience of both self and world in the waking state
are associated to neural correlates “within” the same
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individual. Furthermore, the self-other distinction
apparent at gross macroscopic scales dissolves “into
a frenzied, self-organizing dance of smaller compo-
nents” [63] at subtler microscopic scales. So, the pos-
sibility of non-dual modes of experience might not be
so far-fetched
The physical correlates of the intrinsic perspective,
or non-dual awareness, are likely the physical mani-
festations of h̵Y (see Appendices C 3-C 5). We under-
stand this comparison may rise a substantial amount
of healthy skepticism, an attitude that may be rein-
forced by the many unfounded claims made in the
past on this regard. However, in contrast to previ-
ous claims, our discussion is based on a concrete and
precise conceptual and mathematical framework. In
this sense, we think, it is not just a shot in the dark.
We do this because we are convinced that science ad-
vances by going through controversy, not by avoiding
it, and that further research could potentially unlock
social impact on a grand scale (see below).
Indeed, consider a thought experiment where the
“particles” of a generic system described by factors
F ∝ eH/h̵Y are progressively removed. Notice that
h̵Y remains the same during the whole process, as
do the SRC which implements the intrinsic perspec-
tive (see Fig. 2F). Moreover, it seems natural to as-
sume that h̵Y remains the same even after all particles
are gone, in which case only the SRC remains—like
two empty cameras facing each other in Fig. 2E. Be-
ing the very precondition for observing every phys-
ical phenomenon, the SRC is all-pervasive and irre-
ducible to lower level physical phenomena—this has
the flavor of incompleteness and undecidability (see
Appendix H 3). All this seems consistent with the
idea that Planck’s constant characterizes irreducible
and all-pervasive fluctuations that persists even in the
“vacuum”, a relevant concept in quantum theory. Fi-
nally, the SRC is composed of two subsystems, Alice
and Bob in Fig. 2C,F, that play alternative roles as
subject and object, in a seemingly non-dual way.
So, new kinds of experiments combining first- and
third-person methods might be envisioned, where
scientists can explore potential quantum-like fea-
tures of their own experience. Meditation techniques
and biofeedback might facilitate the observation of
quantum-like effects in “quantum cognition” exper-
iments [64, 65], for instance, or in experiments of
photon detection by humans [66–69]. Similarly, psy-
chophysics experiments might be devised to measure
h̵Y and test whether h̵Y = h̵. If so, much like Brow-
nian fluctuations provide indirect evidence about the
“existence” of atoms, quantum fluctuations might
provide indirect evidence about the “existence” of
non-dual awareness. Admittedly these kinds of ex-
periments may be hard to realize for now. However,
the history of science is full of examples of our aston-
ishing human capacity to create and transform our
reality whenever the stakes are high.
By grounding our worldview, scientific paradigms
can hugely impact society. While neglecting phenom-
enal experience, materialism has extraordinarily im-
proved our lives through the systematic transforma-
tion of the physical world. However, such transforma-
tions by themselves are neither good nor bad; this de-
pends entirely on our mindset. If phenomenal expe-
rience is as fundamental as physical phenomena, per-
haps an equally extraordinary, systematic transfor-
mation of our minds is possible. This may empower
us to balance our mastery of nature with a similar
mastery of ourselves. Some meditation techniques are
claimed to help develop an “objective” mind, which
seems very relevant in this age of massive misinfor-
mation enabled in part by our mastery of AI and
information technologies. Non-dual modes of experi-
ence are claimed to be the most radical methods to
develop a peaceful and virtuous mind, less fearful and
biased, more harmoniously connected to others and
the world. If so, the stakes are high: further research
could help us tackle some of the biggest challenges
we face today—e.g., strong social divisions, extreme
inequality, and a lack of agreement to fight climate
change [70].
V. EPILOGUE
May all beings have happiness and the causes of happiness.
May all beings be free from suffering and the causes of suffering.
May all beings not be separated from sorrowless bliss.
May all beings abide in equanimity, free from bias, greed and hatred.
The Four Immeasurables
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Appendix A: Overview
At the core of this work is the integration of ideas
from different disciplines, such as cognitive science,
neurophenomenology, quantum physics, philosophy,
mathematics and computer science. We have not
found yet a way to sidestep this without undermin-
ing the central message of the work. Some readers
may feel that this work involves ideas and method-
ologies from a range of fields somewhat wider than
usual in interdisciplinary works. What some readers
may find rather obvious, others may find a bit ob-
scure. For instance, some well-versed readers in phe-
nomenology may not be very familiar with the kinds
of mathematical calculations involved in physics and
vice versa. Furthermore, to some readers some of the
concepts involved, such as enactivism, self-reference,
“quantumness” and non-dual awareness, may seem a
bit subtle or counter-intuitive. Moreover, some read-
ers may feel that some of the ideas on which this work
builds are scattered throughout a wide variety of lit-
erature and that it may take a bit longer than usual
to go over it and put all the pieces together.
With this in mind we try to provide in these ap-
pendices as much detail as possible, with the hope
that this may facilitate the reading of the work. Un-
fortunately, the price to pay for this is a rather long
document. There is no free lunch after all. To facili-
tate its reading, we here provide an overview.
In Appendix B we describe how standard ap-
proaches to the intrinsic perspective can easily lead
to an infinite regress. In Appendix C we review some
insights from neurophenomenology [26, 28, 29, 55] re-
garding the nature of both science and consciousness
that are relevant to this work. This phenomenolog-
ical reflection suggests, in particular, that the scien-
tific method could be formulated in a pragmatic way
that applies to both the physical and the phenom-
enal worlds. We also review a neurophenomenolog-
ical framework recently proposed [28] for a poten-
tially more fundamental understanding of conscious-
ness and highlight the potential parallels with our ap-
proach discussed in the main text. As this appendix
may seem a bit long and subtle, we include a sum-
mary in Appendix C 4. Some readers may prefer to
read the summary first.
In Appendix D we describe some aspects of quan-
tum theory that are relevant to this work, and illus-
trate the type of conceptual problems associated to
the theory. In particular, we mention Rovelli’s re-
lational interpretation of quantum mechanics, which
aligns with the relational approach taken in the main
text. Furthermore, we show how to write the von
Neumann equation as a pair of equations in terms of
real matrices. These are interpreted in the main text
as describing two “sub-observers” mutually observing
each other to implement the intrinsic perspective. We
also show how some well-known and non-trivial ex-
amples of quantum dynamics can be written in terms
of real kernels with non-negative entries, which can be
interpreted in probabilistic terms. Appendix E com-
plements Appendix D by providing a comprehensive
discussion of one of the simplest quantum systems,
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i.e., a non-relativistic free particle, which is closely
related to a classical diffusive particle. We use this
example to highlight some aspects that are relevant to
our approach, in general, and to take insight to deal
with complex Hamiltonians, in particular. As these
two appendices are necessarily technical, we try to
provide as much mathematical detail as possible.
In Appendix F we first briefly review the frame-
works of active inference and enactivism. Afterwards
we discuss the more relational approach we take in
this work to model scientists doing science and the
constraints imposed by objectivity. This allows us to
implement the self-referential coupling in the main
text. We also discuss the famous two slits experi-
ment from the perspective offered by our framework.
Finally, we discuss how enactivism focuses on the pro-
cess of observation itself, rather than on the observer
and observed poles of the subject/object polarity, and
how this suggests our approach may transcend single
observers and their cognitive limitations.
In Appendix G we discuss the principle of max-
imum dynamical entropy [36] and the associated
graphical models. We also show that the belief prop-
agation (BP) algorithm [39] on chain-like graphs can
be written in a way formally analogous to imaginary-
time quantum dynamics [38]. However, in this case,
the BP messages on the leaves of the chain, which ini-
tiate the BP iteration, can always be chosen constant.
We then discuss the more interesting case of cycles.
Although the BP algorithm is not guaranteed to be
exact anymore [71], we can choose initial and final
conditions for the probability marginals to effectively
turn the cycle into a chain. This yields the formal
analogue of the general imaginary-time quantum dy-
namics considered in Ref. [38]. We also discuss how
real and so symmetric density matrices may be inter-
preted in classical terms and how the “classical” limit,
h̵Y → 0, in our approach can lead to imaginary-time
classical dynamics.
Since the concept of self-reference [54] does not
seem to be very common in the literature, in Ap-
pendix H we review some of its main aspects and
highlight the role it might play a role in science,
as discussed in the main text. In particular, we
use the examples of Turing machines and λ-Calculus
to briefly discuss the concepts of duality and non-
duality. We also briefly discuss some potential rela-
tionships between quantum theory and some aspects
of self-reference.
The analysis in the main text was restricted to fac-
tors with non-negative entries, which can be inter-
preted in probabilistic terms. Genuine quantum dy-
namics does not seem to have this restriction, though.
In Appendix I we argue that our approach is not nec-
essarily restricted to factors with non-negative entries
either. We discuss further the case of Hamiltonians
with complex entries too.
In this work we mostly focus on one observable:
position. However, genuine quantum theory deals
with different kinds of observables, e.g., momentum
or energy. However, strictly speaking, abstract no-
tions like momentum or energy eigenstates have to
be implemented in the laboratory in terms of things
we are familiar with, e.g., the position of a pointer in
a measuring device. In Appendix J we argue, along
with Feynman [47], that our focus on position vari-
ables only should in principle allow for the descrip-
tion of all (non-relativistic) phenomena. We briefly
discuss some aspects of quantum measurement the-
ory using the measurement of momentum of a free
particle as an illustration. In particular, we briefly
discuss how the formalism of quantum measurements
of momentum eigenstates naturally arises from mea-
surements of position of a pointer in a measuring de-
vice suitably interacting with the system. Finally, we
discuss how the Hamiltonian operators required to
implement the quantum measurement naturally arise
from non-negative real kernels. Appendices I and J
may be useful to compare our approach to the gen-
uine (non-relativistic) quantum formalism.
In Appendix K we briefly discuss two prominent
approaches to quantum theory—QBism [31, 72] and
a recent derivation from information principles [73].
We also briefly discuss a different approach [74] to
model the observer based on algorithmic information
theory. Although still at a toy-model level, this re-
cent algorithmic approach also seems to point to some
quantum-like phenomenology. We focus on how we
currently understand these alternative approaches re-
late to ours.
These appendices are not intended to form a sin-
gle coherent document. Rather, they are intended to
provide the context, background, details, or proofs for
the claims made in the main text. As such, the main
text is the thread that connects these appendices.
Appendix B: On modeling the intrinsic
perspective
Here we discuss in a bit more detail our approach
to the intrinsic perspective and how standard ap-
proaches can easily lead to an infinite regress. With
good reason there has historically been an insis-
tence on defining scientific expressions from a priv-
ileged extrinsic or third-person perspective (see Ap-
pendices H 2, C, K 3). However, the intrinsic or first-
person perspective is, by definition, the opposite of
the extrinsic perspective we have traditionally used
in science. So, we should try to avoid falling into
the understandable temptation to describe the intrin-
sic perspective in terms of its opposite, the extrinsic
perspective, in a straightforward way. We better first
turn our attention to the intrinsic perspective itself.
To do so, it may be useful to remember that science
has often advanced by investigating specific instances
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FIG. 3: The intrinsic perspective and the homunculus fal-
lacy: (A) Traditionally, physics analyzes the experimen-
tal system alone (inner red dotted box) without explicitly
taking into account the observer. Traditionally, cognitive
science analyzes the observer (Wigner’s friend) interact-
ing with an environment or experimental system (mid-
dle blue dashed box) without explicitly taking into ac-
count the external observer (Wigner) that observes the
former. We do take explicit account of Wigner (exter-
nal black dashed-dotted box; cf. Fig. 1A in the main
text). However, this more relational perspective, hinted
at by Rovelli [32] (see Appendix D 2), would not take ex-
plicit account of the observer who is looking at Wigner.
By adding another observer (Rovelli) we are head to an
infinite regress (cf. Fig. 5.1 in Ref. [75]). (B) The ho-
munculus fallacy, which is similar to the situation in (A)
except that it leads to an infinte regress of internal, rather
than external, observers. Homuncular infinite regress in
(B) is derivative work: Pbroks13Original: Jennifer Garcia
(Reverie) [CC BY-SA 2.5]
of a phenomenon, say an apple falling from a tree, to
find general features that transcend the specific ex-
ample investigated, e.g., the law of gravity.
Now, the only instance of intrinsic perspective that
we have direct access to is our own. So, one way to
investigate the intrinsic perspective is by turning our
attention from the usual external objects of observa-
tion, including other observers, to ourselves, the sub-
jects who observe. This does not imply that a specific
scientist that is analyzing his own intrinsic perspec-
tive is special in any way, nor that we are introducing
any kind of subjective bias. It neither implies that
we humans are special in some sense. Instead, this
is only a strategy to investigate which features of the
intrinsic perspective we find universal when we com-
pare our own experience of it with the experiences
reported by others (see Appendices C and H 2).
As in the example above, where the law of grav-
ity transcends the special case of a falling apple, such
universal features can potentially transcend the spe-
cific example of our own intrinsic perspective. Indeed,
one of the main theories of consciousness [76] follow a
qualitatively similar approach. It starts by trying to
identify the “essential properties of phenomenal ex-
perience” and this is effectively done by comparing
our own phenomenal experience with that reported
by others.
Our modeling of scientists doing science attempts
to capture the idea that the intrinsic perspective con-
cerns how “I” experience something, not to how other
considers “I” experience it. If “I” manage to model
the universal features of how “I” experience some-
thing, “I” would be modeling the universal features of
how everyone else intrinsically experiences that some-
thing for themselves. The problem of describing how
phenomena looks from the perspective of the observer
herself, rather than how an external observer consid-
ers such phenomena should look to the former ob-
server, is self-referential. A na¨ıve approach to it can
easily lead to an infinite regress (see Fig. 3A).
Consider, for instance, a model of an observer ob-
serving a certain phenomenon (like Wigner’s friend
in Fig. 3A). We might be tempted to say that we are
modeling the “first-person perspective” of Wigner’s
friend (see Appendix K 3). However, in our view this
effectively describes the perspective that an external
observer (like Wigner in Fig. 3A) assigns to the ob-
server under investigation. So, strictly speaking, this
is not the intrinsic perspective of Wigner’s friend. In
this example Wigner observes his friend who in turn
observes an experimental system. Acknowledging the
presence of Wigner was hinted at by Rovelli in his
relational interpretation of quantum mechanics [32],
and this is a key step in our modeling of the intrinsic
perspective. However, in our view, this is not enough
because we can now ask: who observes Wigner? If we
were to add another external observer (named Rovelli
in Fig. 3A) we would be headed to an infinite regress,
as we would need to keep on adding observers. In-
deed, this would be a variation of the so-called “ho-
munculus fallacy.”
The homunculus fallacy [77] is the failed attempt
to explain a person’s analysis of sensory inputs and
decision on appropriate responses in terms of another
little person (an homunculus) inside the former, who
is responsible for doing so (see Fig. 3B). How does
this homunculus analyze his sensory inputs and de-
cide on his appropriate responses? If we add another
homunculus within the previous one, we are headed
to an infinite regress.
These kind of problems are common when dealing
with self-referential systems. Consider, for instance,
the task of finding a program in Python 3 that prints
itself. An homuncular attempt would be to print a
program, say
print(‘‘Hello world!’’), (B1)
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by simply adding a print operator. This yields
print(‘print(‘‘Hello world!’’)’), (B2)
which prints the program in Eq. (B1), but does not
actually print itself, i.e., it does not print the program
in Eq. (B2). If we try to add another print operator
we are headed to an infinite regress. In this example,
the print operator plays the role of the observer and
the homunculus in Figs. 3 A and B, respectively.
A program in Python 3 that does print itself is
shown in Fig. 2B in the main text. It is composed
of two strings that mutually refer to each other.
Kleene’s recursion theorem shows that it is possible
in general to build self-referential Turin machines by
composing two sub-machines that mutually refer to
each other (see Appendix H 1 d). In this work we
propose that we can similarly escape the homuncular
infinite regress associated to the intrinsic perspective
by allowing Wigner’s friend in Fig. 3A to also observe
Wigner. In this way, Wigner and his friend can mu-
tually observe each other, effectively observing them-
selves. Like the two sub-machines of a self-referential
Turing machine, here Wigner and his friend do not
refer anymore to two individuals, but to two halves of
a single individual. In other words, the architecture
of a self-referential observer should be composed of
two sub-systems that refer to each other (see Fig. 2
in the main text).
Appendix C: The rigorous investigation of the
physical and phenomenal worlds
Here we review and discuss in more detail some in-
sights from phenomenology regarding the nature of
both science and consciousness we have relied on in
the main text. This phenomenological reflection sug-
gests that the scientific method could be formulated
in a pragmatic way that applies to both the physi-
cal and the phenomenal worlds. We also discuss a
neurophenomenological framework recently proposed
for a potentially more fundamental understanding of
consciousness. Since this appendix may be a bit long,
subtle and technical, we then present a summary of
the main points. The author may prefer to read this
summary first and then decide what aspects to focus
on. Here we rely heavily on quoting experts in the
field. Our goal up to here is to facilitate the reading
of the main aspects of the literature relevant for our
work.
Finally, in Appendix C 5 we discuss in more de-
tail some of the potential parallels with our approach
that might help put the phenomenological framework
summarized here into more quantitative terms. Since
this framework is rather recent and challenges some
assumptions of the mainstream approach, this dis-
cussion is necessarily speculative and a healthy skep-
ticism is implied. We have included this discussion
here because we think it holds the potential to sug-
gest new lines of inquiry that may help expand our
current understanding of consciousness and science
more generally.
Strictly speaking, consciousness can mean ei-
ther phenomenal consciousness or access conscious-
ness [78, 79]. Phenomenal consciousness is the sub-
jective experience itself or “what it feels like” to be
in a particular state. It essentially means “experi-
ence in all its forms across waking, dreaming, deep
sleep, and meditative states of awareness” [28] (pp.
15-16). Access consciousness, on the other hand, is
characterized by the availability of perceptual infor-
mation for use in a wide-range of cognitive tasks such
as reporting its content, or reasoning or acting on
the bases of it [78, 80]. The mainstream perspec-
tive in neuroscience is largely based on access con-
sciousness, as this is associated with the verbal re-
ports or other behavioral responses that can be mea-
sured in the lab—we will briefly discuss this below.
On the other hand, recent developments in neurophe-
nomenology have placed a focus on phenomenal con-
sciousness, leading to an alternative characterization
of consciousness that we will discuss further below.
Except when specified otherwise, here the term con-
sciousness refers to phenomenal consciousness since
this is our focus here.
This neurophenomenological framework tries to
parallel the way we have reached our current fun-
damental understanding of the physical world, which
has been possible in part because physics does not
constraint itself a priori to what is believed to be
“normal”. Rather, there is a constant push for more
and more refined techniques of exploration of the phe-
nomena to be studied. Furthermore, qualitatively dif-
ferent phenomena usually requires qualitatively dif-
ferent exploration techniques—e.g., microscopes for
the very small and telescopes for the very far. This
approach has revealed that our ordinary concepts of,
e.g., space, time, and matter are only approximately
valid in a narrow “normal” range of observation, be-
yond which things become much subtler and counter-
intuitive. Furthermore, such subtler and counter-
intuitive phenomena are considered more fundamen-
tal than the “normal” phenomena, not the other way
around, because they are based on more refined ex-
ploration techniques that allow for a wider range of
observation.
The main phenomena investigated in the science
of consciousness is subjective experience. So, refined
techniques for the exploration of the phenomenal
world, beyond the narrow range considered “normal”
today, may be required to push towards a more fun-
damental understanding of consciousness. Consider-
ing what we have learned from the physical world,
we should be prepared to find counter-intuitive phe-
nomena which may defy our current assumptions and
perhaps be difficult to grasp. One such refined tech-
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nique for exploring the phenomenal world is medi-
tation. Advance meditative techniques can lead to
absorptions into so-called “altered” states of con-
sciousness, as opposed to what we consider “normal”
today [28, 41, 55, 81], which indeed suggest some
counter-intuitive phenomena. Interestingly, there ap-
pears to be some common core concepts underlying
some counter-intuitive aspects of both the physical
and the phenomenal world, e.g., relationalism (see
below).
Although some of the most refined first-person
methods known to date, e.g., meditation, has been
typically used by contemplative traditions like Bud-
dhism, this is not to be read as an attempt to bring
“mysticism” into science. Quite the contrary, it can
be read as an attempt to bring the rigor of science
to the utilization of these methods, if possible, which
may be of great benefit to society. Paraphrasing Neil
deGrasse Tyson, perhaps we may know enough to
think we are right about everything regarding these
traditions, but not enough to realize that we may
have missed or misunderstood some scientifically use-
ful and relevant points.
The 14th Dalai Lama, who has been actively par-
ticipating in regular conversations between leading
scientists and contemplative practitioners, has mani-
fested a rather scientific attitude in this regard (em-
phasis ours):
My confidence in venturing into science lies in
my basic belief that as in science so in Buddhism,
understanding the nature of reality is pursued
by means of critical investigation: if scientific
analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain
claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must
accept the findings of science and abandon those
claims. (Ref. [82], pp. 2-3)
Since the language used by these traditions may
seem confusing, it is useful to focus on the actual
meaning of the words used and the context in which
they are used. It is also useful not to disregard the
whole tradition because we find something we com-
pletely disagree with. Fortunately, some philosophers
and scientists have made a great effort to cut through
the language and extract those aspects that could be
relevant for science. We discuss some of them here.
We start by reviewing some of the main reasons
provided by Thompson [27, 28], Velmans [26], and
Bitbol [29] to argue that there is both a primacy
of the physical and a primacy of the phenomenal.
We also discuss why this suggests that a more fun-
damental scientific description of nature should put
both the physical and the phenomenal in an equal,
though relational or non-dual footing. This more
fundamental description should avoid the extremes
of solipsism, panpsychism, dualism, and bare mate-
rialism. We then move on to discuss Thompson’s
neurophenomenological framework for (phenomenal)
consciousness. Afterwards, we review some prelim-
inary ideas on the potential physical correlates of
“consciousness-as-such”, “pure awareness” or “non-
dual awareness”. We finally provide a brief summary
of the main points relevant for our final discussion on
the potential parallels with our approach.
1. Interdependence of the physical and the
phenomenal
Here we present some insights from the field of phe-
nomenology related to how the scientific method is
actually performed in practice. To proceed, it may
be useful to temporarily put aside all our assump-
tions, no matter how accurate they may seem, and
try to “describe the real factual situation”, as ad-
vised by Einstein. To begin, Bitbol [29] argues that
experience plays a more fundamental role in science
than usually acknowledged:
An analysis of ordinary and scientific knowl-
edge shows us that objective domains of knowl-
edge are elaborated in two steps, with con-
scious experience as an implicit departure point.
Firstly, one progressively pushes aside any fea-
ture of experience on which conscious subjects
cannot agree, such as individual tastes, commu-
nity values, or the emotional tinge which is asso-
ciated by individuals and communities with par-
ticular situations. Secondly, one only retains a
sort of structural residue of conscious experience
that can be the object of a consensus, and of a
collectively efficient use as a predictive tool. At
its most abstract, this structural residue is math-
ematical; but it can also consist of general propo-
sitions stating various types of relations between
entities and predicates, such as “brains are bio-
electrical organs made of neurons and glial cells”.
(Ref. [29])
As an illustration of this process of “objectifi-
cation”, Bitbol discusses how thermodynamic vari-
ables such as temperature and pressure have been
extracted from their experiential basis:
In the beginning, there were bodily “sen-
sations”, ordinary practices, and an overabun-
dance of qualitative observations about color of
metals, fusion or ebullition of materials, expan-
sion of liquids according to whether they are cold
or hot etc. Heat and temperature were hardly
distinguished from one another, and from the
feeling of hotness. As for pressure, it was lit-
tle more than a name for felt strain on the skin.
But, progressively, a new network of quantitative
valuations emerged from this messy experiential
background, together with the laws that connect
them (such as the ideal gas law). Even though
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sensations of hotness and strain still acted as a
root and as a last resort for these valuations, they
slipped farther and farther away from attention,
being the deeper but less reliable stratum in a
growingly organized series of criteria for assess-
ing thermodynamic variables. At a certain point,
the sensation of hotness no longer played the role
of an implicit standard at all; it was replaced
by phase transitions of water taken as references
for a scale of variable dilatations in liquid ther-
mometers. This scale, which posits a strict order
relation of temperatures, replaced the mixture of
non-relational statements of hot or cold and par-
tial order relation of hotter and colder which tac-
tile experience together with qualitative observa-
tion of materials afford. Accordingly, the visual
experience of graduation readings, or rather the
invariant of many such visual perceptions, was
given priority over the tactile experience of hot-
ness. Later on, when the function “Heat” was
clearly distinguished from the variable “temper-
ature”, and its variation defined as the prod-
uct of the “heat capacity” times the variation
of temperature, tactile experience was submit-
ted to systematic criticism: the feeling of hotness
was now considered as a complex and confused
outcome of heat transfer between materials of
unequal heat capacities and the skin, and also of
the physiological state of the subject. From then
on, declarations about tactile experience, which
had acted initially as the tacit basis of any ap-
praisal of thermic phenomena, were pushed aside
and locked up in the restrictive category of so-
called “subjective” statements [83]. (Ref. [29])
Furthermore, Bitbol argues that we tend to forget
the long scientific process and to take its “end result”
as the starting point, the “objective truth” out of
which the actual starting point of the process, i.e.,
subjective experience, has to be derived (emphasis
his):
The creators of objective knowledge become
so impressed by its efficacy that they tend to for-
get or to minimize that conscious experience is
its starting point and its permanent requirement.
They tend to forget or to minimize the long his-
torical process by which contents of experience
have been carefully selected, differentiated, and
impoverished, so as to discard their personal or
parochial components and to distillate their uni-
versal fraction as a structure. They finally turn
the whole procedure upside down, by claiming
that experience can be explained by one of its
structural residues. Husserl severely criticized
this forgetfulness and this inversion of priorities,
that he saw as the major cause of what he called
the “crisis” of modern science [84]. According to
him, it is in principle absurd to think that one
can account for subjective conscious experience
by way of certain objects of science, since objec-
tivity has sprung precisely from what he calls the
“life-world” of conscious experience. (Ref. [29])
Bitbol finally provides a series of suggestions to de-
velop an alternative framework or stance. In par-
ticular, he invites us to reflect on how “objectivity”
arises from intersubjective debate, the role of inter-
subjectivity as a common ground for the investiga-
tion of both the phenomenal and the physical worlds,
and how a systematic training of experience—e.g.,
via meditation or bio-feedback—could potentially ex-
pand the basis of possible intersubjective agreement
(see original for Bitbol’s references to other works):
[First, s]how how objectivity arises from a
universally accepted procedure of intersubjective
debate. Do not construe it as a transcendent re-
source of which intersubjective consensus is only
an indirect symptom. Draw inspiration from a
careful reflection about physics: either from the
process of emergence of objective temperature
valuations from an experiential underpinning...
or from the model of quantum mechanics con-
strued as a science of inter-situational predictive
invariants rather than a science of “objects” in
the ordinary sense of the word.... Then, rec-
ognize that intersubjectivity should be endowed
with the status of a common ground for both
phenomenological reports and objective science.
Start from this common ground in order to elab-
orate the amplified variety of knowledge that re-
sults from embedding phenomenological reports
and objective findings within a unique struc-
ture...
[Second, d]o not rely on a minimal and most
elementary form of intersubjective consent, but
try to amplify the criteria of intersubjective un-
derstanding by refining the stability and sharp-
ness of subjective experience. After all, the rea-
son why numerical values and ratios are privi-
leged as objects of intersubjective agreement is
likely to be the fact that they are not too difficult
to be agreed upon, even among subjects with a
poorly cultivated experience. But if experience
is systematically trained and educated, either in
the first person by meditation, or in the second
person by making explicit unsuspected features
of experience in dialogue, or in a combination of
first- and third-person modes by bio-feedback,
the basis of possible intersubjective consensus is
likely to expand beyond recognition. (Ref. [29])
Velmans [26] reaches similar conclusions by an-
alyzing the roles played by human beings in psy-
chophysics experiments, wherein an experimentalist
“objectively” observes a subject “subjectively” expe-
riencing, e.g., images. He asks what makes a hu-
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man being a “subject” (S) and another an “exper-
imenter” (E) and finds no fundamental distinction
(see Appendix F 3 c). Like Bitbol, Velmans notices
that without first-person “experiences” there cannot
be third-person “observations” and therefore no sci-
ence (emphasis his):
Although reductionists pretend other-
wise,“external observers” are also “experiencing
subjects” and “experiencing subjects” are also
“external observers”. In a typical psychophysi-
cal experiment they simply play different roles.
External observers are normally interested in
events external to themselves (for example the
mental states of other people) and consequently
focus on what their observations (of other
people) represent. Subjects are typically asked
to focus on the nature of the experiences them-
selves. However, in terms of phenomenology
there is no difference between a given individ-
ual’s “observations” and “experiences”... Your
visual observations and visual experiences of
this [article], for example, are one and the same.
One cannot reduce first-person experiences to
third-person observations for the simple reason
that, without first-person experiences one can-
not have third-person observations. Empirical
science relies on the “evidence of the senses”.
Eliminate experiences and you eliminate science!
(Ref. [26], p. 316)
Usually we take observations of measuring devices
as “public” and those reported by subjects in psy-
chological experiments as “private”. However, Vel-
mans points out that observations of measuring de-
vices are, strictly speaking, “private” experiences sci-
entists have. It is just that we take it for granted that
if scientists report the same “private” experience of
the measuring device, then the corresponding obser-
vations are the same. However, since scientists cannot
directly access the experiences of each other, but only
their reports, there is no way for them to be certain
that their experiences of the measuring device are ac-
tually similar. Strictly speaking, we cannot rule out
the possibility that they might be lying to each other.
We may argue against Velmans that natural selection
might in principle eliminate the liars in the long-term,
or that liars could perhaps be forced to tell the truth
by asking them to place bets—like in QBism. But
the point remains: scientific observations are strictly
speaking experiences (emphasis his):
[The experimenter (E) and the subject (S)]
know what it is like to have their own experi-
ences, but they can only access the experiences
of others indirectly via their verbal descriptions
or nonverbal behaviour. This applies to all ob-
served phenomena [including physical phenom-
ena, e.g., a pointer in a measuring device] ...
As E does not have direct access to S’s expe-
rience of the [pointer] and vice versa, there is
no way for E and S to be certain that they
have a similar experience (whatever they might
claim). E might nevertheless infer that S’s ex-
perience is similar to his own on the assumption
that S has similar perceptual apparatus, operat-
ing under similar observation arrangements, and
on the basis of S’s similar observation reports.
S normally makes similar assumptions about E.
It is important to note that this has not im-
peded the development of physics and other nat-
ural sciences, which simply ignore the problem
of “other minds” (uncertainty about what other
observers actually experience). They just take
it for granted that if observation reports are the
same, then the corresponding observations are
the same. The success of natural science testifies
to the pragmatic value of this approach...
Ironically, psychologists have often agonised
over the merits of observation reports when pro-
duced by subjects, although, like other scientists,
they take them for granted when produced by ex-
perimenters, on the grounds that the observa-
tions of subjects are “private and subjective”,
while those of experimenters are “public and ob-
jective”. As experimenters do not have access
to each other’s experiences any more than they
have access to the experiences of subjects, this
is a fallacy, as we have seen. Provided that the
observation conditions are sufficiently standard-
ised, the observations reported by subjects can
be made public, intersubjective and repeatable
amongst a community of subjects in much the
same way that observations can be made public,
intersubjective and repeatable amongst a com-
munity of experimenters. This provides an epis-
temic basis for a science of consciousness that
includes its phenomenology. (Ref. [26], pp. 222-
223)
Velmans proposes to formulate the scientific
method in a way that more accurately reflects the
pragmatic features described above. He argues that
in so doing the scientific method could equally ap-
ply to both the investigation of the physical and the
phenomenal worlds (emphasis his):
[O]bservations can be “objective” in the sense
of intersubjective, and the observers can “be ob-
jective” in the sense of being dispassionate, ac-
curate and truthful. Procedures can also “be ob-
jectified” in the sense of being standardised and
explicit. No observations, however, can be objec-
tive in the sense of being observer-free. Looked
at in this way, there is no unbridgeable, epis-
temic gap that separates physical phenomena
from psychological phenomena.
In short, once the empirical method is
stripped of its dualist trappings, it applies as
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much to the science of consciousness as it does
to the science of physics in that it adheres to the
following principle:
If observers E1 to n (or subjects S1 to n) carry
out procedures P1 to n under observation condi-
tions C1 to n they should observe (or experience)
result R
(assuming that E1 to n and S1 to n have simi-
lar perceptual and cognitive systems, that P1 to n
are the procedures which constitute the experi-
ment or investigation, and that C1 to n include
all relevant background conditions, including
those internal to the observer, such as their at-
tentiveness, the paradigm within which they are
trained to make observations and so on).
Or, to put it more simply:
If you carry out these procedures you should
observe or experience these results. [26] (pag.
219).
Notice that this notion of “objective”—which is the
one we use in this work—allows for the possibility to
achive an “objective” description of the phenomenal
world. Like in traditional science—Velmans argues—
to achieve such an “objective” view may require effort
and ingenuity, it may not be obvious at first sight
(emphasis his):
[T]he phenomena of consciousness provide
data that are potentially public, intersubjective
and repeatable. Consequently, the need to use
and develop methodologies appropriate to the
study of such phenomena does not place them
beyond science. Rather, it is part of science.
(Ref. [26], p. 221)
Velmans refers to his approach as “critical phe-
nomenology” to emphasize—in the same spirit of
Varela’s neurophenomenology—the relevance of both
first- and third-person methods:
[C]ritical phenomenology [CP] adopts a form
of “psychological complementarity principle” in
which first-person descriptions of experience
and third-person descriptions of correlated brain
states provide accounts of what is going on in
the mind that are complementary and mutu-
ally irreducible. A complete account of mind
requires both ... [W]hile CP takes subjective ex-
periences to be real, it remains cautious about
the veridical nature of phenomenal reports in
that it assumes neither first- nor third-person re-
ports of phenomena to be incorrigible, complete,
or unrevisable—and it remains open about how
such reports should be interpreted within any
given body of theory.
CP is also open to the possibility that first-
person investigations can be improved by the de-
velopment of more refined first-person investiga-
tive methods, just as third-person investigations
can be improved by the development of more re-
fined third-person methods. CP also takes it as
read that first- and third-person investigations of
the mind can be used conjointly, either providing
triangulating evidence for each other, or in other
instances to inform each other.
Finally, CP is reflexive, taking it for granted
that experimenters have first-person experiences
and can describe those experiences much as their
subjects do. And crucially, experimenters’ third-
person reports of others are based, in the first
instance, on their own first-person experiences...
If this analysis is correct, the “phenomena”
observed by experimenters are as much a part of
the world that they experience as are the “sub-
jective experiences” of subjects. If so, the whole
of science may be thought of as an attempt to
make sense of the phenomena that we observe or
experience. (Ref. [26], pp. 228-229)
In our view, grounding the whole of science on ex-
perience is somehow analogous to the way λ-Calculus
grounds the whole of computation on strings (see Ap-
pendix H 2). λ-Calculus indicates that the distinction
between data and code on which Turing machines rely
is only apparent and unnecessary (see Fig. 15). Such
a distinction is similar to the distinction between “ob-
jective” observations and “subjective” experiences. It
may facilitate analysis and communication but per-
haps it is unnecessary if we expand the domain of sci-
ence to incorporate the whole of experience, includ-
ing “objective” observations as a particular case—as
Bitbol suggested above. By explicitly incorporating
both scientists and the world they investigate into a
single, relational framework, such a reflexive or man-
ifestly self-referential science should allow a form of
self-referential experiments, where scientists can rig-
orously investigate themselves via, e.g., meditation or
bio-feedback. This would be similar to the way string
can operate on themselves in λ-Calculus. We expect
our approach could serve as a step in this direction.
In principle, scientists could achieve
“objectivity”—in Velmans’ sense—about their
own experiences much like mathematicians agree on
the proof of a theorem [85]. Mathematicians can
do this even though theorems are mental constructs
that, strictly speaking, cannot be shown to others in
the same way we show a pointer in an experimental
device. Indeed, some meditative traditions have
been exploring for centuries such a kind of rigorous
communication protocols about personal conscious
experiences [27, 28, 85]. Moreover, such math-like
intersubjective agreements can be compared to
third-person measurements of the corresponding
physical correlates, for instance, as an alternative
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way to cross-check them. On this regard, the 14th
Dalai Lama says:
A comprehensive scientific study of con-
sciousness must therefore embrace both third-
person and first-person methods: it cannot ig-
nore the phenomenological reality of subjective
experience but must observe all the rules of sci-
entific rigor: So the critical question is this:
Can we envision a scientific methodology for the
study of consciousness whereby a robust first-
person method, which does full justice to the
phenomenology of experience, can be combined
with objectivist perspective of the study of the
brain?
Here I feel a close collaboration between mod-
ern science and the contemplative traditions,
such as Buddhism, could prove beneficial. Bud-
dhism has a long history of investigation into the
nature of the mind and its various aspects—this
is effectively what Buddhist meditation and its
critical analysis constitute. Unlike that of mod-
ern science, Buddhisms approach has been pri-
marily from first-person experience. The con-
templative method, as developed by Buddhism,
is an empirical use of introspection, sustained by
rigorous training in technique and robust test-
ing of the reliability of experience. All medita-
tively valid subjective experiences must be veri-
fiable both through repetition by the same prac-
titioner and through other individuals being able
to attain the same state by the same practice. If
they are thus verified, such states may be taken
to be universal, at any rate for human beings.
(Ref. [82], p. 134)
Such self-referential experiments might allow sci-
entists to have direct contact with deeper forms of
phenomenal consciousness, which may help them col-
lectiveley identify its universal qualitative features
to guide the search of its physical correlates. Inter-
estingly, in line with Velmans, some traditions like
Buddhism maintain that once meditators achieve an
“objective” view of the world, they realize it is not
“observer-free”—as suggested also by our approach.
In the next subsection we discuss a poten-
tially more fundamental, though admittedly counter-
intuitive, framework for phenomenal consciousness
proposed by Thompson [28] based on reports from
advanced meditators (see also Ref. [56]). Like Vel-
mans, Thompson also proposes a non-dual scientific
framework, building partly on Bitbol’s ideas. While
Velmans elaborates on the scientific method in a way
we find rather systematic, Thompson elaborates on
phenomenal consciousness in a way we find quite pro-
found.
Thompson notices that scientific evidence strongly
suggests that consciousness is contingent upon phys-
ical phenomena, i.e., its neural correlates. In this
sense there is a primacy of the physical. However, he
argues that, strictly speaking, there is also an epis-
temological and methodological primacy of the phe-
nomenal [27, 28]: without consciousness there is no
observation and without observation there is no data;
everything perceived, believed, theorized, researched,
intersubjectively agreed upon, and known is done so
by conscious observers [27]. In Thompson’s words:
[T]he implicit departure point and always-
present background condition for science is our
concrete, sensuous experience of the life-world.
In creating classical science, we set aside features
of this kind of experience that vary individually
and cannot be made the object of a stable con-
sensus. Using logic and mathematics, we create
an abstract and formal representation of certain
invariant and structural features of what we ex-
perience under rigorously controlled conditions
that we impose, and this formal model becomes
an object of consensus and the basis for an objec-
tive description. [... S]cientific models are distil-
lations of our embodied experience as observers,
modelers, and interveners. [... S]cientific knowl-
edge is not the exhibition of the nature of reality
as it is in itself; it is an expression of the relation
between our embodied cognition and the world
that it purports to know. (Ref. [27], p. xxvii).
We can implement the so-obtained models via tech-
nological devices to intervene, manipulate, measure,
and control phenomena as registered in conscious ex-
perience. In this sense, “lived experience is the point
of departure and return for the production of objec-
tive knowledge”. For instance, to develop a quanti-
tative approach regarding lengths, we select an arbi-
trary conscious experience as a unit of measurement,
e.g., the experience of a platinum bar, and compare
all other related conscious experiences, e.g., a bar of
wood, to that standard. The comparison itself is a
conscious experience too.
Now, precisely because of its third-person, objec-
tive approach, it seems quantitative science can only
deal with the contents of consciousness, which can
be compared among them, not with consciousness as
such—according to Thompson, consciousness cannot
be objectified, because it is that by which any ob-
ject shows up for us at all. We can never step outside
consciousness to see how it measures up to something
else. In this sense, consciousness is like space: we
can develop quantitative accounts of the objects “in”
space by comparing them among themselves, but we
cannot step outside space to compare it to something
else. However, much as we have indirectly learned
about space by studying the objects “in” space, we
can in principle learn about subjective experience by
investigating how scientists can establish an “objec-
tive” science out of their multiple subjective perspec-
tives, as we argue in this work.
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Thompson also challenges the common view that
consciousness is nothing other than a brain process,
i.e., that every conscious experience is identical to
some pattern of brain activity:
Neuroscience itself doesn’t demonstrate this
identity; rather, the identity is a metaphysical
interpretation of what neuroscience does show,
namely, the contingency or dependence of cer-
tain kinds of mental events on certain kinds of
neuronal events. In every neuroscience exper-
iment on consciousness, the evidence is always
of the co-occurrence of mental events and neu-
ronal events, and that isn’t sufficient to establish
their identity. Even the causal manipulations,
strictly speaking, go both ways, from neuronal
events to mental events and from mental events
to neural ones. We can alter a person’s men-
tal states by acting on her brain (through direct
electrical brain stimulation, drugs, surgery, and
so on), and we can alter a person’s brain activity
by acting on her mental states (by asking her to
imagine something, by having her direct her at-
tention in a certain way, and so on). (Ref. [28],
pp. 101-102).
However, Thompson argues that we cannot infer
from the epistemological primacy of consciousness
that it has ontological primacy in the sense of being
the primary reality out of which everything is com-
posed or the ground from which everything is gener-
ated. That the world we know is always a world for
consciousness does not entail that the world is made
out of consciousness.
In summary, for Thompson we can never step out-
side consciousness when investigating and knowing
the physical world, and consciousness never shows up
independently of some physical basis. In this sense,
there is both a primacy of the physical and a pri-
macy of the phenomenal. From this perspective, and
in line with relationalism, the physical and the phe-
nomenal could be said to co-emerge in relationship to
each other, i.e., in a non-dual way, like two sheaves of
reeds propping each other up [28]. Hence, Thompson
invites us to explore non-dual frameworks that can
hold these two points of view, the physical and the
phenomenal, without privileging one over the other
(emphasis ours):
Since consciousness by nature is experien-
tial, and experience is primary and ineliminable,
consciousness cannot be reductively explained in
terms of what is fundamentally or essentially
nonexperiential, like classical science. Yet clas-
sical science, as well as much (though not all) of
modern science, has conceived of physical phe-
nomena as being fundamentally, in themselves,
essentially devoid of any relation to anything ex-
periential. Bridging from nature so conceived to
consciousness is an impossible task, for the two
concepts mutually exclude each other...
[T]he scientific concept of matter may need
to be modified in order to account for the ulti-
mately nondual relationship between conscious-
ness and matter, that is, for the way that “sub-
tle consciousness” [i.e. non-dual awareness] and
“subtle energy” [i.e. the hypothesized physical
basis of non-dual awareness] are contingent upon
each other. In my view, this proposal is best
understood not as pointing back to something
like nineteenth-century “vitalism”, according to
which living things posses a special nonphysical
element or substance, but instead as pointing to-
ward the need to rethink what we mean by “phys-
ical” so that physical being is understood as natu-
rally including, at its most fundamental level, the
potential for consciousness or experiential being.
(Ref. [28], pp. 103-104)
Our approach suggests the mere potential for ex-
perience is already incorporated at the most funda-
mental levels of the physical world. So, we may not
need to rethink what we mean by “physical”, but to
more carefully consider the implications of the quan-
tum nature of the universe. We will discuss the ex-
pressions “non-dual awareness” and “subtle energy”
in the quote above in the next two subsections. Im-
portantly, Thompson makes clear he is advocating for
neither dualism nor panpsychism, but for a non-dual
framework (emphasis ours):
Dualism says that matter and consciousness
have totally different natures; panpsychism says
that every physical phenomenon possesses some
measure of experience as part of its intrinsic na-
ture. Neither position is attractive to me [since
they don’t sit well with scientific evidence...]
[W]e need to work our way to a new under-
standing [that] would replace our present dualis-
tic concepts of consciousness and physical being,
which exclude each other from the start, with a
nondualistic framework in which physical being
and experiential being imply each other or de-
rive from something that is neutral between them.
(Ref. [28], pp. 104-105)
Up to now we have discussed the relationalism
between the physical and the phenomenal world.
However, according to the Madhyamaka school of
Buddhism, relationalism in principle characterizes all
phenomena (see Appendix H 2 b). This is usually re-
ferred to as “dependent arising”. Thompson [28] de-
scribes that, according to the Madhyamaka school of
Buddhism, dependent arising happens at three lev-
els. The first one is causal dependence. For instance,
“[i]n the case of a cell, many causes and conditions—
environmental, genetic, metabolic, and so forth—
contribute to its coming into existence, its continu-
ing to exist for a time, and its ceasing to exist” [28]
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(p. 330). The second level is whole/part dependence.
For example, a cell depends on its parts: its mem-
brane, organelles, molecular constituents, etc. But
such parts also depend on the whole: “the specific
metabolic pathways and molecules they synthesize
depend on the functioning of the entire cell for their
existence, for these pathways and molecules can’t per-
sist for long outside the special environment the cell
maintains within its membrane. Thus part and whole
co-arise and mutually specify each other” [28] (p.
330).
The third level of dependent arising is conceptual
dependence. Thompson points out that, “[a]ccording
to the subschool of Madhyamaka called Pra¯san˙gika
Madhyamaka, the identity of something as a single
whole depends on how we conceptualize it and refer
to it with a term. We can also add that its iden-
tity depends on a scale of observation. Thus the cell
has no intrinsic identity independent of a conceptual
scheme and scale of observation that individuate it as
a unit” [28] (p. 330). For instance, “[o]n one level,
cells are indivisible things; on another, they dissolve
into a frenzied, self-organizing dance of smaller com-
ponents” [63]. More precisely (emphasis ours):
What we mark off as a system depends on our
cognitive frame of reference and the concepts we
have available.
Such conceptual dependence doesn’t mean
that nothing exists apart from our words and
concepts, or that we make up the world with
our minds. On the contrary, in order to desig-
nate something as a cell or as a fluid, or more
generally as a system of whatever kind, there
must be some basis for that designation in what
we observe. The subtle point, however, is that
what shows up for us as a system of whatever
kind depends not just on a basis of designation
but also on how we conceptualize that basis and
use words to talk about it. For this reason, the
full statement of dependent arising as concep-
tual dependence, according to Pra¯san˙gika Mad-
hyamaka, is that whatever is dependently arisen
depends for its existence on a basis of designa-
tion, a designating cognition, and a term use to
designate it. (Ref. [28], pp. 331-332)
The level of causal dependence is in line with the
focus of science in general, and physics in particular,
on causality. Emergence and complex systems the-
ory, according to Thompson, is conceptually related
to the level of part/whole co-dependence. The level
of conceptual dependence is subtler. Our approach
suggests that it might be related to quantum theory,
as we discuss further in Appendix C 5.
2. A potential road to a more fundamental
understanding of consciousness
The discussion in the previous subsection suggests
it may be possible to investigate the phenomenal
world with the same rigor that the physical world has
been investigated. This requires the development of
refined first-person methods and rigorous, standard-
ized protocols to reach intersubjective agreement and
establish “objectivity”. Here we discuss Thompson’s
recent neurophenomenological framework for (phe-
nomenal) consciousness, which attempts to do this.
As this framework contrasts with that of mainstream
access consciousness neuroscience, we first briefly dis-
cuss the latter.
a. Mainstream perspective: unconscious, conscious,
and self-related processes
Access consciousness aligns with the mainstream
view that consciousness is the outcome of a process
of increasing cognitive complexity: “raw data” com-
ing, e.g., from the external world are processed un-
consciously in order to “extract” high-level features
that might afterwards become consciously accessible.
From this perspective, consciousness “emerges” at
the end of such a process.
Indeed, some mainstream perspectives in access
consciousness neuroscience [1] posit three levels of in-
formation processing. First, it is possible for a hu-
man subject to react to subliminal information even
though she reports being unaware of it —this is re-
ferred to as unconscious processing and is sometimes
associated to “feature extraction”. Second, conscious
access takes place when information presented to a
human subject enters her awareness and becomes re-
portable to others. Finally, some processes may refer
to self-related tasks—e.g., self-monitoring.
b. Neurophenomenological perspective: non-dual
awareness, contents of awareness, and self-awareness
Instead of going from the unconscious to the con-
scious via increasing cognitive complexity, as in main-
stream access consciousness neuroscience, Thomp-
son’s framework in a sense goes in the reverse di-
rection. Based on insights from the rigorous investi-
gation of the phenomenal world enabled by medita-
tive techniques, Thompson suggests that (phenome-
nal) consciousness, at its most fundamental level, is
totally devoid of cognitive complexity. We now dis-
cuss Thompson’s framework in detail.
In everyday life, at ordinary scales of observation,
the physical world appears to be composed of sepa-
rated objects with well-defined properties which in-
teract among them, space appears to be independent
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FIG. 4: Lucid dreaming and non-dual awareness: In normal (non-lucid) dreams we, the self-as-dreamer, usually identify
with the dream body, or self-as-dreamed. Here we illustrate this both from an external (A) and an internal (B)
perspective. The dashed box in (B) represents the internal perspective of the self-as-dreamer. The identification of the
self-as-dreamer with the self-as-dreamed is represented with dotted arrows. However, both the self-as-dreamed and the
world (here a dog) are manifestations of our dreaming mind with associated neural correlates. In a lucid dream we can
in principle become aware that we are dreaming. Furthermore, we can become aware that the self-as-dreamed is not
who we really are, no matter how convincing, or ‘real’, this seems to be before we reach lucidity. Instead, our sense of
self can encompass the awareness of the whole dream state—dashed box in (B). The whole dream state is composed
of both the self-as-dreamed and the world (here a dog), which contrasts with the usual dual perspective that frames
our dreaming experience as ‘I am here and the world is there’. In this sense, this is a form of non-duality. Something
similar can in principle happen in the waking state. We might say that we can become aware that both the sense of
self and the world we perceived in the waking state are both produced by the corresponding neural correlates taking
place “inside us”. Of course, we may not experience the neural correlates themselves, but since these are associated to
mind states, we might equally say that we become aware that the sense of self and the world are both manifestations
of the mind. Images of head and dog taken from Christof Koch—an exact copy of Figure 1.1 in Ref. [86] [CC BY-SA
3.0].
of time, and space and time appear to be indepen-
dent of matter. In particular, the intuition that the
physical world is made up of separated objects with
well defined properties is implicit in the search for the
“fundamental particles” out of which all other objects
are composed.
However, after we learned to develop more refined
techniques of observation to transcend our senses, we
also learned that the physical world usually defies
common sense. Space and time are not independent
of each other; according to the special theory of rela-
tivity they form a single entity—spacetime. Not even
spacetime is a separate entity; according to the gen-
eral theory of relativity it depends on matter which
in turn is influenced by spacetime. The “fundamen-
tal particles” described by quantum physics do not
look like ordinary objects, e.g., they depend on the
way we observe them—so, strictly speaking, we can-
not say these are (outer) observations of an observer-
independent physical world [87–89]. So, contrary to
everyday intuition, the physical world at its most fun-
damental level seems to be relational [32, 75]. This
includes, in particular, the interdependence or re-
lationalism between the observer and the observed
seemingly implied by quantum physics.
Similarly, the world of phenomenal experience, or
the phenomenal world, in everyday life appears to
be composed of separated “entities”. For instance,
there seems to be a pre-existing world “out there”
and a separated pre-existing subject “in here” that
perceives it. But, given the lessons we have learned
from science, should we uncritically accept this as the
way the phenomenal world is and reject a priori any
attempt to explore this in a more rigorous way? Or
should we first look for more refined exploration tech-
niques to confirm whether this is actually the case?
Indeed, the field of neurophenomenology com-
bines the tools of neuroscience with refined tech-
niques of observation of the phenomenal world de-
veloped by some millenarian traditions, i.e., medi-
tation techniques—although, strictly speaking, med-
itation cannot be considered either as the (inner)
observation of an observer-independent phenomenal
world [27]. Interestingly, some advanced meditation
techniques has also led to the conclusion that, at
its most fundamental level, the phenomenal world
too is relational (see Appendix H 2 b). This in-
cludes, in particular, the interdependence or rela-
tionalism between subject and object, also referred
to as subject/object non-duality, implicit in the “al-
tered state” of consciousness called “non-dual aware-
ness” [28, 41, 57, 58, 60, 90] (see Appendix H 2 c).
Non-dual awareness has been recently defined in a
Nature Reviews Neuroscience article [61] as “a state
of awareness in which perceived dualities, such as
the distinction between subject and object, are ab-
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sent”. Recently, scientists like Christof Koch [91]
(see ch. 10 therein) and Thomas Metzinger [41] have
joined the efforts of Evan Thompson and the late
Francisco Varela, among others, to tackle the con-
cept of non-dual awareness. Due to its relatively low
cognitive complexity, non-dual awareness has been
suggested [41, 92] to be to consciousness studies as
the E. coli is to biology, i.e., it may be among the
simplest versions of consciousness and so can be a
source of insight that is simpler to investigate. In
a Trends in Cognitive Science article [90], Richard
J. Davidson and collaborators identify “non-dual ori-
ented practices”, which can in principle lead to the
experience of non-dual awareness, as “designed to
elicit an experiential shift into a mode of experienc-
ing in which the cognitive structures of self/other and
subject/object are no longer the dominant mode of
experience”. Non-dual awareness is also referred to
as “pure awareness”, “pure consciousness”, “pure ex-
perience”, “luminous awareness”, “subtle conscious-
ness”, “consciousness-as-such”, “minimal phenome-
nal experience”, among others [28, 41, 57, 58, 60, 90].
Here we will mostly stick to the expressions non-dual
awareness or consciousness-as-such.
Before discussing further the admittedly subtle
concept of non-dual awareness, let us briefly mention
the experience of lucid dreaming which may serve as
a metaphor for it (see Fig. 4); we will closely fol-
low Thompson [28] (see chapters 4-6 and references
therein for further details; see also Ref. [62]). In
normal—i.e., non-lucid—dreams, dreamers tend to
identify with the dream ego, or self as dreamed, which
often appears in the form of the dream body, and to
take what we experience in the dream as real (see
Fig. 4). In a lucid dream the dreamer can in prin-
ciple become aware that she is dreaming, influence
the dream ego and remember waking life. There is
evidence that the lucid dreamer can communicate—
while lucid dreaming—with scientists in a lab via
movements of the eyes or other parts of the body.
This in principle allows for communication using the
Morse code or to address questions such as “do dream
actions take the same amount of time as waking ac-
tions?” There is also evidence that communication
can go the other way around, i.e., from scientists in
the lab to lucid dreamers by, e.g., stimulation via high
and low tones.
The key point is that in a lucid dream we can be-
come aware that our dream ego, our self as dreamed,
is not who we really are as we usually believe dur-
ing a normal, non-lucid dream (see Fig. 4). Rather,
we can recognize that we encompass the whole dream
state. In other worlds, we can realize that both our
dream ego and the rest of the dream world are actu-
ally manifestations of our own mind. In Thompson’s
words:
When we dream, we see the dreamscape from
the perspective of the dream ego. Although the
entire world of the dream exists only as the con-
tent of our awareness, we identify ourselves with
only a portion of that content—the dream ego
that centers our experience of the dream world
and presents itself as the locus of our awareness
[see Fig. 4].
In a lucid dream, however, we experience an-
other kind of awareness with a different locus.
This awareness witnesses the dream state, but
without being immersed in the dream world the
way the dream ego is. No matter what contents
come and go, including the forms taken by the
dream ego, we can tell they are not the same
as the awareness witnessing the dream state.
From the vantage point this provides, we can
observe dream images precisely as dream im-
ages, i.e., as manifestations of the mind—not
the mind of the dream ego but the mind of the
dreamer who imagines the dream ego. In this
way, we no longer identify only with the ego
within the dream; our sense of self now encom-
passes the witness awareness of the whole dream
state. (Ref. [28], p. 143)
From a neuroscientific perspective, both the dream
ego and the dream world have associated neural cor-
relates. Strictly speaking, according to mainstream
neuroscience, the same is true in the waking state:
both the sense of self and the world that we perceive
have associated neural correlates. Were those neu-
ral correlates to disappear, the sense of self and the
world we perceive would also disappear for us.
In principle, something analogous to the disidentifi-
cation with the dream ego that can happen in a lucid
dream can also happen in the waking state. Although
this might sound strange at first, one way we might
look at this from the perspective of mainstream neu-
roscience is that we can become aware that the sense
of self and the world we perceive are both due to asso-
ciated physical phenomena taking place “inside us”,
i.e., their neural correlates. Even though we may not
actually experience the neural correlates themselves,
these are associated to mental phenomena. So, we
could also say that we can become aware that our
sense of self and the world we perceive in the waking
state are both manifestations of our mind (see Fig. 4).
Importantly, this is not to deny the conventional re-
ality of the sense of self and the world, but to point
out the way such a sense of self and world can ex-
ist for us. From Thompson’s neurophenomenological
perspective (emphasis ours):
In an ordinary dream, we identify with our
dream ego and take what we experience to be
real... Whatever we see or feel seems to ex-
ist apart from us with its own being or intrin-
sic nature. This confused state of mind serves
as a model for our waking ignorance of the na-
ture of reality. We think our waking ego ex-
ists with its own separate and essential nature,
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but this belief is delusional, for our waking ego
is no less an imaginative construction than our
dream ego, formed by imaginatively projecting
ourselves into the past in memory and into the
future in anticipation. The “I-Me-Mine” stand-
ing over against the world as a separate thing
or entity can function as a distorted mental con-
struct in the waking state, not just in dreams.
The dream world and the waking world both
seem real and solid, yet in neither case do we re-
alize that whatever we take to be real and solid
is always a mode of appearance—something that
appears real in one way or another—and that
modes of appearance by their very nature can’t
be separated from the mind.
By contrast, full and complete lucidity—
where we wake up in the dream state and directly
experience it as luminous appearance, empty of
substantiality—offers a traditional metaphor for
liberation and enlightenment [see below]... This
metaphor isn’t mean to deny the conventional re-
ality of the waking world . It aims rather to ef-
fect a fundamental shift in our understanding of
what it means for something to be real. “Real”
is the name we give to certain stable ways that
things appear and continue to appear when we
test them, not the name for some essence hidden
behind or within appearances. (Ref. [28], p. 174)
The insights obtained from the rigorous investiga-
tion of the phenomenal world suggests a shift in per-
spective which does not necessarily contradict the sci-
entific knowledge accumulated to date. Indeed, our
derivation of a quantum formalism by explicitly mod-
eling scientists doing science provides evidence that
such a shift in perspective can be completely compat-
ible with our current scientific knowledge.
Thompson discusses a technique called “dream
yoga” which is said to help have lucid dreams in order
to practice meditation in the dream state. This kind
of meditation is considered as a powerful method for
learning to recognize the state of non-dual awareness.
He suggests lucid dreaming and dream yoga offers a
way to investigate consciousness disentangled from
current sensory input, and envisions a new science of
dreaming [28, 62]. In Thompson’s words (emphasis
ours):
Meditative lucid dreaming or “dream yoga”
brings contemplative insight into the dream
state. For centuries Tibetan Buddhists have cul-
tivated dream yoga as a practice of mental trans-
formation. Combining their ancient practices
with modern methods of lucid dream commu-
nication, we can envision a new kind of dream
science that integrates dream psychology, neuro-
science, and dream yoga.
But dream yoga doesn’t just offer new tools
for dream science. It strikes deeper by chal-
lenging the assumption that reality is indepen-
dent of the mind. Dream yoga asks us to view
waking experience as a dream while also teach-
ing us how to wake up within the dream state.
In this way... [D]ream yoga tries to show us
how the waking world is not outside and sepa-
rate from our minds; it is brought forth and en-
acted through our imaginative perception of it.
(Ref. [28], pp 164-165)
We now return to the discussion of non-dual aware-
ness. There is evidence that the state of lucid dream-
ing can be paralleled by a form of lucidity in deep
and dreamless sleep [28, 62]. This state of deep and
dreamless sleep is not only devoid of the self-other
distinction required for experiencing oneself as sepa-
rate from the world, but also from any kind of content
altogether. So, it is in principle possible to experience
a form of non-dual awareness during lucid deep and
dreamless sleep [28, 42, 62]. This is said to be possible
also in deep meditative states [28].
It is understandable that some of us may consider
the concept of non-dual awareness perhaps senseless,
counter-intuitive, or to belong to the domain of phi-
losophy or religion rather than science. However, this
does not need to be so. Indeed, similar things could
have been said in the past about the concept of the
origin of the universe. We cannot travel back to that
moment and directly measure what happened. More-
over, not even some physical concepts such as space
and time may have existed at the very moment the
universe originated. However, guided by a theory, we
can deduce certain consequences that we can observe
today like, e.g., cosmic microwave background radia-
tion.
Similarly, although strictly speaking non-dual
awareness is said not to be experienced with a sub-
ject/object structure, it may still be possible, per-
haps guided by a theory, to experience or measure
certain consequences before and after the experi-
ence of non-dual awareness takes place. Indeed,
there has been some recent attempts to character-
ize the concept of non-dual awareness in more scien-
tific terms and to identify its potential physical cor-
relates [28, 41, 42, 58–60, 91].
Thompson argues that the existence of a kind of
awareness in deep and dreamless sleep would chal-
lenge the conscious/unconscious taxonomy used in
mainstream consciousness neuroscience, which tends
to classify deep dreamless sleep as unconscious. In
particular, he emphasizes the distinction between
phenomenal and access consciousness and points out
that what mainstream neuroscience usually considers
as unconscious might actually qualify as phenome-
nally conscious. In Thompson words (emphasis his):
Consciousness can mean awareness in the
sense of subjective experience [i.e., phenomenal
consciousness] or awareness in the sense of cog-
nitive access [i.e., access consciousness] [...]
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[Y]ou could be phenomenally aware of some-
thing while lacking cognitive access to that
awareness. Perhaps you experience the image on
the screen, but it went so fast you weren’t able
to form the kind of memory needed for verbal
report of exactly what it was [...]
On way to think about the Indian yogic idea
of subtle consciousness [i.e., non-dual awareness]
is to see it as pointing to deeper levels of phenom-
enal consciousness to which we don’t ordinarily
have cognitive access, especially if our minds are
restless and untrained in meditation. According
to this way of thinking, much of what Western
science and philosophy would describe as uncon-
scious might qualify as conscious, in the sense
of involving subtle levels of phenomenal aware-
ness that could be accessible through meditative
mental training. (Ref. [28], p. 7-8)
Furthermore, Thompson emphasizes that, strictly
speaking, typical approaches in mainstream neuro-
science do not actually address consciousness as such:
[B]inocular rivalry doesn’t give us a contrast
between the presence and absence of conscious-
ness; it give us a contrast between the presence of
a particular visual content within consciousness
and the absence of that content from conscious-
ness. When you’re in a binocular rivalry set up,
you’re awake with a coherent field of awareness,
and you report the coming and going of a par-
ticular content within that field. Your conscious-
ness as such, however, never disappears; on the
contrary, the experimental setup depends pre-
cisely on your being conscious the entire time
and being able to report the changing contents
of your awareness [...]
Given that specific patterns of brain activ-
ity correlate with states deemed to be con-
scious because individuals have cognitive access
to their contents, and thus can report those con-
tents, we infer that these patterns of brain ac-
tivity are reliable neural correlates of conscious-
ness. So, strictly speaking, we’re not corre-
lating consciousness itself with brain activity;
rather, we’re correlating something that we al-
ready take to be a reliable indication or expres-
sion of consciousness—verbal reports or some
other cognitive performance—with brain activ-
ity. (Ref. [28], pp. 64, 98)
After carefully investigating the detailed descrip-
tions of the phenomenal world obtained via re-
fined meditative techniques, Thompson proposes a
three-fold taxonomy of consciousness [28]: (non-
dual) awareness, contents of awareness, and self-
awareness (or self-experience). This taxonomy dif-
fers from the conscious/unconscious one, tradition-
ally assumed in mainstream access consciousness neu-
roscience. Thompson describes awareness as essen-
tially contentless and as that which is the crucial pre-
condition for any content or appearance to manifest
(i.e., it is “luminous”), is able to apprehend those
appearances in one way or another (i.e., it is “know-
ing”), and in so doing is self-appearing and prere-
flectively self-aware‘ (i.e., it is “reflexive”). Further-
more, awareness is non-dual, i.e., it does not poses a
subject-object structure.
3. Non-dual awareness and its potential
physical correlates
With the expression “subtle energy” in Ap-
pendix C 1, Thompson is referring to a conjecture
made by the 14th Dalai Lama at the Massachusetts
Institue of Technology as a concession to neuro-
science, which has not found convincing evidence that
consciousness can be independent of a physical sub-
strate, as Buddhists tend to believe. In this, the Dalai
Lama sticks to his statement that “if scientific analy-
sis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in
Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the find-
ings of science and abandon those claims” [82] (p. 3).
Here we discuss in more detail this potential physical
correlate of non-dual awareness. In Appendix C 5, we
discuss them from the fresh perspective provided by
our approach.
More precisely, the meditative insights reported by
the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions suggest
there are different levels of consciousness. On one
extreme, there is the everyday “gross” consciousness,
which the Dalai Lama readily concedes can certainly
be contingent on the brain. However, at the other
extreme, there is “subtle consciousness”, or non-dual
awareness, which he believes cannot be contingent
on the brain but on more subtle physical processes
(emphasis ours):
Just as there are many different levels of con-
sciousness [the Dalai Lama says], there are many
different levels of energy. Broadly speaking,
from the Vajrayana perspective [considered to
be the highest standpoint, the most precise and
reliable for the phenomenal investigation of the
mind/matter relationship], so long as an event or
phenomenon is a conscious one, it is necessarily
contingent upon a physical event or physical phe-
nomenon. In general, we can make that broad
statement. But it will have to be followed imme-
diately with a “however” clause. The “however”
or caveat is that the physical basis—the energy—
for subtle consciousness is also of a very subtle
kind. It carries all movement or excitation, even
at the level of brain cells. Mental movement is
also due to that energy. So the scientific con-
cept of matter needs to be modified in order to
appreciate this subtle energy.
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One possible avenue [to scientifically inves-
tigate this kind of consiousness], he says, is to
experiment on meditators who are in what the
Tibetan Buddhist tradition calls the “clear light
state”. (Ref. [28], pp. 84-86)
The properties ascribed to such a “subtle energy”
seem to parallel the properties of quantum fluc-
tuations in several respects, as we discuss in Ap-
pendix C 5. Admittedly, this seems far removed from
the traditional perspectives in both mainstream neu-
roscience and contemplative traditions. Thompson
mentions Francisco Varela’s position on the matter:
Shortly before his death, Francisco Varela
talked about the Tibetan Buddhist notion of
“subtle consciousness”... [S]ubtle consciousness
isn’t an individual consciousness; it’s not an or-
dinary “me” or “I” consciousness. It’s sheer
luminuous and knowing awareness beyond any
sensory or mental content. It’s rarely seen by
the ordinary mind, except occasionally in special
dreams, intense meditation, and at the very mo-
ment of death, when one’s ordinary “I” or “me”
consciousness falls apart. It’s the foundation for
every other type of consciousness, and it’s be-
lieved to be independent of the brain. Neuro-
science can’t conceive of this possibility, while
for Tibetan Buddhists it’s unthinkable to dismiss
their accumulated experience testifying to the re-
ality of this primary consciousness...
Varela’s position is to suspend judgement.
Don’t neglect the Buddhist observations and
don’t dismiss what we know from science. In-
stead of trying to seek a resolution or an answer,
contemplate the question and let it sit there.
Have the patience and forbearance to stay with
the open question...
[S]taying with the open question means turn-
ing it around and examining it from all sides,
without trying to force any particular answer or
conclusion. But it also means not being afraid
to follow wherever the argument goes. (Ref. [28],
pp. xxiv-xxv)
Staying with the open question, Thompson allows
himself to conjecture that this subtle energy might be
associated to the electromagnetic fields produced by
living cells, specially the neuroelectrical fields pro-
duced by the brain and the bioelectrical fields pro-
duced by the heart (emphasis ours):
From [a] bioelectrical perspective, evolution
occurs not just in structures, organs, and bodies
but also in dynamic electrical fields. Whereas
life in general comprises the emergence of self-
organizing bioelectrical fields, animal evolution
comprises the emergence of self-organizing neu-
roelectrical fields.
The Dalai Lama [said] that the physical ba-
sis for pure awareness is a subtle energy whose
presence can be felt in the body. This energy
[...] is said to carry all excitation and move-
ment, including at the level of cells. Although
the Dalai Lama suggested that the scientific con-
cept of matter may need to be modified in order
to appreciate this energy, I’m inclined to think
that this energy is already known to science as
the electromagnetic fields produced by living cells,
specially the neuroelectrical fields produced by the
brain and the bioelectrical fields produced by the
heart. What has barely begun to be investigated,
however, is how meditative practices sensitize
one to subtle experiential aspects of these bio-
electrical fields, as well as how these practices
enable one to alter bioelectromagnetic processes
in the brain, the heart, and the rest of the body.
(Ref. [28], pp. 342-344)
Staying with the open question, here we also allow
ourselves to explore how our approach may poten-
tially embodied several of the main points of Thomp-
son neurophenomenological framework (see main text
and Appendix C 5). In so doing, we try not to be
afraid to follow wherever the argument goes. To fa-
cilitate the comparison, we now summarize the main
points discussed up to here.
4. Summary of main points
Here we summarize some of the main ideas we have
discussed at length in Appendices C 1-C 3. Based on
this summary, we will discuss in Appendix C 5 some
potential parallels between these ideas and our ap-
proach. Here by (phenomenal) consciousness we refer
just to subjective experience.
First, as pointed out by Dehaene [93], one of the
main ingredients that has turned (access) conscious-
ness from a “philosophical mystery” into a laboratory
phenomenon is taking subjective or first-person re-
ports seriously. Tononi’s integrated information the-
ory [76], one of the main theories of consciousness,
takes subjectivity so seriously that it “starts from
the essential properties of phenomenal experience,
from which it derives the requirements for the phys-
ical substrate of consciousness”. How to determine
the “essential properties of phenomenal experience”?
One way is to analyze our own everyday phenomenal
experience and compare to what others report from
their own analysis—this is essentially what Tononi
has done (see below).
This focus on everyday experience is analogous to
the focus of early Newtonian physics on everyday
phenomena—e.g., an apple falling from a tree—which
led to the discovery of some general principles—e.g.,
the law of gravity. However, more refined (third-
person) exploration techniques taught us that a more
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fundamental understanding of the physical world de-
fies common sense—think of quantum physics and
Einstein’s theory of relativity. Similarly, it seems
natural to expect that a more fundamental under-
standing of consciousness can be reached if we look
for more refined (first-person) techniques for explor-
ing the phenomenal world, rather than focusing only
on everyday experience. We should be prepared to
find results that defy common sense as well.
The field of neurophenomenology [27, 28, 55] aims
at integrating refined first- and third-person meth-
ods to have a more comprehensive understanding of
consciousness. Although some of the most refined
first-person methods known to date, e.g., meditation,
has been typically used by contemplative traditions
like Buddhism, this is not to be read as an attempt
to bring “mysticism” into science. Quite the con-
trary, it can be read as an attempt to bring the rigor
of science to the utilization of these methods which
may be of great benefit to society. Interestingly, these
more refined first-person methods suggest that, like
the physical world, the phenomenal world appears to
be relational.
Second, there is both a primacy of the physical,
i.e., consciousness never shows up apart from a phys-
ical substrate, and a primacy of the phenomenal, i.e.,
without consciousness there is no observation and
without observation there is no data—furthermore,
the scientific method presupposes consciousness in
that everything perceived, believed, theorized, re-
searched, intersubjectively agreed upon, and known is
done so by conscious observers. In line with this two-
fold primacy, and with the relationalism suggested
by the critical investigation of both the physical and
the phenomenal worlds, Thompson [28]—as well as
Velmans [26] and Bitbol [29]—invites us to search for
a non-dual framework that gives equal weight to the
physical and the phenomenal worlds.
In particular, we should avoid falling into the ex-
treme of solipsism, i.e. assuming that the world is
nothing but a projection of the mind, and the ex-
treme of bare materialism, i.e., assuming that there is
an observer-independent material world—an extreme
that the ultimate quantum nature of the physical
world also suggests should be avoided [87–89]. More-
over, this search should fall neither into the extreme
of dualism, i.e., assuming matter and consciousness
are two intrinsically existing substances with totally
different natures, nor the extreme of panpsychism,
assuming ad hoc that physical particles have “micro-
experiences”. Rather, the sought for non-dual frame-
work should be based on an interdependence of the
physical and the phenomenal that allows these two to
imply each other, like two sheaves of reeds propping
each other up.
Such a framework should not only rely on refined
third-person methods, traditionally used in science,
but also in refined first-person methods, like med-
itation, that can potentially enable a more rigor-
ous and systematic exploration of the phenomenal
world. Velmans [26] argues this could be achieved
if by “objective” we pragmatically mean that proce-
dures are (O1) standardized and explicit, (O2) that
observations are intersubjective and repeatable, and
(O3) that observers are dispassionate, accurate and
truthful—instead of a priori equating “objective” to
“observer-free”. He suggests to formulate the scien-
tific method essentially as “if you carry out these
procedures you should observe or experience these
results”—the act of carrying out the procedures can
itself be seen as an experience. This might ground the
whole of science on experience, with “objective” ob-
servation as a particular case—much like λ-Calculus
grounds the whole of computation on strings only, ef-
fectively eliminating the distinction between data and
code. In such a manifestly self-referential formulation
of science, explorations of the phenomenal world via
refined first-person methods could be considered as
self-referential experiments where scientists investi-
gate themselves—much like strings in λ-Calculus op-
erate on themselves.
Third, relationalism is sometimes referred to as de-
pendent arising in the Madhyamaka school of Bud-
dhism. According to Thompson [28], there are three
levels of dependent arising: (i) causal dependence,
(ii) part/whole dependence, and (iii) conceptual de-
pendence. In short, whatever is dependently arising
(i) depends on causes and conditions to exist, (ii) has
its parts and whole co-arising and mutually specify-
ing each other, and (iii) depends for its existence on
a basis of designation, a designating cognition, and
a term to designate it. Causal dependence is in line
with science in general due to its focus on understand-
ing causality. Thompson suggests that parts/whole
dependence is related to complex systems theory and
emergence. Our approach suggest that conceptual
dependence might be related to quantum theory, as
discussed in Appendix C 5.
Fourth, based on a careful review of some in-
sights obtained from such refined first-person ex-
ploration techniques, Thompson [28] proposes a
three-fold taxonomy of (phenomenal) consciousness:
consciousness-as-such or non-dual awareness, con-
tents of awareness, and self-awareness. This differs
from the unconscious/access-conscious/self-conscious
taxonomy traditionally assumed in mainstream ac-
cess consciousness neuroscience. However, in con-
trast to Thompson’s, neither Dehaene’s nor Tononi’s
frameworks, which are two of the most prominent
theories of access consciousness, are based on these
more refined first-person techniques. In this sense,
Dehaene’s and Tononi’s framework might turn out to
be to Thompson’s framework as Newtonian physics
is to quantum physics. However, Thompson’s frame-
work is much more recent and, unlike Dehaene’s and
Tononi’s, it is not yet formalized into a mathemati-
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cal theory—although we hope our approach may be
a step in this direction (see Appendix C 5).
Non-dual awareness has been defined in a Nature
Reviews Neuroscience article [61] simply as “a state
of awareness in which perceived dualities, such as
the distinction between subject and object, are ab-
sent” (see Fig. 4). However, according to Thompson’s
more thorough characterization [28], non-dual aware-
ness is: “luminous”, i.e., it is the crucial precondition
for any content or appearance to manifest, the mere
potential to become aware of something; “knowing”,
i.e., it is able to apprehend whatever appears; “re-
flexive”, i.e., it is self-appearing and prereflectively
self-aware; contentless, i.e., it is prior to any content
or appearance; non-dual, i.e., it is not experienced in
a subject/object structure; irreducible, i.e., it is the
most fundamental level of consciousness on which all
other forms of consciousness depend, it cannot be ex-
plained in terms of lower-level concepts, it cannot be
objectified or known as an object of observation be-
cause it is the very precondition for any object to
be observed. Finally, the contents of awareness are
whatever we happen to be aware of from moment to
moment, and self-awareness is the experience of some
of the contents of awareness as referring to a self.
Finally, in line with scientific evidence and contrary
to widespread Buddhist belief, the 14th Dalai Lama
points out that the system they consider as the most
precise and reliable for investigating the relationship
between mind and matter suggests there is indeed
a physical basis for non-dual awareness, though it
should be “of a very subtle kind”—a “subtle energy”.
How to interpret this “subtleness” of the physical cor-
relates of non-dual awareness? The subtle energy
referred to by the Dalai Lama could be said to be
all-pervading in that it is said to carry all excitation
and movement, including at the level of cells—in par-
ticular, it should not be constraint to specific neural
systems or the brain only. In a sense, this parallels
the “luminous” quality of non-dual awareness, i.e., its
being always present as a precondition for any phe-
nomenal content to manifest.
Thompson’s conjecture is that such a subtle energy
might be associated to the electromagnetic fields pro-
duced by living cells, which are physical yet, strictly
speaking, not material. Thompson suggests this hy-
pothesis could be tested by measuring how medita-
tion can sensitize one to subtle aspects of these fields
and allow one to alter them. Besides Thompson’s,
there are other recent proposals for the physical cor-
relates of non-dual awareness. For instance, Met-
zinger [41] suggests that it is about the ascending
reticular arousal system, which essentially turns on
the brain. Koch [91] suggests it is about the causal
power of interacting neurons, captured in terms of
integrated information theory [76], that could fire
to generate contents of consciousness but do not.
Josipovic [58, 59] suggests it is about the central pre-
cuneous network, which appears to play a key role in
the global organization of the brain. However, here
we focus on Thompson’s proposal as it is the only one
that appears to be consistent with our approach. We
leave a more thorough comparison for future work.
There are some additional potential aspects of the
physical correlates of non-dual awareness, parallel-
ing some of their phenomenal counterparts, which we
find relevant. Indeed, in the same way that non-dual
awareness cannot be objectified, i.e., made a content
of awareness, nor reduce to lower-level experiences, its
corresponding physical correlates, though of course
physical, should not be reducible to objective, lower-
level physical phenomena. Paralleling the reflexivity
and non-duality of awareness, their physical corre-
lates should be associated to a self-referential process
and integrate subject and object in a relational, in-
terdependent way.
5. Potential parallels with the quantum
formalism
Here we discuss in more detail the potential re-
lationship between the ideas summarized in Ap-
pendix C 4 and our approach (see Table I). In doing
so, we try to follow Varela’s advice to stay with the
open question and avoid being afraid to follow wher-
ever the argument goes. We are aware that the type
of comparison attempted here may understandably
rise a substantial amount of healthy skepticism, an at-
titude that may be reinforced by the many unfounded
claims made in the past on this regard. However, in
contrast to previous claims, our discussion is based
on a concrete and precise conceptual and mathemat-
ical framework and, in this sense, we think, is not
just a shot in the dark. So, our invitation is to have
an attitude like the one that allowed the origin of the
universe to become a subject of scientific discourse.
Moreover, we see a few reasons why we should not
a priori shy away from this discussion. First, there is
recent evidence that humans can be sensitive to single
quanta of light, or photons [66]. There is also some
evidence that certain aspects of human behavior ap-
pear to display some quantum-like features [64, 65]—
which is usually referred to as “quantum cognition”.
This suggests that quantum-like phenomena may not
be that far removed from human experience as pre-
viously thought.
Second, the critical investigation of both the phys-
ical and phenomenal worlds lead to strikingly similar
conclusions, like relationalism, as we have discussed
above. Should we uncritically take this just as a mere
coincidence or should we investigate whether there
is an underlying reason for this to be so—especially,
taking into account that the process of observation
appears to play a key role in both cases?
Finally, the widespread assumption that conscious-
32
Critical investigation of the physical world Critical investigation of the phenomenal world
Methodology Enhancing experimental techniques Enhancing meditative techniques
Logical reasoning Logical reasoning
Intersubjective agreement Math-like intersubjective agreement
Similarities Relationalism, interdependence Relationalism, interdependence
Physical causality Causal dependence
Emergence, complex systems Part/whole dependence
Observations relative to E-observer: Conceptual dependence:● U-observer/observed interaction ● Basis of designation● “Cognition” by E-observer ● Designating cognition● Model of U-observer-observed interaction ● Designating term
“Quantumness”: Non-dual awareness:● Observer/observed interdependence ● Subject/object non-duality● All-pervasive fluctuations ● All-pervasive awareness● Irreducible to lower-level physical phenomena ● Irreducible to lower-level phenomenal experiences● Involves self-reference ● Reflexive● Can refer to “the vacuum” ● Can be contentless
Differences Primacy of the physical—but observer-dependent Primacy of the phenomenal—but “subtle energy”
associated
Public—though in principle inferred from invari-
ants of private experiences.
Private—though in principle inferable from publicly
available physical correlates
TABLE I: Critical investigation of the physical and phenomenal worlds: Here we summarize some potential parallels
and discrepancies suggested by the critical investigation of the physical and phenomenal worlds, as well as our approach
(see Appendices C 4 and C 5).
ness emerges from “matter” rests on whatever defini-
tion of “matter” physics may provide. However, the
fundamentally quantum nature of the physical world,
strictly speaking, suggests a concept of “matter” far
removed from the ordinary concept we may find “nor-
mal” in everyday life. Indeed, there is a kind of cir-
cularity in the statement that consciousness emerge
from “matter” because, according to quantum the-
ory, at the most fundamental level, whatever we call
“matter” depends on how we observe it [29].
Our approach indicates that we can take experience
as the starting point of science—as suggested by Vel-
mans [26], Bitbol [29] and Thompson [28]—and still
be consistent with current scientific knowledge. In
this view, what is inconsistent with science is not ex-
perience itself, but experience that is not “objective”
in Velmans’ sense. Scientific observations effectively
amount at “objective” experiences. Indeed, we use
Velmans’ notion of “objectivity” to obtain a quan-
tum formalism, as we have restricted our approach
to those experiences that are “objective”. In other
words, we have focused on scientists investigating sci-
entists.
Additionally, our approach seems to be consis-
tent with the notion of conceptual dependence, the
third level of dependent arising. More precisely, it
suggests that scientifically observed phenomena may
depend for its existence on a basis of designation,
a designating cognition, and a term use to desig-
nate it. Figure 1A in the main text shows the in-
teraction between an embodied scientist (Wigner’s
friend, an U-observer) and an experimental system—
this could be consider as the basis of designation for
the phenomenon observed. However, this interac-
tion is “modelled” or “cognized” by another observer
(Wigner, an E-observer)—this could be considered
as the designating cognition. Wigner’s “model” it-
self might be consider the symbol or “term” use to
designate the phenomenon. However, both Wigner
and his friend turn into “sub-observers” and become
integrated after shifting to the intrinsic perspective,
so the three levels of conceptual dependence become
integrated too.
We have found that two “non-spurious” aspects of
experience that would be absent in an “observer-free”
scientific theory remain: embodiment and the mere
capacity to experience or observe from an intrinsic
perspective—which we are referring to simply as the
“intrinsic perspective”. That observers are embod-
ied is consistent with embodied cognition, enactivism,
and the idea that every experience has a physical cor-
relate. That observations are made from an intrinsic
perspective suggests that every physical phenomenon
is an experience for someone. This is in line with
Rovelli’s RQM, which posits that every physical phe-
nomenon is relative to an observer. Except that ob-
servers in RQM are considered just a physical system
more—e.g., a rock could count as an observer.
This mere capacity to experience could be de-
fined more precisely, following Thompson’s neurophe-
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nomenological analysis, as the mere potential to be-
come aware of something and the ability to appre-
hend whatever appears, which are the “luminous”
and “knowing” qualities of non-dual awareness. This
potential connection between quantum theory and
non-dual awareness does not have to be as strange
as it may sound. After all, in the relational scien-
tific framework discussed above, the investigation of
both the physical and the phenomenal worlds rely on
experience, and the intrinsic perspective is by defi-
nition the very precondition that makes experience
possible. Importantly, neither the intrinsic perspec-
tive, nor embodiment per se, involve any additional
subjective complexities, like cognitive, perceptual or
motivational biases. So, by themselves they do not
hinder “objectivity”—in Velmans’ sense.
Our approach also suggests a potential physical
correlate for non-dual awareness—what the Dalai
Lama referred to as a “subtle energy”. The features
of such a physical correlate should parallel those that
characterize the concept of non-dual awareness. In
particular, being the mere capacity to observe some-
thing, non-dual awareness is said to be independent
of its contents. Indeed, at its most fundamental
level, it can be contentless. The self-referential cou-
pling (SRC) implements the intrinsic perspective, so
it should have similar features. Indeed, no matter
how many “particles” there are in the system inves-
tigated, the implementation of the SRC is always the
same; in this sense it is independent of its contents. If
we removed all content from Fig. 2F only the SRC be-
tween Alice and Bob would remain. That is, only the
half-heads completely empty of any content—or two
empty cameras facing each other in the toy example
presented in Fig. 2E. Being self-referential, the SRC
has a reflexive flavor. Furthermore, in our approach
the SRC is the crucial precondition for a scientist to
observe any physical phenomenon from her intrinsic
perspective; as such it cannot be reduced to any of
those contents—this has the flavor of incompleteness
and undecidability results (see Appendix H 3). Fi-
nally, the SRC is composed of two subsystems, Alice
and Bob in Fig 2C, that play interdependent roles as
subject and object, in a seemingly non-dual way.
Now, consider a generic system of N particles de-
scribed by a transition kernel proportional to the fac-
tor eH/h̵Y (cf. Eq. (4) in the main text), where H
is the corresponding Hamiltonian. Imagine that we
remove the N particles one by one until they are all
gone—this would be a sort of “vacuum”, a relevant
concept in quantum theory. Notice that h̵Y, being
constant, remains the same during the whole pro-
cess. It makes sense to imagine that it remains the
same once we have removed all particles—after all,
the “vacuum” in quantum theory is not “classical”
but “quantum”. So, from this perspective, h̵Y seems
to characterize the physical processes that support
the SRC between Alice and Bob.
This suggests the physical correlate of non-dual
awareness would be a form of quantum fluctuations
characterized by h̵Y. Interestingly, quantum fluctua-
tions are irreducible to lower level physical phenom-
ena as well as all-pervading since they affect every
physical phenomenon. This situation would be in
line with science, as it does not negate the physical
basis of awareness, and with the meditative insights
from the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, because, even
though there would be a physical basis for the sub-
tlest level of consciousness, this basis cannot be re-
duce to lower-level physical phenomena. It is physical
but indeterminate.
As we have discussed in previous subsections, in
the same way that strings can operate on themselves
in λ-Calculus, an approach to scientists investigat-
ing scientists should allow for scientists to investi-
gate themselves. Humans can learn to explore “ob-
jectively” the physical world, e.g., by doing a career
in science, even if they are not born being “objec-
tive”. In principle, humans can also learn to ex-
plore the phenomenal world in an “objective” way—
again, “objective” in Velmans’ sense, not in the sense
of “observer-free”. Furthermore, scientists can care-
fully design an experimental system to effectively
neutralize unwanted influences, simplify its investiga-
tion, and isolate a phenomenon of interest. Similarly,
it is in principle possible—e.g., through meditation
techniques—to calm down the mind and concentrate
single-pointedly on a specific phenomenal experience
of interest—e.g., the breath or an image.
This suggests that new kinds of experiments could
be envisioned at the interface of neurophenomenol-
ogy, consciousness neuroscience, quantum physics,
and quantum cognition, where highly trained med-
itators collaborate with scientists to explore poten-
tial quantum-like features of the phenomenal world.
For instance, we could explore whether meditation
might enhance the quantum-like effects reported in
quantum cognition experiments, or facilitate the ob-
servation of quantum-like features in experiments of
single photon detection by humans. We could also
search for novel, psychophysics experiments to mea-
sure h̵Y and test whether indeed h̵Y = h̵. Consis-
tent with Thompson’s conjecture, we could also in-
vestigate whether, through meditation, humans could
sensitize to and alter subtler and subtler aspects of
the electromagnetic fields that underlie our cognitive
processes, down to the quantum level. Further the-
oretical and experimental developments are required
to understand which possibilities are available, if any.
We hope our mathematical framework can help guide
the kind of questions and predictions that could be
addressed.
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Appendix D: Quantum mechanics recast
Here we first describe in Appendix D 1 some as-
pects of quantum theory relevant to this work for the
reader that may not be familiar with them. After-
wards, in Appendix D 2 we illustrate the type of con-
ceptual problems associated to the theory. We do this
via the so called Wigner’s friend thought experiment
wherein an external scientist (Wigner) observers his
friend observing a physical system. We also men-
tion Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum
mechanics (RQM), which aligns with the relational
approach taken in the main text (see Fig. 1A). Rov-
elli suggests his relational interpretation can solve
the conceptual puzzle associated to Wigner’s friend
thought experiment.
In Appendix D 3 we then discuss how the von Neu-
mann equation, which characterizes the dynamics of
closed quantum systems, can be understood as a pair
of equations in terms of real matrices. This pair of
equations are interpreted in the main text in the spirit
of Kleene’s recursion theorem (see Appendix H 1 d)
as describing two “sub-observers” mutually observ-
ing each other to implement the intrinsic perspective.
In Appendix D 4 we show how, following this decom-
position of the von Neumann equation in terms of
a pair of real equations, some well-known and non-
trivial examples of quantum dynamics can be written
in terms of real kernels with non-negative entries. To
keep the discussion as simple as possible, the techni-
cal details associated to such examples are presented
separately in Appendix D 5.
1. Quantum theory in a nutshell
In Appendix E we describe in detail a non-
relativistic quantum free particle, one of the simplest
quantum systems, in close parallel with its classical
analogue, a diffusive particle. Here we complement
Appendix E by discussing some more general aspects
of quantum theory for the reader that may not be
familiar with these.
A quantum system differs from a classical stochas-
tic system in that [94]: (i) its state is necessarily de-
scribed in general by a density matrix, ρ, whose di-
agonal contains all probabilistic information; (ii) the
off-diagonal entries of ρ can in general be complex
and ρ is Hermitian, i.e. ρ† = ρ where ρ† represents
the adjoint of ρ—often ρ† = [ρ∗]T coincides with the
conjugate transpose of ρ—this is the case, e.g., of fi-
nite dimensional systems; (iii) the dynamics of the
system is given by
ρ′ = UρU †, (D1)
where U has in general complex entries and is unitary,
i.e. UU † = U †U = 1I. When the time-step size  tends
to zero we can write U = 1I − iH/h̵, where H =H† is
a suitable Hermitian matrix called the Hamiltonian,
h̵ is Planck’s constant, and i is the imaginary unit.
Equation (D1) then becomes
ih̵
∂ρ
∂t
= [H,ρ], (D2)
Equation (D2) is called von Neumann equation.
Some relevant questions to understand quantum
theory are [94]: Why does ρ need to be a matrix?
Why does only the diagonal of ρ contain the prob-
abilistic information—which is known as the Born
rule? Why is ρ complex and Hermitian? Why does ρ
satisfy von Neumann equation, Eq. (D2)?
When ρ has only one eigenvector ∣ψ⟩ with non-zero
eigenvalue, it is said to describe a pure state. Since
the diagonal of ρ represents probabilities, such a non-
zero eigenvalue is actually equal to one; so we can
write ρ = ∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣, where ⟨ψ∣ = [∣ψ⟩]† is the Hermitian
conjugate of ∣ψ⟩. In this case, if we write ρ′ = ∣ψ′⟩ ⟨ψ′∣,
Eq. (D1) becomes ∣ψ′⟩ = U ∣ψ⟩ . (D3)
Similarly, for pure states Eq. (D2) becomes equiv-
alent to Schro¨dinger equation
ih̵
∂ ∣ψ⟩
∂t
=H ∣ψ⟩ . (D4)
An important point for the implementation of the
SRC (i.e., the self-referential coupling) in the main
text is that, without loss of generality, the initial state
of a quantum experiment can be considered as a sym-
metric density matrix, ρsym, whose diagonal elements
yield the classical probabilities for the system to be
in the corresponding state. Indeed, a general den-
sity matrix, ρ, can be written as ρ = UprepρsymU †prep
via a suitable unitary preparation operator Uprep.
Consider a quantum experiment with a general ini-
tial density matrix ρ which evolves to a final state
ρ′ = UρU †. This is equivalent to an experiment with
initial density matrix ρsym, which evolves to the same
final state ρ′ = UeffρsymU †eff , via the effective unitary
operator Ueff = UUprep.
Consider the measurement of a general observable
characterized by the Hermitian operator
O =∑
k
λk ∣k⟩ ⟨k∣ , (D5)
where λk ∈ R and ∣k⟩ are the corresponding eigenval-
ues and eigenvectors, respectively—the index k can
also be continuous in which case the sum is changed
by an integral. According to the (projective) mea-
surement postulate of quantum theory, if the normal-
ized quantum state is given by∣ψ⟩ =∑
k
ck ∣k⟩ , (D6)
then a measurement of O would yield outcome λk
with probability ∣ck ∣2 and the quantum state would
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update or “collapse” to ∣ψ⟩ → ∣k⟩. So, the expected
value of O is
⟨O⟩ψ ≡ ⟨ψ∣O ∣ψ⟩ = Tr [ρψO] =∑
k
∣ck ∣2λk, (D7)
where ρψ = ∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣ is the density matrix associated to
pure state ∣ψ⟩.
More generally, consider a mixed state ρ =∑α λα ∣ψα⟩ ⟨ψα∣, which could be read as “with prob-
ability λα ≥ 0 the system is in pure state ∣ψα⟩”.
Equation (D7) can be straightforwardly generalized
to ⟨O⟩ρ = Tr [ρO].
Although this may give the impression that quan-
tum states such as ∣k⟩ exists in the abstract, this is
not necessarily so. As discussed in Appendix J, states
such as these can be more pragmatically considered
as shorthand notations for the kind of manipulations
we have to do in the laboratory to actually implement
such measurements. In particular, measurements are
generally implemented via suitable interactions be-
tween the system of interest and a measurement de-
vice. Such interactions can only be characterized in
terms of things we are familiar with, such as the po-
sition of a pointer or the angle between two mirrors.
Under a Wick rotation, i.e. under the change t = iτ
Eqs. (D2) and (D4) become
h̵
∂ρ̃
∂τ
= [H, ρ̃], (D8)
h̵
∂ ∣ψ̃⟩
∂τ
= H ∣ψ̃⟩ , (D9)
which are now real equations, so all quantities in-
volved become real too. This is termed imaginary-
time or Euclidean quantum dynamics [38, 40].
The entries of the vector ∣ψ⟩ can be written as
ψ(x) = ⟨x∣ψ⟩ = √p(x)eiϕ, which is called the
wave function. Under a Wick rotation the i disap-
pears, so Wick-rotated, imaginary-time, or Euclidean
wave functions can be written as ψ̃(x) = ⟨x∣ψ̃⟩ =√
p(x)eφ(x) (see Appendices E 1 c, F 3 e, and G).
When φ(x) = 0 we have ψ̃(x) = θ(x) ≡ √p(x) (cf.
Appendix G 4).
2. Wigner’s friend thought experiment and
Rovelli’s relational interpretation
Here we illustrate the type of problems associ-
ated to the conceptual interpretation of quantum the-
ory. To do so, consider the so-called Wigner’s friend
thought experiment (see Fig. 5). This consists of two
observers: Wigner’s friend (F ) who measures a sys-
tem (S) in her lab (L), and Wigner (W ) who simulta-
neously measures the composed system S+F , i.e. his
friend’s lab L. Suppose Wigner’s friend measures a
two-state property of the system S denoted by a vari-
able z ∈ {−1,+1}. For instance, the system S could
F FW
丨𝜓〉S 丨𝜓〉L
z = ? w = ?
S
L
D
FIG. 5: Wigner’s friend thought experiment: Wigner’s
friend (F ) measures the spin (S) of a particle in the ver-
tical direction and obtains outcome z. From Wigner’s
friend perspective, the spin is in one of the two pure states∣ψ⟩S defined in Eq. (D10). Wigner observes his friend’s
lab (L = S+F ) from the outside, considering it as a quan-
tum system (dashed box). Since Wigner have no access
to z, he would assign to L a superposition state ∣Ψ⟩L (see
Eq. (D13)). Has event z happen or not? (cf. Fig. 1 in
Ref. [88]). The way Wigner’s friend is treated here is an
example of how observers are usually treated in physics
as any other physical system, in sharp contrast with cog-
nitive science; in this case Wigner’s friend is treated as a
particle with spin. Figure 1A in the main text depicts a
similar but classical situation based on the enactive ap-
proach to cognitive science.
be an electron and z could denote whether its spin
points up, z = +1, or down z = −1. If the outcome of
the measurement is z = +1 or z = −1, then Wigner’s
friend would say that the system S is in state (cf. Eq.
(1) in Ref. [88])
∣ψ⟩S = ∣↑⟩S ≡ (10)
S
or ∣ψ⟩S = ∣↓⟩S ≡ (01)
S
,
(D10)
respectively.
Wigner cannot measure the system S alone but
only the lab as a whole, L = S + F—for simplicity,
we are not explicitly modeling the detector (D) here
as this would be redundant for our purpose: the de-
tector state determines with absolute certainty the
state of Wigner’s friend, i.e. what she knows about
the system S (see Eq. (2) in Ref. [88]). Mathemati-
cally, the state of the detector and of Wigner’s friend
are essentially replicated variables and it is enough
for us to keep only one of them (c.f. Ref. [32] and
Sec. 5.6 of Ref. [75]).
Assume that, from Wigner’s perspective, his friend
is initially in a generic pure state ∣init⟩F and that
the lab remains isolated during his friend’s measure-
ment. Thus, according to quantum theory, Wigner
can describe his friend’s measurement as a quantum
interaction via a unitary (see Eq. (D3))
US→L ∣↓⟩S ⊗ ∣init⟩F ≡ ∣↓⟩S ⊗ ∣z = −1⟩F , (D11)
US→L ∣↑⟩S ⊗ ∣init⟩F ≡ ∣↑⟩S ⊗ ∣z = +1⟩F . (D12)
These equations say that if after Wigner’s friend ob-
serves outcome z = −1, i.e. she is in state ∣z = −1⟩F ,
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after her measurement then the state of system S is∣↓⟩S , and similarly for z = +1 (see Eq. (D10)). This
is essentially what is meant in practice by state and
observation.
Now, assume that Wigner knew that the state of
the system S, right before his friend measures it, was∣→⟩S ≡ √1/2(∣↓⟩S + ∣↑⟩S). So, by the linearity of
the unitary dynamics (see Eq. (D3)), the state that
Wigner would assign to the lab after his friend’s mea-
surement has been completed is
∣Ψ⟩L = ∣↓⟩S ⊗ ∣z = −1⟩F + ∣↑⟩S ⊗ ∣z = +1⟩F√
2
, (D13)
i.e. a linear superposition of the states defined in
Eqs. (D11) and (D12). This equation expresses the
fact that, according to Wigner, his friend has mea-
sured system S. So, Wigner knows that his friend
knows the state of system S. However, Wigner him-
self does not know the state of S and that is why
he describes the state of the lab by a superposition,∣Ψ⟩L. In contrast, since Wigner’s friend has indeed
measured system S, for her S is in a definite state:
either ∣↓⟩S or ∣↑⟩S , not a superposition of these. As-
sume she has actually observed z = −1, i.e. S is in
state ∣↓⟩S . We can ask [75] (see Sec. 5.6.1 therein):
Has event z = −1 happened or not?
According to Rovelli’s relational interpretation
of quantum mechanics [32] (see also Sec. 5.6 of
Ref. [75]), this apparent puzzle captures the core con-
ceptual difficulty of the interpretation of quantum
theory, i.e., reconciling the possibility of quantum su-
perpositions with the fact that the world we observe
is characterized by definite values of physical quanti-
ties. However, Rovelli further argues that the puzzle
dissolves if we admit that states of physical systems
are not determined in an absolute sense but relative
to another physical system, an “observer”. In con-
trast to common wisdom in cognitive science, though,
for Rovelli “observation” is just a physical interaction
and observers are just physical systems with no spe-
cial properties, e.g. rocks and electrons classify as
“observers” [32] (see Fig. 5 herein).
3. Von Neumann equation as a pair of real
matrix equations
Here we show how the von Neunmann equation,
Eq. (D2), can generally be written in terms of two
equations describing two real probability matrices re-
lated to the real and imaginary parts of the density
matrix (cf. Appendix E 2 c). Following the discussion
in the main text, these pair of equations can be inter-
preted as implementing the intrinsic perspective. In a
sense, this section goes in the reverse direction of the
main text. In the next subsections we show explicit
examples of quantum dynamics written in terms of
non-negative real kernels that can be interpreted in
probabilistic terms.
We assume that we can represent the adjoint opera-
tion † by the combination of transpose T and complex
conjugate ∗ operations, i.e. if µ is a generic matrix
with complex entries, then µ† = (µT )∗ = (µ∗)T . No-
tice that a generic Hermitian matrix can be written
as µ = Ms +Ma/i, where Ms = MTs is a real sym-
metric matrix and Ma = −MTa is a real antisymmet-
ric matrix; indeed µ† =MTs −MTa /i =Ms +Ma/i = µ.
Furthermore, since any generic real matrix M can
be decomposed into symmetric and antisymmetric
parts, i.e. M = Ms +Ma, then we can write Ms =(M +MT )/2 and Ma = (M −MT )/2. From this per-
spective, we can consider a generic Hermitian matrix
µ as a convenient representation of a generic real ma-
trix M that allows us to keep explicit track of the
symmetric and antisymmetric parts of the latter via
the real and imaginary parts of the former, respec-
tively.
So, we can write ρ and H in Eq. (D2) as ρ =
Ps + Pa/i and H = −h̵Js + −h̵Ja/i. Here the sym-
metric and antisymmetric matrices corresponding to
ρ and H can be written in terms of real matrices
P and J , respectively, as done for the generic ma-
trix M above. Since Trρ = 1 and the diagonal ele-
ments of an antisymmetric matrix are zero, we have
Trρ = TrPs = TrP , so TrP = 1. We have written H in
terms of a real matrix h̵J so we do not have to worry
about h̵ in the equations below. We will refer to J as
the dynamical matrix.
In this way, Eq. (D2) can be written as
i
∂
∂t
(Ps + Pa/i) = −[Js + Ja/i, Ps + Pa/i], (D14)
where h̵ has been absorved in J = −H/h̵. Equating
the real and imaginary parts of Eq. (D14) we get a
pair of equations
∂Ps
∂t
= [Js, Pa] + [Ja, Ps], (D15)
∂Pa
∂t
= −[Js, Ps] + [Ja, Pa]. (D16)
By adding and subtracting Eqs. (D15) and (D16),
we obtain an equivalent pair of equations in terms of
the real matrix P , i.e.
∂P
∂t
= −[Js, PT ] + [Ja, P ], (D17)
∂PT
∂t
= [Js, P ] + [Ja, PT ]. (D18)
While Eq. (D18) is the transpose of Eq. (D17), we
can also write these two equations as corresponding
to two different observers A and B who describe the
experiment with probability matrices PA and PB , re-
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spectively; i.e.
∂PA
∂t
= −[Js, PB] + [Ja, PA], (D19)
∂PB
∂t
= [Js, PA] + [Ja, PB], (D20)
under the condition that PB = PTA at time t = 0,
which guarantees that at all next time steps we have
PB = PTA (cf. Eqs. (E74) and (E75)). This condition
can in principle be satisfied for any experiment as
discussed in the main text and Appendices G 3 and
F 3 d.
As described in the main text, A and B can indeed
be considered as two complementary “sub-observers”.
In Appendix D 4 we recast some typical examples of
quantum dynamics to show that these equations can
be formulated in terms of real non-negative kernels
that therefore can in principle be interpreted proba-
bilistically (see also Appendix G).
Remark: Notice that since for small time steps
 we can write unitary evolution operators as
U = 1I − iH/h̵. So, we can write commutators with
H in terms of commutators with U since[U, ρ] = −i[H,ρ]/h̵; (D21)
this is also true for other types of evolution kernels.
Using Eq. (D21), we can then write the von Neumann
equation, Eq. (D2), as
∂ρ
∂t
= 1

[U, ρ], (D22)
where the limit → 0 is understood.
This observation is useful when dealing with Gaus-
sian kernels, for instance, because a Gaussian ker-
nel K(x,x′) with vanishing variance σ2 cannot be
straightforwardly expanded in a Taylor series asK(x,x′) ≈ δ(x − x′) + O(σ2), where δ(x) is the
Dirac delta. However, we can straightforwardly writeK(x,x′) = δ(x − x′) − L(x,x′), where L(x,x′) =
δ(x−x′)−K(x,x′). Although L is not O(σ2), its con-
volution with a smooth function yields a term O(σ2).
In Appendices D 4 a, D 4 b, D 5 a and D 5 b we obtain
von Neumann-like equations similar to Eq. (D22),
where commutators are directly written in terms of
real Gaussian kernels K with variance σ2 = O().
4. Some examples of quantum dynamics in
terms of non-negative real kernels
Here we briefly discuss how some well-known exam-
ples of quantum systems can be described in terms of
non-negative real kernels, including systems associ-
ated to complex non-stoquastic Hamiltonian opera-
tors. In Appendix D 5 we provide the details of the
derivations. In Appendix I we discuss why the non-
negativity of the kernels is not necessarily a restric-
tion in our approach. Although we here focus on the
position observable only, in Appendix J we discuss
why this is not necessarily a restriction in our ap-
proach either.
a. From non-relativistic path integrals to real
convolutions
Consider the Schro¨dinger equation
ih̵
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − h̵2
2m
∂2ψ(x, t)
∂x2
+ V (x)ψ(x, t) (D23)
of a particle of mass m in a one-dimensional non-
relativistic potential V . In terms of the short-time
path integral representation [95], with time step  →
0, can be written as (see Appendix D 5 a for all tech-
nical details)
∂ρ
∂t
= i

[(K ∗ ρ) − (ρ ∗K)] , (D24)
where ρ(x,x′, t) is the density matrix and K(x,x′) is
a real kernel given by
K(x,x′) = 1∣A∣ exp [−H(x,x′)h̵ ], (D25)
with A = √i2pih̵/m and
H(x,x′) = m
2
(x − x′)2
2
+ V (x), (D26)
the corresponding “energy” function, which is a func-
tion of the position at two consecutive times, not of
position and momentum.
In contrast to Eq. (D21), Eq. (D24) contains a fac-
tor i. This is because the kernel K is real while U is
complex. We have effectively done a Wick rotation to
get the real non-negative kernel K, and then reintro-
duce the i as a factor in Eq. (D24), which essentially
implements the SRC.
Equation (D26) would lead to an asymmetric ker-
nel in Eq. (D25) due to the potential V . How-
ever, since the contribution of the potential to the
exponent of K in Eq. (D25) is already of order ,
we can straightforwardly symmetrize it by replacing
V (x) → [V (x) + V (x′)]/2 = V (x) +O() without af-
fecting the relevant equations.
In Eq. (D24) we have introduced the convolutions
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[K ∗ ρ] (x,x′) = 1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x,x′′)h̵ ]ρ(x′′, x′, t)dx′′, (D27)
[ρ ∗K] (x,x′) = 1∣A∣ ∫ ρ(x,x′′, t) exp [−H(x′′, x′)h̵ ]dx′′. (D28)
Notice that the integration variables in K∗ρ and ρ∗K
are, respectively, the first and second arguments of ρ,
which yields the analogous of left and right matrix
multiplication.
Following the discussion in Appendix D 3,
Eq. (D24) can be written as a pair of real matrix
equations (see more general example in Sec. D 4 b).
The point we want to make here is that the kernel
appearing in such pair of equations can be real and
non-negative, as we can see in Eq. (D25). In the
next section we show this is also true in more general
cases where the Hamiltonian is complex.
Remark: While the kernel K defined in Eq. (D25) is
real and non-negative, it is not normalized. Indeed,
we have (e.g. take ψ(x′, t) = 1 in Eq. (D41))
∫ K(x,x′)dx = 1 − V (x)/h̵ +O(2). (D29)
This fact has sometimes been used to argue against
the viability of any probabilistic interpretation of the
Euclidean, or imaginary-time, Schro¨dinger equation
[38, 40, 96].
However, we will show in Appendix G that the
proper probabilistic analogue of K is not a transi-
tion probability but factors in a graphical model or
something closer to the squared root of the product
of forward and backward transition probabilities (cf.
Eqs. (G49)).
b. Particle in an electromagnetic field via asymmetric
real kernels
The Schro¨dinger equation of a particle of charge e
interacting with an electromagnetic field can be writ-
ten as
ih̵
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − h̵2
2m
(∇− i e
h̵c
A)2 ψ(x, t)+ eV (x, t)ψ(x, t), (D30)
where x denotes the position vector in three dimen-
sional space, while V and A denote the scalar and
vector fields respectively. Notice that the Hamilto-
nian associated to Eq. (D30) now contains an imagi-
nary part given by the terms linear in A arising from
the expansion of (∇− ieA/h̵c)2ψ(x, t).
As shown in full detail in Appendix D 5 b, and fol-
lowing Appendix D 3, the von Neumann equation cor-
responding to Eq. (D30) can be written as a pair of
real matrix equations
∂PA
∂t
= −1

[Ks, PB] + 1

[Ka, PA], (D31)
∂PB
∂t
= 1

[Ks, PA] + 1

[Ka, PB], (D32)
where the two probability matrices satisfy PA = P
and PB = PT , and ρ = (P + PT )/2 + (P − PT )/2i
yields the density matrix. Here, Ks and Ka, are the
symmetric and anti-symmetric parts of a real kernelK = Ks +Ka given by
K(x,x′) = 1∣AEM ∣ exp [− h̵HEM(x,x′)], (D33)
where the real electromagnetic “energy” function is
given by
HEM(x,x′) = m
2
(x − x′

)2 + V (x + x′
2
, t) + e
c
(x − x′

) ⋅A(x + x′
2
, t) + e2
mc2
[A(x + x′
2
, t)]2 . (D34)
So, even in the case of a charged particle in an electro-
magnetic field, whose Hamiltonian operator is com-
plex (and so non-stoquastic), can be thought of as
arising from a real non-negative kernel real K. It is
no clear at this point, though, how to interpret HEM
defined in Eq. (D34)—how it relates to the actual en-
ergy of the system—nor the real kernel K defined in
Eq. (D33). It seems to suggests a probabilistic inter-
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pretation of electromagnetic phenomena. We leave
this for future work.
5. Derivation of real kernel representations in
Appendix D 4
a. From non-relativistic path integrals to real
convolutions
As originally described by Feynman, the non-
relativistic Schro¨dinger equation can be derived from
the path integral via (see e.g. Eq. (18) in Ref [95])
ψ(x`+1, t + ) = 1A ∫ exp [ ih̵S(x`+1, x`)]ψ(x`, t)dx`,
(D35)
where for the one-dimensional case in Appendix D 4 a
we can set the short-time action as
S(x`+1, x`) = m
2
(x`+1 − x`

)2 − V (x`+1), (D36)
and
A = √i2pih̵/m; (D37)
furthermore, x` represents the position of the particle
at time t = `. Notice that by iterating Eq. (D35) we
can obtain the path integral representation.
It is possible to rewrite these equations in terms
of real Gaussian convolutions, which can be naturally
interpreted in probabilistic terms. Before we show
how to do this, we will outline the main steps in the
derivation of Schro¨dinger equation, Eq. (D23), from
Eq. (D35), described in detailed in e.g. Ref. [95].
This closely parallels the derivation in terms of real
Gaussian convolutions to be described afterwards.
First, expanding ψ(x`+1, t+) to first order in , we
can write Eq. (D50) as

∂ψ(x`+1, t)
∂t
= 1A ∫ exp [ ih̵S(x`+1, x`)]ψ(x`, t)dx`− ψ(x`+1, t).
(D38)
Since  → 0, the complex Gaussian factor associated
to the kinetic term in Eq. (D36) oscillates very fast
except in the region where ∣x`+1 − x`∣ = O(√h̵/m).
So, to estimate the integral to first order in , the
term ψ(x`, t) in the right hand side of Eq. (D38) need
be expanded around x`+1 to second order in x`+1 − x`.
Consistent with this approximation to first order in
, we also do exp [−iV (x)/h̵] = 1− iV (x)/h̵+O(2).
This leads to Eq. (D23).
However, as we know from the derivation of the dif-
fusion equation approximation for a random walk [97,
98], a real Gaussian has an equivalent cancelling ef-
fect, not because of fast oscillations but because of
exponentially small terms (see Appendix E 1 a). More
precisely, we will argue that if we introduce the en-
ergy function
H(x,x′) = m
2
(x − x′)2
2
+ V (x), (D39)
we can do the replacement, which amounts at a Wick
rotation → −i,
1A exp [ ih̵S(x,x′)]→ 1∣A∣ exp [−H(x,x′)h̵ ]; (D40)
notice that the kinetic term in the right hand side
of Eq. (D40) leads to a real Gaussian with variance
h̵/m and normalization constant given precisely by∣A∣.
Due to this Gaussian term, the integral
1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x,x′)h̵ ]ψ(x′, t)dx′ = [1 − h̵V (x)] [ψ(x, t) + h̵2m ∂2ψ(x, t)∂x2 ] +O(2)
= ψ(x, t) − 
h̵
V (x)ψ(x, t) + h̵
2m
∂2ψ(x, t)
∂x2
+O(2), (D41)
can be approximated to first order in  in a way simi-
lar to that of the integral in Eq. (D38). Indeed, since
 → 0, the real Gaussian factor associated to the ki-
netic term in Eq. (D39) is exponentially small except
in the region where ∣x − x′∣ = O(√h̵/m). This has al-
lowed us to estimate the integral to first order in  by
expanding the term ψ(x′, t) in the left hand side of
Eq. (D41) around x up to second order in x − x′. Con-
sistent with this approximation to first order in , we
have also done exp [−V (x)/h̵] = 1−V (x)/h̵+O(2).
This implies that Eq. (D23) can be written in terms
of real Gaussian convolutions in a way similar to
Eq. (D38) as
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
∂ψ(x`+1, t)
∂t
= i{ 1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x`+1, x`)h̵ ]ψ(x`, t)dx` − ψ(x`+1, t)} . (D42)
Indeed, by replacing the term with the integral in
the right hand side of Eq. (D42) by the right hand side
of Eq. (D41), and multiplying both sides of Eq. (D42)
by ih̵/, we obtain Schrodinger equation, Eq. (D23).
In this way we have essentially bring the imaginary
unit i from the exponential in Eq. (D38) down to
turn it into a linear factor in Eq. (D42). In contrast
to Eq. (D50), however, it does not seem possible to
obtain a real path integral by iterating Eq. (D42).
Finally, we now show that Eq. (D42) leads
to an equation analogous to the von Neu-
mann equation (Eq. (D2)) for the density matrix
ρ(x,x′, t) = ψ(x, t)ψ∗(x′, t), in terms of real Gaus-
sian convolutions instead of differential operators. In-
deed, taking the time derivative of this density matrix
yields
∂ρ(x,x′, t)
∂t
= ∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
ψ∗(x′, t) + ψ(x, t)∂ψ∗(x′, t)
∂t
;
(D43)
now, replacing the time derivatives of the wave func-
tion ψ and its conjugate ψ∗ in Eq. (D43), respectively,
by the right hand side of Eq. (D42) and its conjugate
we obtain
∂ρ(x,x′, t)
∂t
= i

{ 1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x,x′′)h̵ ]ρ(x′′, x′, t)dx′′ − ρ(x,x′, t)}
− i

{ 1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x′, x′′)h̵ ]ρ(x,x′′, t)dx′′ − ρ(x,x′, t)} .
(D44)
Clearly, the terms ρ(x,x′, t) in the right hand side
cancel out, and we can write Eq. (D44) in compact
form as
∂ρ
∂t
= i

[(K ∗ ρ) − (ρ ∗K)] , (D45)
where we have introduced the kernel
K(x,x′) = 1∣A∣ exp [−H(x,x′)h̵ ], (D46)
and the convolutions
[K ∗ ρ] (x,x′, t) = 1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x,x′′)h̵ ]ρ(x′′, x′, t)dx′′, (D47)[ρ ∗K] (x′, x, t) = 1∣A∣ ∫ exp [−H(x′,x′′)h̵ ]ρ(x,x′′, t)dx′′. (D48)
to represent, respectively, the first and second inte-
grals in the right hand side of Eq. (D44). Notice
that the integration variables in (K ∗ ρ) and (ρ ∗K)
are, respectively, the first and second arguments of
ρ, which yields the analogous of left and right matrix
multiplication.
b. Particle in an electromagnetic field via asymmetric
real kernels
Prelude: Hermitian kernel via a complex “energy”
function: The Schro¨dinger equation of a particle of
charge e interacting with an electromagnetic field can
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be written as
ih̵
∂ψ(x, t)
∂t
= − h̵2
2m
(∇− i e
h̵c
A)2 ψ(x, t)+ eV (x, t)ψ(x, t), (D49)
where x denotes the position vector in three dimen-
sional space, while V and A denote the scalar and
vector fields respectively. Notice that the Hamilto-
nian operator associated to Eq. (D49) now contains
an imaginary part given by the terms linear in A
arising from the expansion of (∇− ieA/h̵c)2ψ(x, t).
Equation (D49) can be derived via the path inte-
gral formulation from the extension of Eq. (D50) to
three-dimensional space (i.e. by doing the substitu-
tion x→ x)
ψ(x`+1, t+) = 1AEM ∫ exp [ ih̵SEM(x`+1,x`)]ψ(x`, t)d3x`,
(D50)
with action
SEM(x`+1,x`) = m
2
(x`+1 − x`

)2 + e
c
(x`+1 − x`

) ⋅A(x`+1 + x`
2
, t) − V (x`+1 + x`
2
, t) , (D51)
and
A→ AEM ≡ (i2pih̵/m)3/2; (D52)
here we are using a midpoint discretization for the
action.
As in the previous section, it is possible to derive
Eq. (D49) by doing a replacement similar to that in
Eq. (D40), i.e.
1AEM exp [ ih̵SEM(x,x′)]→ 1∣AEM ∣ exp [− h̵H̃EM(x,x′)], (D53)
but with a complex “energy” function
H̃EM(x,x′) = m
2
(x − x′

)2 + V (x + x′
2
, t) − ie
c
(x − x′

) ⋅A(x + x′
2
, t) . (D54)
As with Eq. (D40), this corresponds to a Wick ro-
tation  → −i. We can recognize that the real part
is the three-dimensional version of the energy func-
tion defined in Eq. (D39). We could think of HEM
as an “energy” function with a complex interaction
energy whose real and imaginary parts correspond to
the electric and magnetic fields, respectively. This
seems similar to writing the electromagnetic field as
E + iB which allows to write Maxwell’s equations in
compact form (see e.g. Eq. (7.10) in Ref. [99]).
As in the previous section, we can derive Eq. (D49)
from an equation analogous to Eq. (D42), i.e.

∂ψ(x`+1, t)
∂t
= i{ 1∣AEM ∣ ∫ exp [− h̵H̃EM(x`+1,x`)]ψ(x`, t)d3x` − ψ(x`+1, t)} . (D55)
Indeed, as in the previous section, the Gaussian factor in the complex kernel (see Eqs.(D52) and (D54))
C(x,x′) = exp [− 
h̵
H̃EM(x,x′)]/∣AEM ∣, (D56)
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associated to the kinetic term in Eq. (D54) al-
lows us to expand the other factors in the inte-
gral in Eq. (D55) around x`+1 up to second or-
der in ∣x`+1 − x`∣ or to first order in . More
precisely, by introducing the variable u = x`+1 − x`,
so (x`+1 + x`)/2 = x`+1 − u/2 as well as x` = x`+1 − u,
and doing x = x`+1, x′ = x` to avoid cluttering the
equations with indexes, we can write
[C ∗ ψ](x, t) = 1∣AEM ∣ ∫ exp(−mu22h̵ ) f(x,u, t) [ψ(x, t) − u ⋅ ∇ψ(x, t) + 12u ⋅Hψ(x, t) ⋅ u] +O(2), (D57)
where the convolution C ∗ ψ denotes the integral in
the right hand side of Eq. (D55), Hψ stands for the
Hessian or matrix of second derivatives of ψ. Fur-
thermore, the function
f(x,u, t) = {1 − 
h̵
V (x, t) + i e
h̵c
u ⋅A(x, t) − i e
2h̵c
u ⋅ ∇A(x, t) ⋅ u − 1
2
[ e
h̵c
u ⋅A(x, t)]2} , (D58)
is the expansion up to first order in  or second order
in u of the exponential factors in the complex ker-
nel C, which correspond to the interaction terms in
Eq. (D54), i.e. those containing V and A.
Taking into account that the first two moments
of u are ⟨uj⟩u = 0 and ⟨ujuk⟩u = δjkh̵/m, where
⟨⋅⟩u refers to the average taken with the Gaussian
exp(−mu2/2h̵)/∣AEM ∣, and that terms containing
u2 and u3 or higher can be neglected, the integral
in Eq. (D57) yields
[C ∗ ψ](x, t) = (1 − 
h̵
V )ψ + h̵
2m
∇2ψ − i e
mc
A ⋅ ∇ψ − i e
2mc
∇ ⋅Aψ − e2
2h̵mc2
A2ψ (D59)
Furthermore, taking into account that
(∇− i e
h̵c
A)2 ψ =∇2ψ − ( e
h̵c
)2 A2ψ−
i
e
h̵c
[2A ⋅ ∇ψ + (∇ ⋅A)ψ] , (D60)
we obtain
[C ∗ ψ](x, t) = ψ(x, t) + 
h̵
[ h̵2
2m
(∇− i e
h̵c
A)2 ψ(x, t) − V (x, t)ψ(x, t)] +O(2). (D61)
So, we can indeed write the Schro¨dinger equation
Eq. (D49) as

∂ψ
∂t
= i[C ∗ ψ − ψ], (D62)
which is the analogous of Eq. (D42). To see this, we
can replace C∗ψ in Eq. (D62) by the right hand side of
Eq. (D61), cancel out the ψ terms, and multiply the
remaining equation by ih̵/, which yields Eq. (D49).
By doing the same analysis that led from Eq. (D42)
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to Eqs. (D44) and (D45) we get
∂ρ
∂t
= i

[C ∗ ρ − ρ ∗ C] ≡ i

[C, ρ]. (D63)
Notice, however, that contrary to the kernel K in
Eq. (D45), which is real and symmetric, the kernelC in Eq. (D63) is still complex and asymmetric. In-
deed, from Eqs.(D54) and (D56) we can see that by
exchanging the two arguments of C we get
C(x′,x) = [C(x,x′)]∗, (D64)
which, considering C as a matrix, also shows that C
is Hermitian. We could also see that C is Hermitian
by writing Eq. (D56) as C = Ks +Ka/i with
Ks(x,x′) = 1∣AEM ∣ exp [−m(x − x′)22h̵ − h̵V (x + x′2 , t)] cos [ eh̵c (x − x′) ⋅A(x + x′2 , t)] , (D65)
Ka(x,x′) = − 1∣AEM ∣ exp [−m(x − x′)22h̵ − h̵V (x + x′2 , t)] sin [ eh̵c (x − x′) ⋅A(x + x′2 , t)] , (D66)
which are clearly symmetric and antisymmetric, re-
spectively, due to the symmetry properties of the cos-
inusoidal and sinusoidal functions.
Postlude: real asymmetric kernel via a real “energy”
function: Since the kernel C defined in Eq. (D56)
is Hermitian (see Eq. (D64)), Eq. (D63) has the
same structure of Eq. (D2). So, as described in Ap-
pendix D 3 (see also the remark therein), we can write
Eq. (D63) as a pair of real equations in terms of a real
kernel K = Ks +Ka, which in this case is given by the
sum of the right hand sides of Eqs. (D65) and (D66),
K(x,x′) = 1∣AEM ∣ exp [−m(x − x′)22h̵ − h̵V (x + x′2 , t)][cos z − sin z], (D67)
where
z = 
h̵
e
c
(x − x′

) ⋅A(x + x′
2
, t) . (D68)
Due to the very sharp Gaussian factor (since → 0),
we can expand the sinusoidal and cosinusoidal func-
tions up to second order in their argument since the
rest gives contributions of order higher than . Now,
up to second order we have
cos z − sin z = exp(−z − z2) +O(z3). (D69)
Equations (D65)-(D68) show that, even in the case
of a charged particle in an electromagnetic field,
whose Hamiltonian operator is complex (and so non-
stoquastic), can be thought of as arising from a non-
negative real kernel K = Ks +Ka. More precisely,
following Appendix D 3 the corresponding von Neu-
mann equation can be understood as a pair of real
matrix equations
∂PA
∂t
= −1

[Ks, PB] + 1

[Ka, PA], (D70)
∂PB
∂t
= 1

[Ks, PA] + 1

[Ka, PB], (D71)
where the two probability matrices satisfy PA = P
and PB = PT , and ρ = (P + PT )/2 + (P − PT )/2i
yields the density matrix. Following the approach
introduced in the main text, these equations can be
interpreted in probabilistic terms.
However, the term z2 in Eq. (D69) leads via
Eq. (D68) to a term with a quadratic factor (/h̵)2,
which prevents us from writing K ∝ exp (−HEM/h̵)
with a Hamiltonian-like function HEM independent
of  and h̵ (cf. Eq. (D56)). It is possible to go around
this issue, though, by noticing that (remember that
u = x − x′, so (x + x′)/2 = x − u/2)
⟨z2⟩
u
= ( e
h̵c
)2 ⟨[u ⋅A(x − u
2
, t)]2⟩
u
= 
h̵
e2
mc2
[A(x, t)]2 +O(2), (D72)
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where ⟨⋅⟩u refers to the average taken with the Gaus-
sian exp(−mu2/2h̵)/∣AEM ∣, and we have used the
results ⟨uj⟩u = 0 and ⟨ujuk⟩u = (h̵/m)δjk.
Since the first term in the right hand side of
Eq. (D72) is already of order , we can safely replace
z2 → 
h̵
e2
mc2
[A(x + x′
2
, t)]2 +O(2), (D73)
so
e−z2 → exp(− 
h̵
e2
mc2
A2) , (D74)
in Eq. (D69), since when we expand in u only the
term independent of u remains as the other terms in
the expansion lead to terms of higher order in .
So, we can indeed write the asymmetric real kernelK = Ks +Ka in Eq. (D67) associated to the complex
kernel C in Eq. (D56) as
K(x,x′) = 1∣AEM ∣ exp [− h̵HEM(x,x′)] (D75)
where the real electromagnetic “energy” function
(with no tilde) is given by
HEM(x,x′) = m
2
(x − x′

)2 + V (x + x′
2
, t) + e
c
(x − x′

) ⋅A(x + x′
2
, t) + e2
mc2
[A(x + x′
2
, t)]2 (D76)
Appendix E: Classical diffusion vs.
non-relativistic quantum free particle
In Appendix D we provide a review of some con-
cepts of quantum theory that are relevant for the
discussion in the main text. In particular, we show
how von Neumann equation, which characterizes the
quantum dynamics of the density matrix, can be writ-
ten in terms of a pair of equations describing the dy-
namics of a pair of real matrices related to the real
and imaginary parts of the density matrix. We also
provide some non-trivial examples. Here we com-
plement Appendix D by providing a comprehensive
discussion of one of the simplest quantum systems—
i.e., a non-relativistic free particle—which is closely
related to a classical diffusive particle. We use this
example to highlight some aspects that are relevant
to the discussion in the main text. In doing so, we
hope to provide some useful intuition for the reader
that may not be familiar with quantum theory.
1. Classical diffusion and real Gaussian kernels
Here we present the example of a classical diffusive
particle in a way different from the usual presenta-
tion. Although at some point this may seem a rather
contrived presentation, it is purposely done this way
to highlight certain aspects which are relevant for the
discussion in the main text. In particular, we distin-
guish between symmetric and antisymmetric changes
of the probability density and the corresponding oper-
ators that generate them. Furthermore, we highlight
the antisymmetric changes that can be associated to
relative motion.
a. No drift: symmetric probability changes only
Here we discuss the case of a diffusive particle with
no drift. This concerns only symmetric changes of
the particle’s probability density and, therefore, only
symmetric operators. Consider a diffusive particle
with zero drift and diffusion coefficient D = kBT /γ,
where kB , T , and γ are Boltzmann constant, tem-
perature, and the coefficient of friction, respectively.
The probability density to transition from position x′
to position x during a time step of size  is given by
a Gaussian kernel
P0 (x∣x′) = 1√
4piD
e−(x−x′)2/4D
≡ 1
Z
e
− 
hdiff
H0diff(x,x′), (E1)
where hdiff = 2kBT and
H0diff(x,x′) = γ2 (x − x′)22 , (E2)
play an analogous role to Planck’s constant and the
Hamiltonian function of a free particle of mass γ, re-
spectively. Here Z = √2pihdiff/γ is the normaliza-
tion constant.
If p0(x′, t) is the probability density for the diffu-
sive particle with zero drift to be at position x′ at
time t, the probability density for it to be at position
x at time t +  is given by
p0(x, t + ) = ∫ P0 (x∣x′)p0(x′, t)dx′. (E3)
For → 0 the Gaussian kernel in Eq. (E1) is exponen-
tially small except when ∣x − x′∣ = O(√hdiff/γ). So,
we can expand p0t (x′, t) up to second order around x
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pv(y, t) = p0(y - v t, t)
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FIG. 6: Drift induced by a change of reference frame: A
diffusive particle with no drift in a reference frame X,
described by probability density p0(x, t), acquires a drift
when observed from a reference frame Y that has a ve-
locity −v with respect to X. In the reference frame Y the
diffusive particle is described by the probability density
pv(y, t) = p0(y − vt, t).
to obtain the right hand side of Eq. (E3) up to first
order in . This yields
p0(x, t + ) = p0(x, t) + D∂2p0(x, t)
∂x2
+O(2), (E4)
or, taking the limit  → 0, using D = hdiff/2γ, and
multiplying both sides by hdiff ,
hdiff
∂p0(x, t)
∂t
= h2diff
2γ
∂2p0(x, t)
∂x2
. (E5)
Equation (E5) is similar to the Schro¨dinger equation
of a non-relativistic free particle (see Eq. (E48) be-
low), except that the latter has an imaginary unit
and a minus sign in the left and right hand sides, re-
spectively. Unlike Planck constant that has units of
energy and time, hdiff has units of energy only; this
is related to γ having units of mass over time.
Equation (E5) can be written as (cf. Eq. (E49)
below)
hdiff
∂p0
∂t
= J̃0p0, (E6)
where
J̃0 = h2diff
2γ
∂2
∂x2
, (E7)
is analogous to the Hamiltonian operator associated
to a free particle (see Eq. (E50) below). Indeed, if we
do a Wick rotation, i.e., if we do t = iτ , Eq. (E6) turns
into Schro¨dinger equation, Eq. (E49), with Hamilto-
nian operator H0 = −J̃0 and time variable τ .
b. Drift: antisymmetric probability changes and moving
reference frames
Here we discuss the case of a diffusive particle
with drift. The drift is associated to antisymmet-
ric changes of the particle’s probability density and,
therefore, to antisymmetric operators. Furthermore,
in this case the drift can be considered as due to a
change of reference frame (see Fig. 6).
Indeed, consider the same diffusive particle dis-
cussed in the previous subsection, which has no drift
in the reference frame X utilized therein. Imagine
that this particle is now described from a different
reference frame Y , which is moving with a constant
velocity v along the negative x direction with respect
to reference frame X (see Fig. 6). Due to this rel-
ative motion, the same diffusive particle is observed
with a drift v along the positive x direction. This
change of reference frame amounts at a coordinate
transformation
x→ y = x + vt. (E8)
The diffusive particle in reference frame X is de-
scribed by probability density p0(x, t), which satisfies
Eq. (E5). So, in reference frame Y the same diffusive
particle is described by the probability density
pv(y, t) = p0(y − vt, t). (E9)
The equation satisfied by pv can be obtained from
Eq. (E5) by observing that the change of coordinates
in Eq. (E8) transforms the time and space derivatives
as
∂
∂x
∣
t
= ∂
∂y
∣
t
and
∂
∂t
∣
x
= ∂
∂t
∣
y
+ v ∂
∂y
∣
t
. (E10)
So Eq. (E5) transforms into
hdiff
∂pv(y, t)
∂t
= J̃vpv(y, t)
≡ h2diff
2γ
∂2pv(y, t)
∂y2
− vhdiff ∂pv(y, t)
∂y
.
(E11)
Equivalently, the operator J̃0 in Eq. (E7) transforms
into (cf. Eq. (E52) below)
J̃v = J̃vs + J̃va . (E12)
Here (cf. Eqs. (E53) and (E54))
J̃vs = h2diff2γ ∂2∂y2 , (E13)
J̃va = −vhdiff ∂∂y , (E14)
are the symmetric and antisymmetric parts of J̃v,
which describe diffusion and drift respectively (see
below).
We now describe a different way to obtain this re-
sult which serves to illustrate some ideas we use in
the main text to obtain a quantum dynamics. Under
the change of coordinates in Eq. (E8) the transition
probability density P0 in Eq. (E1) transforms into
Pv (y∣y′) ≡ 1Z e− hdiff Hvdiff(y,y′), (E15)
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where (cf. Eq. (E9))
Hvdiff(y, y′) =H0diff(y − v(t + ), y′ − vt)= γ
2
(y − y′)2
2
− γv (y − y′)

+ γ
2
v2.
(E16)
The second term in the second line of Eq. (E16) is
antisymmetric under permutations of y and y′, wich
reflects the intrinsic directionality associated to the
drift. In contrast to H0diff in Eq. (E2), which is sym-
metric under such permutations, Hvdiff in Eq. (E16)
contains both terms which are antisymmetric (second
term in second line) and terms which are symmetric
(first and third terms in second line).
In line with this, Eq. (E4) transforms into
∆pv(y, t) = ∆spv(y, t) +∆apv(y, t), (E17)
where ∆pv(y, t) = pv(y, t + ) − pv(y, t) and
∆sp
v(y, t) ≡ ∫ Ksym (y, y′)pv(y′, t)dy′ (E18)
= hdiff
2γ
∂2pv(y, t)
∂y2
+O(2),
∆ap
v(y, t) ≡ ∫ Kanti (y, y′)pv(y′, t)dy′ (E19)
= −v ∂pv(y, t)
∂y
+O(2),
are the symmetric and antisymmetric contributions
to ∆pv(y, t), respectively. Here
Ksym (y, y′) ≡ 12 [Pv (y∣y′) +Pv (y′∣y)] = 1Z e−γ(y−y
′)2
2hdiff
− γv2
2hdiff cosh [γv(y − y′)
hdiff
] , (E20)
Kanti (y, y′) ≡ 12 [Pv (y∣y′) −Pv (y′∣y)] = 1Z e−γ(y−y
′)2
2hdiff
− γv2
2hdiff sinh [γv(y − y′)
hdiff
] , (E21)
are the symmetric and antisymmetric parts of the cor-
responding transition probability density in Eq. (E15)
and we have used Eqs. (E15) and (E16).
To obtain the final expressions in Eqs. (E18) and
(E19) we expanded both pv(y′, t) and the hyperbolic
functions in Eqs. (E20) and (E21) up to second or-
der around y and proceeded as in the derivation of
Eq. (E4). Using Eqs. (E18) and (E19) we can take
the  → 0 limit of Eq. (E17) which, after multiply-
ing both sides by hdiff , yields Eq. (E11). A solution
pv(x, t) to Eq. (E11) yields the probability density to
find the diffusive particle in position y at time t in
reference frame Y .
c. Circular processes and imaginary-time quantum-like
diffusion
Here we briefly discuss the case of a process on a
cycle
Pdiff(y) = F̃n(y0, yn)n−1∏`=0 F`(y`+1, y`), (E22)
with Gaussian factors F`. The additional factor F̃n
turns the chain into a loop—here yn+1 = y0. This case
is associated to imaginary-time quantum dynamics
and, as such, can lead to real-time quantum dynamics
after implementing the SRC. In this sense, this is the
proper classical analogue of the quantum dynamics
of a free particle.
As discussed in Appendix G 3, it is in general not
possible to write Eq. (E22) in a way compatible with
a standard Markov chain. A way to obtain some-
thing similar to a Markov chain is to condition on
the initial and final probability densities, pv(y0, t)
and pv(yn, t + n), so we can effectively open the cir-
cular graphical model. This kind of stochastic pro-
cesses with given initial and final data were origi-
nally studied long ago by Schro¨dinger in an attempt
to find the closest classical analog to Schro¨dinger
equation [100, 101]. So, they are often referred to
as Schro¨dinger bridges—however, as far as we know,
Schro¨dinger did not consider them as a way to turn
a circular graphical model into one with the topology
of a chain, as we do here.
It turns out Schro¨dinger bridges can be described
in terms of what we today call belief propagation al-
gorithms (see Appendix G 3). More precisely, assume
the factors F`(y, y′) = e−Hvdiff(y,y′)/Z, where Hvdiff is
given in Eq. (E16). So, the probability density
pv(y, t) = µv→(y, t)µv←(y, t), (E23)
of the Schro¨dinger bridge is described in terms of mes-
sages µv→ and µv←; here t0 ≤ t ≤ tf , where t0 and tf
are the initial and final times, respectively. These
messages satisfy the equations
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µv→(y, t + ) = 1Z ∫ e− hdiff Hvdiff(y,y′)µv→(y′, t)dy′, (E24)
µv←(y, t) = 1Z ∫ e− hdiff Hvdiff(y′,y)µv←(y′, t + )dy′, (E25)
as well as the initial and final conditions
pv(y, t0) = µv→(y, t0)µv←(y, t0), (E26)
pv(y, tf) = µv→(y, tf)µv←(y, tf). (E27)
In this particular case F`(y, y′) = Pv (y∣y′) in
Eq. (E15). In general, however, factors F` are not
normalized. In the  → 0 limit Eqs. (E24) and (E25)
become (cf. Eq. (E11) and Appendix G 3)
hdiff
∂µ→(y, t)
∂t
= [J̃vµ→] (y, t) (E28)
≡ h2diff
2γ
∂2µ→(y, t)
∂y2
− vhdiff ∂µ→(y, t)
∂y
,
−hdiff ∂µ←(y, t)
∂t
= [µ←J̃v] (y, t) (E29)
≡ h2diff
2γ
∂2µ←(y, t)
∂y2
+ vhdiff ∂µ←(y, t)
∂y
.
Notice the change in the sign of v in the second equa-
tion.
Equations (E25) and (E29) are the time reversal
of Eqs. (E24) and (E28), respectively. This reflects
the fact that µv→ and µv← carry information about the
initial and final conditions forward and backward in
time, respectively. It is then convenient to write
µv→(y, t) = eR(y,t)+S(y,t), (E30)
µv←(y, t) = eR(y,t)−S(y,t), (E31)
where R(y, t) → R(y,−t) and S(y, t) → −S(y,−t)
are symmetric and antisymmetric, respectively, un-
der time reversal (cf. Ref. [38] after Eq. (2.20); see
also Eq. (2.47) therein). Furthermore, according to
Eq. (E23), we have pv(y, t) = e2R(y,t), so
µv→(y, t) = √pv(y, t)eS(y,t), (E32)
µv←(y, t) = √pv(y, t)e−S(y,t). (E33)
d. “Form invariant” equations
Equations (E28) and (E29) correctly describes the
Schro¨dinger bridge in reference frame Y . However,
physicists prefer that equations describing “funda-
mental laws of nature” remain “form invariant” under
changes of coordinates like that in Eq. (E8). Granted,
Eqs. (E28) and (E29) are not considered fundamen-
tal equations in this sense. However, the Schro¨dinger
equation which we obtain based on them is indeed
considered a fundamental equation.
The main point we want to make is that we can
obtain the dynamics of the probability density in ref-
erence frame Y either by explicitly solving Eqs. (E28)
and (E29) or by using ideas of “form invariance”; the
choice is optional. In the quantum analogue discussed
below, more relevance is usually given to “form invari-
ance”. However, in that case too we can pragmati-
cally obtain the correct wave function by solving the
analogues of Eqs. (E28) and (E29).
So, we now illustrate how Eqs. (E28) and (E29), de-
scribing the system in reference frame Y , can be kept
formally equivalent to the corresponding equations in
reference frame X, i.e. to Eqs. (E28) and (E29) with
v = 0. This closely mirrors the situation with the
Schro¨dinger equation described in Appendix E 2 a.
To do so, notice that
Hvdiff(y, y′) =H0diff(y, y′) + ∆fγ(y, y′) , (E34)
where ∆fγ(y, y′) = fγ(y, t + ) − fγ(y′, t) with (here
c = γ)
fc(y, t) = −cvy + c
2
v2t. (E35)
Following Eqs. (E34) and (E35), we can rewrite
Eqs. (E24) and (E25) as (cf. Eq. (E57))
efγ(y,t+)/hdiffµv→(y, t + ) = 1Z ∫ e− hdiff H0diff(y,y′) [efγ(y′,t)/hdiffµv→(y′, t)]dy′, (E36)
e−fγ(y,t)/hdiffµv←(y, t) = 1Z ∫ e− hdiff H0diff(y′,y) [e−fγ(y′,t+)/hdiffµv←(y′, t + )]dy′. (E37)
So, we can see that the modified messages (notice the tildes)
µ̃→(y, t) = efγ(y,t)/hdiffµv→(y, t), (E38)
µ̃←(y, t) = e−fγ(y,t)/hdiffµv←(y, t), (E39)
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satisfy the driftless diffusion equation and its con-
jugate, i.e. Eqs (E28) and (E29) with J̃v re-
placed by J̃0. Importantly, this modification does
not change the probabilities since µ̃→(y, t)µ̃←(y, t) =
µv→(y, t)µv←(y, t) = pv(y, t). So, we can say that the
dynamical equation remains “form invariant” under
transformations like that in Eq. (E8), but the mes-
sages transform according to Eqs. (E38) and (E39).
e. Formulation in terms of real probability matrices
Finally, it will be useful to extend this analogy with
quantum mechanics by describing the free particle
using probability matrices, in terms of which we im-
plement the SRC in the main text. This is because
density matrices, the quantum analogue of probabil-
ity matrices, have a more direct connection to prob-
abilities than “wave functions” do. Indeed, while the
diagonal of a density matrix already yields the rele-
vant probabilistic information, a wave function needs
to be multiplied by “another” wave function, its con-
jugate, to obtain probabilistic information.
introducing the real probability matrix (cf.
Eq. (E59) below)
P v(y, y′; t) = µv→(y, t)µv←(y′, t), (E40)
whose diagonal gives the probabilities P v(y, y; t) =
pv(y, t). Taking the time derivative of P v and using
Eqs. (E28) and (E29) yields
hdiff
∂P v
∂t
= [J̃v, P v] = [J̃vs , P v] + [J̃va , P v], (E41)
where [A,B] = AB −BA is the commutator between
operators, or matrices, A and B. Similarly, Eq. (E17)
becomes
∆P v = ∆sP v +∆aP v, (E42)
where
∆sP
v = [Jvs , P v] and ∆aP v = [Jva , P v], (E43)
with Jvs = J̃vs /hdiff and Jva = J̃va /hdiff (notice the tildes;
cf. Eqs. (E70) and (E71) below).
2. Non-relativistic quantum free particle in
terms of real Gaussian kernels
a. Standard formulation using complex Gaussian
kernels
To provide some intuition to those who may not be
familiar with quantum mechanics, we here discuss the
case of a non-relativistic free particle, which closely
parallels the case of a classical diffusive particle de-
scribed in Appendix E 1. We also discuss how a drift
due to a change of reference frame leads to antisym-
metric changes accompanied by a factor i. In the
main text we take insight from this example to deal
with complex Hamiltonians.
The probability amplitude for a free particle of
mass m to transition from position x at time t to
position x′ at time t +  is given by a complex Gaus-
sian kernel (cf. Eq. (E1))
G0 (x,x′) = 1√
2ipih̵/meim(x−x′)2/2h̵
≡ 1A ei h̵L0free(x,x′),
(E44)
where h̵ is Planck constant and (cf. Eq. (E2))
L0free(x,x′) = m2 (x − x′)22 , (E45)
is the so-called Lagrangian which, for the case of a
free particle, coincides with the Hamiltonian func-
tion, i.e. its (kinetic) energy. Here A = √i2pih̵/m
plays the role of a normalization factor.
If ψ0(x′, t) = √p0(x, t)eiϕ(x,t) is the probability
amplitude, or wave function, for the free particle to be
at position x′ at time t, the corresponding probability
is given by the Born rule p0(x, t) = ψ∗0(x, t)ψ∗0(x, t).
Here the real function ϕ(x, t) is the phase of the wave
function and ψ∗0(x, t) = √p0(x, t)e−iϕ(x,t) is the com-
plex conjugate of ψ0(x, t). The probability amplitude
for the particle to be at position x at time t+ is given
by (cf. Eq. (E3))
ψ0(x, t + ) = ∫ G0 (x,x′)ψ0(x′, t)dx′. (E46)
For  → 0 the complex Gaussian kernel in Eq. (E44)
oscillates very fast except in the region ∣x − x′∣ =
O(√h̵/m) which makes contributions outside this
range negligible. So, as in the case of a diffusive
particle, we can expand ψ0(x′, t) up to second order
around x to obtain the right hand side of Eq. (E46)
up to first order in . This leads to similar results as
those of the diffusive particle, only that in this case
the “variance” of the Gaussian kernel is complex, i.e.
σ2 = ih̵
m
. So (cf. Eq. (E4))
ψ0(x, t + ) = ψ0(x, t) + i h̵
2m
∂2ψ0(x, t)
∂x2
+O(2),
(E47)
or, taking the limit  → 0 and multiplying both sides
by ih̵ (cf. Eq. (E5)),
ih̵
∂ψ0(x, t)
∂t
= − h̵2
2m
∂2ψ0(x, t)
∂x2
. (E48)
Equation (E48) has the same form of Eq. (E5), except
for the imaginary unit and the minus sign in the left
and right hand sides, respectively. Planck constant,
h̵, has units of energy and time, unlike hdiff which has
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units of energy only; this is related to the coefficient
of friction, γ in Eq. (E5) having units of mass over
time instead of mass only.
Equation (E48) is usually written as (cf. Eq. (E6))
ih̵
∂ψ0
∂t
=H0ψ0, (E49)
where
H0 = − h̵2
2m
∂2
∂x2
, (E50)
is the Hamiltonian operator associated to a free par-
ticle. From Eq. (E7) we see that H0 = −J̃0.
We now illustrate how a drift due to a change of
reference frame leads to antisymmetric changes ac-
companied by an i. We used this example in the
main text to extend our results to complex Hamilto-
nians. So, consider an observer moving with a con-
stant velocity −v along the positive x direction, who
would therefore observe the same particle with an ad-
ditional velocity v. This amounts at the coordinate
transformation in Eq. (E8) which, using Eq. (E10),
transforms Eq. (E48) into (cf. Eq. (E11))
ih̵
∂ψv(y, t)
∂t
= − h̵2
2m
∂2ψv(y, t)
∂y2
− ivh̵∂ψv(y, t)
∂y
. (E51)
Equivalently, the Hamiltonian operator H0 in
Eq. (E50) transforms into (cf. Eq. (E12))
Hv =Hvs +Hva/i (E52)
where
Hvs = − h̵22m ∂2∂y2 , (E53)
Hva = vh̵ ∂∂y , (E54)
are associated to the symmetric and antisymmetric
parts of an underlying stochastic process—indeed,
notice that Hv = −(J̃vs + J̃va /i) (see below; cf.
Eqs. (E13) and (E14)).
As in the case of the diffusive particle, Eq. (E51)
can be obtained in a different way by noticing that
the function L0free in Eq. (E45) transforms into (cf.
Eq. (E16) and (E34))
Lvfree(y, y′) = m2 (y − y′ − v)22= m
2
(y − y′)2
2
−mv (y − y′)

+ m
2
v2
= L0free + ∆fm ,
(E55)
where ∆fm = fm(y, t + ) − fm(y′, t) and fm is ob-
tained from Eq. (E35) by doing c = m. The second
term in the second line of Eq. (E55) is antisymmet-
ric under permutations of y and y′, which reflects
the intrinsic directionality associated to the moving
reference frame. In contrast to L0free in Eq. (E45),
which is symmetric under such permutations, Lvfree
in Eq. (E55) contains both terms which are antisym-
metric (second term in second line) and terms which
are symmetric (first and third terms in second line).
This turns Eq. (E46) into .
ψv(y, t + ) = ∫ 1A ei h̵Lvfree(y,y′)ψv(y′, t)dy′, (E56)
Equation (E51) can be obtained from Eq. (E56) in
the same way that Eq. (E48) was obtained from
Eq. (E46). However, we will derive this result us-
ing real Gaussian kernels in Appendix E 2 b, which
more closely parallels the case of the classical diffu-
sive particle. Using Eq. (E56) and the third line of
Eq. (E55) we can write (cf. Eqs. (E36) and (E37))
ψv(y, t + )e−ifm(y,t+)/h̵ = ∫ G0 (y, y′) [ψv(y′, t)e−ifm(y′,t)/h̵]dy′. (E57)
Comparing Eq. (E57) to Eq. (E46) we see that
ψ0(x, t) = ψv(x, t)e−ifm(x,t)/h̵. (E58)
So, we can equivalently say that Schro¨dinger equation
remains “invariant”, but the wave function between
the two observers transform according to Eq. (E58),
in such a way that if we know one of them we can
compute the other through this equation. We want
to emphasize, though, that from a practical point of
view, we can also obtain the wave function that yields
the correct probabilities by directly solving Eq. (E51).
The probability density associated to a wave
function is obtained via the Born rule pv(y, t) =
ψv(y, t)ψ∗v(y, t), where ψ∗v is the complex conjugate
of ψv. A way to deal simultaneously with both the
quantum dynamics and the Born rule is to work in
terms of a complex probability matrix, or density ma-
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trix
ρv(y, y′; t) = ψv(y, t)ψ∗v(y′, t), (E59)
whose diagonal yields precisely the probability den-
sity associated to the corresponding wave function,
i.e. pv(y, t) = ρv(y, y; t). We can obtain the equa-
tion governing the dynamics of ρv by taking the time
derivative of Eq. (E59) and using Eq. (E51) and its
conjugate to replace the time derivatives of ψv and
ψ∗v , respectively. This yields (see Eq. (E52))
ih̵
∂ρv
∂t
= [Hv, ρv] = [Hvs , ρv] + [Hva , ρv]/i, (E60)
where [A,B] = AB −BA is the commutator between
operators, or matrices, A and B. Equation (E60) is
the von Neumann equation equivalent to Schro¨dinger
equation.
b. Formulation in terms of real Gaussian kernels
The close analogy between the derivation of
Eqs. (E48) and (E5) suggests it is possible to derive
the latter in terms of real Gaussian kernels too. In-
deed, by following the same steps that led to Eq. (E5)
we can show that

∂ψ0(x, t)
∂t
= i{[K0 ∗ ψ0] (x, t) − ψ0(x, t)} , (E61)
with
K0(x,x′) = 1∣A∣e− h̵L0free , (E62)[K0 ∗ ψ0] (x, t) = ∫ K0(x,x′)ψ0(x′, t)dx′,(E63)
leads precisely to Eq. (E49)—in more general situa-
tions, the exponent would not be given by the same
Lagrangian function but by a new type of “energy”
function (see Appendix D 4 b for the nontrivial ex-
ample of a quantum charged particle in a classical
electromagnetic field).
As in the case of a diffusive particle, here the kernel
associated to an observer moving with velocity v in
the positive x direction is obtained form Eq. (E62)
by simply changing L0free for the corresponding Lvfree
in Eq. (E55), i.e.
Kv (y, y′) = 1∣A∣e− h̵Lvfree(y,y′), (E64)
which, except for the parameters m and h̵, is the same
as Eq. (E15).
However, as already hinted by Eq. (E52), in con-
trast to Eq. (E17) the antisymmetric contributions
need to be divided by the imaginary unit (cf. Ap-
pendix D 3). So, the analogous of Eq. (E17) is
∆ψv(y, t) = i [∆sψv(y, t) +∆aψv(y, t)/i] , (E65)
where ∆ψv(y, t) = ψv(y, t + ) − ψv(y, t) and the i
outside the square brackets comes from the structure
of Eq. (E61), and is associated to the SRC in the
main text. Furthermore (cf. Eqs. (E18) and (E19)),
∆sψv(y, t) ≡ ∫ Ksym (y, y′)ψv(y′, t)dy′ (E66)
= h̵
2m
∂2ψv(y, t)
∂y2
+O(2),
∆aψv(y, t) ≡ ∫ Kanti (y, y′)ψv(y′, t)dy′ (E67)
= −v ∂ψv(y, t)
∂y
+O(2),
are the symmetric and antisymmetric contributions
to ∆ψv(y, t), respectively. Here (cf. Eqs. (E20) and
(E21))
Ksym (y, y′) ≡ 12 [Kv (y, y′) +Kv (y′, y)] = 1Z e−m(y−y
′)2
2h̵
− mv2
2h̵ cosh [mv(y − y′)
h̵
] , (E68)
Kanti (y, y′) ≡ 12 [Kv (y, y′) −Kv (y′, y)] = 1Z e−m(y−y
′)2
2h̵
− mv2
2h̵ sinh [mv(y − y′)
h̵
] , (E69)
are the symmetric and antisymmetric parts of the cor-
responding transition kernel Kv in Eq. (E64). To ob-
tain the final expressions in Eqs. (E66) and (E67) we
expanded both ψv(y′, t) and the hyperbolic functions
in Eqs. (E68) and (E69) up to second order around
x and proceed as in the case of a diffusive particle.
Using Eqs. (E66) and (E67) we can take the  → 0
limit of Eq. (E65) which, after multiplying both sides
by h̵, yields Eq. (E51).
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c. Formulation in terms of real probability matrices
Equation (E65) is better understood in terms of
Eq. (E60), which can be written as (cf. Eq. (E42))
∆ρv = i (∆sρv +∆aρv/i) (E70)
where (cf. Eq. (E43))
∆sρv = [Js, ρv], and ∆aρv = [Ja, ρv], (E71)
with Js = −Hs/h̵ and Ja = −Ha/h̵. The main dif-
ferences between Eqs. (E70) and (E42) are that: (i)
ρv is complex while P
v is real; (ii) the antisymmet-
ric contriubution ∆aρv is accompanied by an i while
∆aP
v is not; (iii) There is an external i outside the
brackets of the right hand side of Eq. (E70) that is
absent in Eq. (E42).
Let us write ρv = Ps + Pa/i in terms of symmetric
and antisymmetric matrices, Ps = PTs and Pa = −PTa .
Separating Eq. (E70) into its real and imaginary parts
we obtain a pair of equations (cf. Appendix D 3)
∆Ps = [Js, Pa] + [Ja, Ps], (E72)
∆Pa = −[JsPs] + [Ja, Pa]. (E73)
Furthermore, by writing Pa = (P + PT )/2 and Pa =(P−PT )/2 as the symmetric and antisymmetric parts
of a probability matrix P we obtain
∆PA = −[Js, PB] + [Ja, PA], (E74)
∆PB = [Js, PA] + [Ja, PB]. (E75)
Here PA = P and PB = PT can be interpreted as
the real probability matrices of two observers that
mutually observe each other in order to be able to
refer to themselves (see main text). These equations
are somehow similar to Eq. (E42).
Appendix F: Modeling scientists doing
experiments
Here we discuss some details of our approach to
model scientists doing experiments based on some
concepts of modern cognitive science. We first dis-
cuss two well-known modeling frameworks, i.e., ac-
tive inference (Appendix F 1) and enactive cognition
(Appendix F 2), that are relevant for our purpose.
However, we take a more relational approach than
traditionally done in these two modeling frameworks.
Indeed, in line with the relational interpretation of
quantum mechanics (RQM) [32] (see Appendix D 2),
the modeling of a scientist doing an experiment is
done from the perspective of another scientist (Ap-
pendix F 3). This allows us to implement the self-
referential coupling discussed in the main text. We
expect our approach can offer some fresh perspective
on cognitive science models.
1. Active inference: world as a generative
process, scientists as generative models
Here we briefly discuss some aspects of active in-
ference in the framework of a scientist carrying out
an experiment. Although we present some technical
details for the reader that may not be familiar with it,
our main purpose is to highlight the main underlying
concepts. In active inference the external world—
an experimental system in this case—is considered
as a generative process, while the organism—here a
scientist—perceiving, interacting with, and learning
about such an external world is considered as (or to
have) a generative model (see Fig. 7; cf. Fig. 2 in
Ref. [102] and Figs. 1 and 2 in Ref. [34]). We dis-
cuss these in the next subsections, closely following
Ref. [34].
a. Experimental systems as generative processes
Following active inference, the scientist’s (con-
trolled) environment, i.e. the experimental system,
is considered hidden to her; she can only indirectly
access it by the data it generates in her sensorium via
her observations. In Fig. 7A we represent the environ-
ment by a Bayesian network enclosed within a solid
rounded rectangle, which depends on the actions of
the organism (external arrow pointing towards the
solid rounded rectangle; cf. Fig. 2 in Ref. [102];
see Sec. 2.1 in Ref. [34]). Accordingly, the state of
the environment at time step ` is described by hid-
den variables s′` (top dark magenta circles) which can
generate an observation x` (center blue and red cir-
cles) with a probability Ω`(x`∣s′` ) (blue arrows point-
ing downwards).
The environment dynamics is specified by the tran-
sition probability Θ`(s′` +1∣s′` , a`) that the environ-
ment is in state s′` +1 at time step ` + 1, given that
at the previous time step its state was s′` and the
scientist performed action a`, e.g., by moving some
knobs. The dynamical dependency between hidden
variables is represented in Fig. 7A by the top horizon-
tal dark magenta arrows. The dependency of these
dynamics on the scientist’s actions is represented by
the black arrow external to the solid rounded rect-
angle and pointing towards it. This is to emphasize
that the scientist can select a whole sequence of ac-
tions according to a behavioral policy [34, 102], pi, as
discussed in the next subsection.
To keep the discussion at the minimal level of com-
plexity required to illustrate the relevant concepts for
our purpose, we focus here only on three time steps,
` = −1,0,1 (see Fig. 7A). However, each transition
from a time step ` to the next `+1 can be partitioned
into as many time steps as desired [34].
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FIG. 7: Active inference: (A) Graphical model characterizing active inference (cf. Figs. 1 and 2 in Ref. [102] as well as
Figs. 2 and 3 in Ref. [34]). The upper graphical model enclosed within a solid line is the generative process associated
to the external system. The only accessible information about this generative process is the data it generates on the
observer’s sensors. The lower graphical model enclosed within a dashed line is the generative model the observer has
about the external world. (B) When the scientist performs the required actions to consistently transform the variable
position xprep into the same initial position x0, she effectively removes all causal dependencies before the start of the
experiment at time step ` = 0. This could be interpreted as a form of causal intervention on the system. We denote this
here as [x = x0] to technically differentiate it from Pearl’s do-calculus, which does not necessarily model the scientist
implementing the intervention [37].
b. Scientists as generative models
Following active inference, the scientist is consid-
ered to be, or to have physically encoded in her neu-
ral system and perhaps body, a generative model
of her (controlled) environment, i.e. of the experi-
mental system. This generative model is represented
in Fig. 7A by a Bayesian network within a dashed
rounded rectangle, which mirrors the Bayesian net-
work representing the environment. The generative
model is defined as a joint probability distribution
over observations x` (middle blue and red circles), in-
ternal “copies” s` of the environment’s hidden states
s′` (bottom green circles), which are encoded in the
scientist’s neural system or body, and behavioral poli-
cies pi (black node external to the solid rounded
square). The latter could be specified, for instance,
by a sequence of control states u` (see Sec. 2.2 in
Ref. [34]), i.e. pi = (u−1, u0, u1), which denote a sub-
jective abstraction of an action, such as a neuronal
command to execute a specific action in the envi-
ronment [34]. In Ref. [34] a one-to-one mapping is
assumed between a selected control state u` and ex-
ecuted action a` in each time step `.
The generative model is represented in Fig. 7A by a
Bayesian network within a dashed rounded rectangle,
which mirrors the Bayesian network representing the
environment. It can be written as [34] (see Eq. (2.4)
therein)
Pgen(x, s, pi) = ppol(pi)p−1(s−1) 1∏`=0Pobs` (x`∣s`)Pdyn` (s`∣s`−1, pi), (F1)
where x = (x−1, x0, x1) and s = (s−1, s0, s1). HerePdyn (bottom horizontal green arrows in Fig. 7A)
specifies the scientist’s model of the environment’s
hidden dynamics, which can be affected by the ac-
tions the scientist performs according to the behav-
ioral policy pi. Furthermore, Pobs` (bottom purple ar-
rows pointing upwards in Fig. 7A) specifies the model
of how hidden states of the environment generate ob-
servations. Finally, p−1 and ppol are priors over the
initial state of the environment and the policy, re-
spectively.
Now, when carrying out an experiment a scientist
first prepares the state of the experimental system at
the start of the experiment, i.e., at time step ` = 0.
Say the experimental system is a particle in a piece-
wise linear potential (see Fig. 1A in the main text).
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This could be done, for instance, by performing a
measurement at a previous time step, ` = −1, say of
the position of the particle x−1 = xprep as displayed in
a reading device—this would correspond to the first
time step in Fig. 7A. Afterwards, the scientist can
act on the system to consistently obtain a desired
observation, x0 = x∗0, at time step ` = 0 when the
experiment starts.
For instance, the scientist can generate some com-
mands that would lunch a mechanism that moves the
particle an amount x∗0 − xprep in such a way that
the scientist consistently observes a given position,
x0 = x∗0, as displayed on a reading device, modulo ex-
perimental error. Different observations xprep at time
step ` = −1 would lead to different actions. The aim
of those actions is precisely that an observation at
time step ` = 0 always yields the same result, x0 = x∗0.
Since the observation at time step ` = 0 yields con-
sistently the same result, this effectively removes the
dynamical dependencies before this time step, when
the experiment starts. This amounts at a form of
causal intervention. We denote this here as [x0 = x∗0]
to technically differentiate it from Pearl’s do-calculus,
which denote causal interventions as do[x0 = x∗0]
to imply a very specific manipulation of a directed
acyclic graph. Pearl’s do-calculus does not necessar-
ily model the scientists implementing the causal in-
terventions [37] (see Fig. 7B).
2. Enactivism: dynamical coupling between
scientist and world
Active inference, as briefly described above, still
has a representationalist flavour in that the task of
the scientist is to learn a model, i.e. a representation,
as accurate as possible of the environment’s dynam-
ics, including how her own actions affect it. The envi-
ronment, which is described by the fixed probability
distributions Θ` and Ω` in Sec. F 1 a, is considered
as something externally given. This is reflected in
that the topology of the Bayesian network represent-
ing the scientist mirrors the topology of the Bayesian
network representing the environment. In particular,
the internal and external dynamics (horizontal arrows
in Fig. 7) flow in the same direction.
In contrast, the enactive approach [27, 35, 104] puts
a stronger emphasis on the dynamical coupling be-
tween scientist and environment [35, 103]. The focus
is often on the particular sensor and motor systems of
an individual like, e.g., a human or a robot. However,
scientists manage to transcend their own sensorimo-
tor limitations with the aid of technological devices
that therefore enable them to couple to the world in
“more fundamental” ways. For instance, the kind of
manipulations and observations associated to light-
matter interaction experiments are enabled by, e.g.,
lasers and electron microscopes. These kinds of cou-
plings between scientists and world are hardly pos-
sible without such technologies. Such technologies
are created by scientists themselves in their quest for
lawful regularities. In this quest scientists have to
learn how to build suitable experimental devices, how
to stabilize the experimental system and achieve re-
peatability, how to obtain a decent measurement pre-
cision, etc. In general, how to achieve objectivity—
conditions (O1)-(O3) in the main text.
One of the enactive approaches to learning builds
on ideas from Piaget, which is said to avoid “the ex-
treme conceptions of empiricism (the structure of the
world must be learned by extracting patterns and
regularities from it) and intellectualism (the agent
imposes its notions on the world to order it fol-
lowing some pre-existing categories)” [35] (p. 107).
Our work is focused only on the post-learning stage,
though. So, it does not depend on a specific theory
of enactive learning. A recent description of an en-
active approach to learning can be found in Ref. [35]
(ch. 4).
In an attempt to clarify some of these ideas, we
now briefly comment on a quote by Di Paolo et al.
on the enactive approach:
“Action in the world is always perceptually
guided. And perception is always an active en-
gagement with the world. The situated perceiver
[e.g., a scientist] does not aim at extracting prop-
erties of the world as if these were pregiven, but
at understanding the engagement of her body
[possibly enhanced by technological devices] with
her surroundings, usually in an attempt to bring
about a desired change in relation between the
two. To understand perception [e.g., what sci-
entists observe in experiments] is to understand
how these sensorimotor regularities or contingen-
cies are generated by the coupling of body and
world [possibly mediated by technologies that
can enhance motor and sensory capabilities] and
how they are used in the constitution of percep-
tual and perceptually guided acts.
“According to [Ref. [27]] the task of the en-
active approach is therefore ‘to determine the
common principles or lawful linkages between
sensory and motor systems [a.k.a., sensorimo-
tor contingencies] that explain how action can
be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent
world.’ ” [35] (p. 42).
From this perspective, we could consider both the
scientist and the environment as physical systems
involved in a circular interaction possibly enabled
by technological devices (see Fig. 8; cf. Fig. 3.5 in
Ref. [35]). Our results in the main text suggest that
what we call laws of nature may be associated to such
lawful linkages between sensory and motor systems,
or sensorimotor contingencies.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the math-
ematical formalization of enactivism is not as well
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FIG. 8: Enactivist framework: (A) Dependency graph of the enactive cognitive model described by Eqs. (F2)-(F6),
as presented in Ref. [35] (see Ch. 3 and Fig. 3.5 therein; see also Ref. [103]). Nodes represent variables. An arrow
indicates that the variable it points to depends on the variable in its tail—in particular, circular arrows indicate
recurrent dependencies. This dependency graph represents a circular interaction: scientist’s actions, a, influence the
environment’s state, s′; environment’s states influence the scientist’s sensor activity, o, via observations; sensor activity
influences neural activity, sN ; neural activity influences motor activity, sM , i.e. outflowing movement-producing signals;
finally, motor activity influences scientist’s actions, which closes the interaction loop. Although, internal neural activity
and environment’s states can influence back, respectively, sensor activity and scientist’s actions—e.g. by changing
body configuration—the global dynamics is clockwise. (B) Simplified dependency graph that only shows the circular
dependency between environment’s states, s′, and scientist’s internal states, s = (sM , sN). An action can prepare a
desired state of the experimental system, e.g., a hand movement to turn a knob that places a particle in a desired
location—in this sense it may be considered as a form of causal intervention. An observation can be mediated via a
reading device, e.g. to determine the final position of the particle (see Fig. 1A in the main text).
developed as that of active inference. Indeed, we are
aware of only a couple of rather recent works [35, 103]
that attempt to do that. Here we briefly discuss some
of the main concepts underlying enactivism, closely
following [35] (see Ch. 3 therein; see also Ref. [103]).
For instance, the (controlled) environment or ex-
perimental system could be described by state vari-
ables s′, e.g., the position of a particle in a piece-wise
linear potential (see Fig. 1A in the main text). Simi-
larly, we could use variables a to represent actions the
scientist perform on the experimental system, e.g. by
moving her hand to turn a knob that puts the particle
in a desired position—these kinds of actions could be
considered effectively as state preparations or causal
interventions. The dynamics of the environment can
then be described by [35]
ds′
dt
= E(s′, a), (F2)
where the function E captures the dependency of the
environment’s current state on its previous state and
the scientist’s previous actions.
The scientist’s sensor activity, here denoted by
variables o, is influenced by the environment via her
observations that stimulate her sensorium. Further-
more, in Refs. [35, 103] the scientist is assumed to
have an internal neural dynamics, here described by
variable sN , which modulates the sensors activity.
The scientist’s sensors’ dynamics can then be de-
scribed by
do
dt
= O(s′, sN), (F3)
where the function O captures the dependency of the
scientist’s sensor dynamics on the state of both the
environment and the scientist’s internal neural dy-
namics.
The dynamics of neural activity is assumed to de-
pend on sensor activity and on the neural activity
itself, i.e.
dsN
dt
= N (s, sN), (F4)
where the function N captures such dependencies.
Additionally, the scientist’s outflowing movement-
producing signals, or motor activity, denoted here by
sM , is assumed to be influenced by the neural activ-
ity, sN , i.e.
dsM
dt
=M(sN), (F5)
where the function M captures such an influence.
Finally, the interaction loop is closed by assuming
the scientist’s actions, which can be implemented via
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body configurations, depend on the current actions
she performs, on her internal motor activity, and on
the state of the environment. So, the scientist’s ac-
tions dynamics can be described as
da
dt
= A(a, sM , s′), (F6)
where the function A captures such dependencies.
3. Relational enactivism: beyond active
inference and enactivism
Here we discuss in more detail how we build on in-
sights from active inference, enactive cognition, and
relationalism to develop a minimal model of scien-
tists doing experiments. In particular, we discuss in
more detail the constraints from “objectivity”, i.e.,
conditions (O1)-(O3) in the main text, and the phe-
nomenon of quantum interference that takes place in
the two slits experiment. We also discuss how our ap-
proach could actually refer to generic patterns of ob-
servations that can transcend specific observers and
their potential cognitive limitations.
a. Experiments as stationary circular processes
The main feature of both active inference and enac-
tive cognition is that they emphasize a circular inter-
action, or sensorimotor loop [35, 105, 106], between
the scientist and the (controlled) environment, i.e.
the experimental system (see Figs. 7 and 8). The
former usually relies on probabilistic inference, while
the latter usually relies on dynamical systems. These
two approaches may turned out not to be as different,
though [105, 106].
Our approach incorporates this core circular dy-
namics, but in a way we find more parsimonious. For
instance, models in active inference often incorporate
not only the basic variables—e.g., position—but also
multiple derivatives of them—e.g., velocity, acceler-
ation, and other “generalized coordinates” [102]. In
contrast, our approach only deals with the basic vari-
ables. Moreover, the dynamics in active inference
arises from (approximately) inverting the generative
model the agent has of her environment. Following
enactivism, we do not assume that there is an actual
model that needs to be inverted. Similarly, enactive
models tend to have a more complex structure, with
bidirectional influences between some variables, but
not others, and recurrent influences in all variables
(see Fig. 8A). In contrast, our approach has influ-
ences flowing in a single direction, with the recurrent
influences explicitly unwrapped into chains of tem-
poral transitions (see Fig. 8B in this appendix and
Fig. 1C, D in the main text).
More parsimonious models are to be expected since
we focus on some of the most fundamental regulari-
ties that can be found in nature. In contrast, active
inference and enactivism usually focus on modelling
specific agents, e.g., bacteria or robots. Fundamen-
tal physical laws are usually associated with the bare
properties that remain after all unnecessary complex-
ity from the phenomena of interest has been elimi-
nated. So, it is likely that such fundamental regular-
ities are somehow associated with the most parsimo-
nious, non-trivial models possible.
b. Models of scientists doing experiments are relative to
other scientists
In RQM [32, 75], the process of observation itself
is relative to an “external” observer who observes the
first observer interact with or observe an experimen-
tal system—like Wigner and his friend, respectively,
in Fig. 1A in the main text (see Appendix D 2 and
Fig. 5 therein). According to Rovelli (emphasis ours):
The absolute state of affairs of the world
is a meaningless notion; asking about the ab-
solute relation between two descriptions is pre-
cisely asking about such an absolute state of af-
fairs of the world [...]
[T]he fact that a certain quantity q has a
value with respect to [an observer] O is a phys-
ical fact; as a physical fact, its being true, or
not true, must be understood as relative to an
observer, say P . (Ref. [32], Sec. II D)
Velmans has taken a similar view in his attempt
to identify what are the differences between the in-
ternal and external perspectives in consciousness re-
search [26] (see, e.g., Fig. 9.2 and page 212 therein;
cf. Fig. 5.1 in Ref. [75]; see below). In particular,
Velmans has considered the possibility that Wigner
and his friend can exchange roles (see Fig. 1D,E in
the main text). Velmans argues that, phenomeno-
logically speaking, there can be no actual difference
in the subjective versus objective status of the phe-
nomena “experienced” by Wigner’s friend and that
“observed” by Wigner (see Appendix F 3 c below).
In this work we take this relational view too. This
contrast with traditional active inference and enac-
tivism where, to our knowledge, the model of an agent
interacting with an environment is not understood
as relative to another scientist. In these approaches
models are usually considered in an absolute sense.
For instance, in active inference the agent’s environ-
ment is considered as a generative process, which is
often treated as a “ground truth” the agent has to
learn, as illustrated in Fig. 7 (but see Refs. [105, 106]).
Similarly, while enactivism emphasizes the circular
interaction between agent and environment without
assuming that the agent is learning a model of a
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“ground truth” environment, to our knowledge such
a circular interaction is not considered as relative to
another agent that is observing it, as illustrated in
Fig. 8. Something similar could be said of active in-
ference too.
c. Wigner and his friend can exchange roles
Velmans’ analysis suggests some mathematical
constraints for our relational approach. He considers
a situation similar to that presented in Fig. 1A in the
main text and asks what makes one human being—
like Wigner’s friend—a “subject” and another—like
Wigner—an “experimenter” [26] (p. 212)? Velmans
argues that the difference has to do with the fact that
Wigner’s friend is required to focus only on her own
experiences (of the environment or the experimental
system), which she needs to respond to or report on
in an appropriate way. In contrast, Wigner is in-
terested primarily in the subject’s experiences, and
in how these depend on the environment stimulus or
brain states that he can “observe.”
But the roles of Wigner and his friend are inter-
changeable. To exchange roles they “merely have to
turn their heads”, Velmans notices, so that Wigner
focuses exclusively on the environment and describes
what he experiences, while his friend focuses her at-
tention not just on the environment (which she now
thinks of as a “stimulus”) but also on events that she
can observe in Wigner’s brain, and on Wigner’s re-
ports of what he experiences (see Figs. 1D,E and 2C).
So, Wigner and his friend turn now into the “sub-
ject” and the “experimenter”, respectively. Velmans
further argues that in this situation Wigner’s friend
would now be entitled to think of her observations (of
the environment and Wigner’s brain) as “public and
objective” and to regard Wigner’s experiences of the
environment as “private and subjective”.
Velmans finds this outcome absurd, as to him the
phenomenology of the environment remains the same,
viewed from the perspective of either Wigner or his
friend, whether it is thought of as an “observed stim-
ulus” or as an “experience”. To Velmans nothing
has changed in the character of the environment that
Wigner and his friend can observe other than the fo-
cus of their interest. In other words, that regarding
phenomenology there is no difference between “ob-
served phenomena” and “experiences”.
Velmans emphasizes that his analysis concerns only
the phenomenal world, as opposed to the physical
world. This is relevant in situations where, for in-
stance, the “subject” directly experiences an optical
illusion, while the “experimenter” realizes that it is an
illusion thanks to his experimental devices. However,
if both “subject” and “experimenter” are scientists
with access to the same experimental resources, they
both can realize that it is an optical illusion.
In the main text we allow both “subject” and “ex-
perimenter” to be scientists with the same access to
resources. In this situation, the distinction between
phenomenal and physical world effectively collapses
in that the experiences of the former are effectively
the same as the observations of the latter.
d. Constraints from “objectivity”
Exchanging the roles of Wigner and his friend is rel-
evant for implementing the conditions for “objectiv-
ity.” As discussed in the main text, this leads to some
mathematical constraints on our relational model (see
Figs. 1D,E). From the perspective of an external
observer (Wigner), a scientist (Wigner’s friend) is
“objective” if she—equipped with the required ex-
perimental devices—accurately reflects what actually
happens “outside” of her, as repeatedly observed by
Wigner and his colleagues. For instance, if Wigner
repeatedly observes a new distant start through a
telescope but his friend reports that there is none,
Wigner has a reason to doubt the objectivity of his
friend. This impression is reinforced if a large com-
munity of scientists agree with Wigner that there is
indeed a new star.
As discussed in the main text, the conditions for
“objectivity” imply that the chain of factors F` asso-
ciated to the environment (see Fig. 1 therein) “mir-
rors” the chain of factors G` = F2n−1−` associated to
the scientist, i.e., G` = FT` or
F2n−`−1 = FT` . (F7)
Here ` = 0, . . . , n − 1. More precisely,
P̃(x̃) = 1
Z
FT0 (x0, x2n−1)⋯FTn−1(xn+1, xn)Fn−1(xn, xn−1)⋯F0(x1, x0). (F8)
This implies that P2n−` = PT` , for ` = 0, . . . , n− 1, i.e.,
that the dynamics from time n to time 2n is given
by the reverse transposed of the dynamics from time
0 to time n. Indeed, using Eq. (F7), Eq. (5) in the
main text can be written for ` = 0, . . . , n − 1 as (with
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F̃n = Fk−1⋯Fn, k = 2n)
P` = 1
Z
F`−1⋯F0F2n−1⋯FnFn−1⋯F`
= 1
Z
F`−1⋯F0FT0 ⋯FTn−1Fn−1⋯F`. (F9)
Further permuting factors we can obtain the dynam-
ics from time n on, which yields for time step 2n−` ≥ 0
(with ` = 0, . . . , n − 1)
P2n−` = 1
Z
F2n−`−1⋯FnFn−1⋯F0F2n−1⋯F2n−`
= 1
Z
FT` ⋯FTn−1Fn−1⋯F0FT0 ⋯FT`−1 = PT` . (F10)
Assuming FT` is invertible, Eq. (F10) can also be
written as (with ` = 0, . . . n − 1)
P2n−` = FT` P2n−`−1 [FT` ]−1 . (F11)
Equivalently, multiplying Eq. (F11) by FT` and its
inverse, respectively from the right and the left, and
doing P2n−` = PT` = we can write the reverse dynamics
from time 2n to n as
PT`+1 = [FT` ]−1 PT` [FT` ] , (F12)
which is the transpose of Eq. (6) in the main text.
The initial and final probability matrices in this
case are symmetric, i.e., P0 = PT0 and Pn = PTn . How-
ever, as discussed in Appendix G 3, we can in princi-
ple fix arbitrary initial and final probabilities which
turns the cycle into two effective chains where belief
propagation can be run. In this case of more gen-
eral initial and final probabilities, the “external” and
“internal” dynamics are still the transpose of each
other, but P int2n = [P ext0 ]T and P intn = [P extn ]T . This
property still allows for the self-referential coupling
(SRC) to lead to a quantum dynamics characterized
by von Neumann equation, Eq. (D2), as discussed in
the main text and Appendix D 3. However, as also
discussed in Appendix G 3, for P0 to be consistent
with a standard density matrix, it may have to be
symmetric.
Anyways, this seems to bring us back to the formu-
lation of active inference presented in Appendix F 1,
where there is a pregiven environment dynamics,
specified by a generative process, that the scientist’s
generative model tries to mirror (see Fig. 7). How-
ever, this is not exactly so because the functional
form of both F` and G` co-emerge as a lawful reg-
ularity out of the many interactions scientists have
with the environment during the learning stage, when
they are familiarizing with the system under investi-
gation. This learning stage may involve the invention
and fine-tuning of new protocols, devices, and even
concepts (e.g., spacetime curvature) that enable sci-
entists to couple to the environment in ways that were
not possible before, and thus to enact new kinds of
lawful regularities.
For instance, the kind of regularities associated to
quantum and relativity theories, which are invisible
to the naked eye, are enabled by sophisticated exper-
imental protocols and devices, as well as conceptual
frameworks, all developed by scientists themselves.
The factors F` and G` characterize the end result of
this process. That is, the situation when the nec-
essary protocols, devices, and concepts are already
invented and standardized, the experiment is so well
designed that repeatability is achieved, and scientists
need only run the experiment a statistically signifi-
cant number of times. In other words, when “objec-
tivity” has been achieved.
In contrast, in the case of active inference as pre-
sented in Appendix F 1, although the generative pro-
cess Θ` depends on the scientist’s actions, its func-
tional form is usually considered fixed. The agent can
transform the functional form of its generative model
via learning, but it cannot transform the functional
form of the generative process. In the enactive view,
instead, it is as if the agent could transform the gen-
erative process as well—e.g., via the development of
new technologies—leading potentially to new kinds of
environment dynamics (e.g., lasers) and observation
mechanisms (e.g., Geiger counters). In other words,
“the world plays a role in learning that is different
from that of providing inputs to internal processing.
Nothing [...] prevents aspects of the dynamics of the
world forming constitutive parts of the learnt senso-
rimotor schemes” [35] (p. 105). Of course, we could
enlarge the notion of action in active inference to in-
clude changes in the functional form of the generative
process Θ`, but to our knowledge this is not how it is
usually interpreted.
e. Example: Two-slit experiment
Here we will first briefly review the two-slit exper-
iment to illustrate the phenomenon of quantum in-
terference, which is sometimes considered one of the
hallmarks of quantum physics (see Fig. 9A). After-
wards, we discuss how the imaginary-time version of
this phenomenon naturally arises in our framework
using factor graph models like those described by
Eq. (2) in the main text (see Fig. 9B). So, the formal
analogue of standard quantum interference arises af-
ter implementing the SRC associated to this model
to shift to the intrinsic perspective, as discussed in
general in the main text. Interference phenomena
has also been obtained using other approaches (see,
e.g., Ref. [107]). However, to our knowledge, none ac-
tually yields the full mathematical form of this phe-
nomenon. Indeed, if we ignore the SRC we can also
obtain (imaginary-time) quantum interference which,
though seemingly non-classical, does not completely
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FIG. 9: Two-slit experiment: (A) Standard (real-time) version of the two-slit experiment. A particle initially at
(vertical) position x = 0 at time t = 0 goes at time t = t1 through a barrier with two slits, located at positions x± = ±xslit,
and hits a screen at a generic position x at a generic time t. Slits can be open or closed. (B) Factor graph associated
to a scientist (Wigner’s friend) performing a two-slit experiment, as modelled by an external scientist (Wigner). The
real non-negative factors F0 and F1 capture the “external” dynamics between the source and the slits, and between
the slits and the screen, respectively. Factors G0 and G1 captures the dynamics “internal” to Wigner’s friend. Here x3
refers to the “internal” physical correlate of the position of the slits. When only one slit is open, say the slit located at
x+, consistency requires that x1 = x3 = x+. However, when both slits are open, x1 does not have to equal x3 anymore,
which yields the imaginary-time version of quantum interference.
coincides with standard quantum interference.
Two-slit experiment: Consider a particle that trav-
els from a source to a screen through a barrier with
two slits (see Fig. 9A). Let the probability amplitude
to go from x′ at time t′ to x at time t be given by
K∆t(x,x′), with ∆t = t − t′. Assume the particle
is initially localized in the source at (vertical) posi-
tion x = 0 (at time t = 0)—i.e., its initial state is
ψ(x,0) = δ(x), where δ stands for the Dirac delta
function. Then the state at time t is given by
ψ(x, t) = ∫ Kt(x,x′)ψ(x′,0)dx′ =Kt(x,0). (F13)
Now imagine that one of the two slits is closed,
so the particle can only go through one of them at
time t1. That is, x1 = x± where the upper and lower
sign denotes the situation where the particle has gone
through the upper and lower slit, respectively. In this
case, the state of the particle at time t is
ψ±(x, t) =K∆t(x,x±)Kt1(x±,0), (F14)
where ∆t = t− t1. The probability to find the particle
at position x in the screen at time t is
P±(x, t) = ∣ψ±(x, t)∣2. (F15)
So we can write
ψ±(x, t) = √P±(x, t)eiϕ±(x,t), (F16)
which defines the phases ϕ±(x, t).
If the two slits are open, instead, then the state of
the particle at time t is given by the superposition
ψboth(x, t) = 1√
2
[ψ+(x, t) + ψ−(x, t)] . (F17)
Here the factor 1/√2 is to guarantee that ψboth is
normalized. So, the probability to find the particle
at position x at time t is
Pboth(x, t) = ∣ψboth(x, t)∣2 = 1
2
[P+(x, t) +P−(x, t)] +√P+(x, t)P−(x, t) cos [∆ϕ(x, t)] . (F18)
where ∆ϕ(x, t) = ϕ+(x, t) − ϕ−(x, t).
Equation (F18) shows that the probabilities asso-
ciated to quantum states do not satisfy the sum rule
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of classical probability theory, i.e.,
Pboth(x, t) ≠ 1
2
[P+(x, t) +P−(x, t)] . (F19)
which is the phenomenon of quantum interference.
The factor 1/2 in the right hand side of Eq. (F19)
indicates that, due to symmetry between slits, the
particle can go through either slit with probability
1/2. The last term in Eq. (F18), which is proportional
to cos [∆ϕ(x, t)], is the interference term.
Factor graph model associated to the two slit-
experiment: We now discuss a factor graph model
associated to the two-slit experiment (see Fig. 9B).
We will see that it coincides with the imaginary-
time version of the standard quantum two-slit ex-
periment described above—i.e., with a hyperbolic co-
sine term instead of the cosine term in Eq. (F18), as
cosh(z) = cos(iz). Consider a path x̃ = (0, x1, x, x3)
that starts as before at the source located at x = 0
at t = 0 and goes through x1 ∈ {x+, x−}, x, and x3 at
times t1, t, and t3, respectively, to return to x = 0.
Here x3 is associated to the physical correlates of the
slits “internal” to Wigner’s friend in Fig. 9B. Follow-
ing Eq. (2) in the main text, the probability associ-
ated to this path is
P̃(0, x1, x, x3) = F0(x1,0)F1(x,x1)G1(x3, x)G0(0, x3).
(F20)
In general, factors F` and G` above do not have to
be related, but “objectivity” requires G` = FT` (see
Eq. (F7)).
If one of the two slits is closed, the particle can only
go through one of them at time t1. That is, x1 = x±
where the upper and lower sign denotes the situation
where the particle goes through the upper and lower
slit, respectively. In this case, the probability to find
the particle at position x at time t is given by
P±(x, t) ≡ 1
Zone
P(0, x±, x, x±), (F21)
where
Zone = Z± ≡ ∫ P(0, x±, x, x±)dx, (F22)
ensures that P± is normalized. Due to the symmetry
between slits, we have that Z± = Zone is the same for
both x±.
Following Eqs. (F20) and (F21) we can write (cf.
Eqs. (E32) and (E33) in Appendix E 1 c)
1√
Zone
F0(x±,0)F1(x,x±) = √P±(x, t)eS±(x,t), (F23)
1√
Zone
G1(x±, x)G0(0, x±) = √P±(x, t)e−S±(x,t), (F24)
which defines the imaginary-time phase S±.
If the two slits are open, instead, then the proba-
bility for the particle to be located at position x at
time t is given by
Pboth(x, t) ≡ 1
Zboth
∑
x1,x3∈{x+,x−}P(0, x1, x, x3) == C {1
2
[P+(x, t) +P−(x, t)] +√P+(x, t)P−(x, t) cosh [∆S(x, t)]} (F25)
where Zboth is a normalization constant, C =
2Zone/Zboth and
∆S(x, t) = S+(x, t) − S−(x, t). (F26)
The first two terms in the second line of Eq. (F25)
come from the elements of the sum with x1 = x3 = x±
(see Eq. (F21)). The last term in the second line of
Eq. (F25), which is the imaginary-time interference
term, comes from the elements of the sum with x1 ≠
x3, i.e.,
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F0(x+,0)F1(x,x+)G1(x−, x)G0(0, x−) = Zone√P+(x, t)P−(x, t)e∆S , (F27)
F0(x−,0)F1(x,x−)G1(x+, x)G0(0, x+) = Zone√P+(x, t)P−(x, t)e−∆S . (F28)
The right hand side of these equations is obtained by
using Eqs. (F23) and (F24).
Equation (F25) is the imaginary-time version of
Eq. (F18). Unlike the cosine term in Eq. (F18), whose
integral can vanish due to its oscillatory behavior, the
hyperbolic cosine term in Eq. (F25) is always posi-
tive. So, the constant C is required for Pboth to be
properly normalized.
Since the factors in Eqs. (F23) and (F24) are prod-
ucts of factors like those in Eqs. (4) in the main text,
the phases S±(x, t) are proportional to the time step
. So, under a Wick rotation  → i the right hand
side of Eqs. (F23) and (F24) turn into complex wave
functions like that in Eq. (F16) and the hyperbolic
cosine turns into a cosine, as cos(iz) = cosh(z) for
any z. Thus combining the approach above with the
SRC to implement the intrinsic perspective can lead
to standard quantum interference.
This provides a fresh perspective to think about
quantum interference. When Wigner’s friend has
information about which slit the particle goes
through—e.g., when only one stlit is open—this has
to be reflected in the physical correlates of the ex-
periment “internal” to her. So, x3 = x1 (see Fig. 9).
In this view, the imaginary-time version of quantum
interference arises because, when Wigner’s friend can-
not access any information about which slit the par-
ticle goes through, the values of x1 and x3 do not
have to coincide even though they refer to the same
“thing” (i.e., the slits). This fact, along with the SRC
described in the main text, can then be considered
from this perspective as the source of standard quan-
tum interference. This would be true no matter the
reason for which Wigner’s friend lacks ‘which-way’ in-
formation. Furthermore, our approach considers the
whole experimental setup, or context, from beginning
to end. So, it could also potentially take account of
variations of the two-slit experiments, such as delay
choice or quantum erasure experiments.
f. Observations as dynamical patterns: matter comes
and goes, but patterns persist
We would like to reflect now on the notion of ob-
server and the process of observation. To do so, we
would like to draw from the enactive approach to
mind and life. In this view, a living organism is not a
bunch of matter but rather a dynamical pattern sup-
ported on a flux of matter. While matter itself comes
and go, the dynamical pattern persists. In Thomp-
son’s words (emphasis ours):
An organism is a material being, and its re-
ality at any given moment coincides completely
with its material constitution. Yet this identity
cannot be based on the constancy of matter be-
cause its material composition is constantly re-
newed: ‘every five days you get a new stomach
lining. You get a new liver every two months.
Your skin replaces itself every six weeks. Every
year, ninety-eight percent of the atoms in your
body are replaced. This nonstop chemical re-
placement, metabolism, is a sure sign of life’...
Only at the level of form or pattern can we find
constancy in flux...
An organism identity is not bound to its ma-
terial constitution, for this constitution is con-
stantly renewed; its identity is accomplished dy-
namically at a formal level. Yet with this free-
dom comes a correlative necessity: the organism
has to change; stasis is impossible The organism
must eat and excrete; otherwise it dies. With-
out incessant metabolic exchange with the world
there can be no emancipation of dynamic self-
hood from mere material presence. (Ref. [25],
pp. 150-152)
Furthermore, the enactive approach attempts to
transcend dualisms—like that of action and percep-
tion or subject and object—by treating the poles of
a duality as co-defining each other through the holis-
tic process they are involved in. For instance, sensors
and effectors are not considered as two separate struc-
tures completely independent of each other. Rather,
they are understood as co-defined through the co-
constitutive role they play in the adaptive engage-
ments between agent and environment. In the words
of di Paolo et al. (emphasis ours):
[W]hen we speak of sensorimotor integration,
or mastering the laws of [sensorimotor contin-
gencies], we are not starting from separate pro-
cesses external to each other—the sensory and
the effector processes—which we then bring to-
gether into an explanation of action and percep-
tion. We start from already co-defined pairs (i.e.
from moments of a same adaptive engagement
between agent and environment). Distinguish-
able anatomic structures may become specialized
during development and evolution, and so be-
come reused and recombined into various differ-
ent adaptive engagements [...] We call this struc-
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tures sensors and effectors, but this is a reifica-
tion that hides the fact that what makes them so
is the co-constitutive role they play in the adap-
tive enactments of an agent. (Ref. [35], p. 139)
Similarly, rather than two polarities completely in-
dependent of each other, subject and world are con-
sidered as inseparable from each other. Referring
to Merleau-Ponty [108], Thompson says (citations to
Merleau-Ponty are omitted from this quote):
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the relation
between self and world is not that of subject to
object but rather what he calls, following Hei-
degger, being-in-the-world. For a bodily subject
it is not possible to specify what the subject is
in abstraction from the world, nor is it possible
to specify what the world is in abstraction from
the subject: “The world is inseparable from the
subject, but from a subject which is nothing but
a project of the world, and the subject is insepa-
rable fom the world, but from a world which the
subject itself projects...”
Things in the world bring forth suitable in-
tentional actions and motor projects from the
subject (the subject is a project of the world),
but things in the world have specific motor senses
or affordances only in relation to the motor
skills of the subject (the world is projected by
the subject). This body-environment circuit of
motor intentionality belongs to what Merleau-
Ponty calls “the intentional arc” subtending the
life of consciousness, which integrates sensibil-
ity and motility, perception and action. The
intentional arc and being-in-the-world are nei-
ther purely first-personal (subjective) nor purely
third-personal (objective), neither mental nor
physical. They are existential structures prior to
and more fundamental than these abstractions.
(Ref. [25], pp. 247-248)
So, from an enactive perspective the observer
and the observed could be seen as being co-defined
through the process of observation. The process of
observation itself could be seen as a circular dynam-
ical pattern supported on a flux of matter that may
come and go. It is not “internal” to the observer but
emerges from the circular coupling between observer
and world. It is analogous to a sensorimotor loop
possibly enabled by experimental devices that scien-
tists develop to couple to the environment in more
fundamental ways. Thanks to these devices, such a
dynamical pattern is not constrained by the cognitive
limitations of a particular kind of observer.
Furthermore, not only the observer and the ob-
served are relational to each other, but the process
of observation itself is relational. This was noticed
early on by Varela et al., who built on ideas from
Eastern philosophy like the so-called “Abhidharma”
(emphasis ours):
In the Abhidharma analysis of consciousness,
each moment of experience takes the form of a
particular consciousness that has a particular ob-
ject to which it is tied by particular relations.
For example, a moment of seeing consciousness
is composed of a seer (the subject) who sees (the
relation) a sight (the object)...
[The Indian philosoher] Nagarjuna attacks
the independent existence of all three terms—the
subject, the relation, and the object. (Ref. [27],
p. 221)
However, to our knowledge, there have not been
attempts to explicitly formalize this additional level
of relationalism in the enactive approach. The pres-
ence of Wigner as an external observer in this work
explicitly acknowledges such a relational nature (see
Fig. 1A in the main text). RQM also acknowledges
that the process of observation is relative to an ex-
plicit external observer. However, it does not attempt
to implement the intrinsic perspective. Here we al-
low Wigner and his friend to play alternative roles
(as Alice and Bob) to implement observations from
an intrinsic perspective (see Fig. 2).
By focusing on the process of observation itself
rather than on the subject-object polarities, enac-
tivism can help us address an apparent limitation
of our approach. For simplicity, we have focused on
modeling a single observer interacting with an ex-
perimental system. However, science is not limited
to one scientist. For instance the initial state of an
experimental system could be prepared by a scien-
tist and the final state be measured by another. In
this case, it would seem as if the experiment could be
performed without necessarily closing the loop. How-
ever, for one of these scientists to realize that there is
indeed a correlation between initial and final states,
the other has to accurately communicate what she
did or observed. This communication closes the loop.
Similarly, a scientist could prepare the initial state of
an experiment, write down clearly what he has done
for other scientists to understand it, and then sadly
die. Another scientist can read what the now de-
ceased scientist wrote, continue the experiment, and
observe the final state. This indirect communication
again closes the loop. Matter may come and go, but
the dynamical pattern persists.
Appendix G: Markov processes and
imaginary-time quantum dynamics
Here we first discuss the principle of maximum dy-
namical entropy, or principle of maximum caliber.
This is a general variational principle, similar to the
free energy principle, from which a variety of models
at, near, and far from equilibrium can be derived [36].
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We have used this principle in the main text to de-
rive the form of the stationary distribution over the
dynamical trajectories characterizing a scientist in-
teracting with an experimental system. We initially
focus on chains for simplicity.
Afterwards, we show that the belief propagation
(BP) algorithm, which is exact on chains, can be writ-
ten in a way formally analogous to imaginary-time or
Euclidean quantum dynamics [38]. More precisely,
BP messages play the role of imaginary-time wave
functions and the continuous-time limit of the BP it-
eration corresponds to the imaginary-time version of
Schro¨dinger equation. However, in this case the BP
messages on the leaves of the chain, which initiate the
BP iteration, can always be chosen constant.
We then discuss the case of cycles which is more in-
teresting. Indeed, the BP algorithm is not guaranteed
to be exact anymore [71]. However, we can choose ini-
tial and final conditions for the probability marginals
to effectively turn the cycle into a chain. This yield
the formal analogue of the general imaginary-time
quantum dynamics considered in Ref. [38].
1. Principle of maximum caliber and factor
graphs
The principle of maximum entropy [109] to de-
rive some common equilibrium probability distribu-
tions in statistical physics can be extended to the
so-called principle of maximum caliber to deal with
non-equilibrium distributions on trajectories [36]. In
particular Markov chains and Markov processes can
be derived from the principle of maximum caliber (see
e.g. Sec. IX B in Ref. [36]). We introduce this princi-
ple here with an example relevant for our discussion.
Consider a probability distribution Pch(x1, . . . , xn)
on (discretized) paths (x1, . . . , xn), where x` refers to
the position at time t = `. Here we will consider the
case of an open chain. Assume that we only have
information about the average energy on the (dis-
cretized) paths given by
Hav[Pch] = ⟨ 1
T
n−1∑`=0 H`(x`+1, x`)⟩Pch , (G1)
where T = n is the total time duration of the path,
and H` is the energy function at time step `. Here
⟨f⟩P = ∫ P(x0, . . . , xn)f(x0, . . . , xn)n−1∏`=0 dx`, (G2)
denotes the average value of a generic function f of
a path, with respect to a generic path probability
distribution P. For convenience, here we are using
integrals instead of sums, as in the main text. How-
ever, our analysis is valid for discrete variables too by
changing these integrals by sums, ∫ → ∑.
The principle of maximum caliber tells us that
among all possible probability distributions we should
choose the one that both maximizes the entropy
S[Pch] = − ⟨lnPch(x0, . . . , xn)⟩Pch , (G3)
and is consistent with the information we have, i.e.Hav[Pch] = Eav, where Eav is the fixed value of
the average energy. Introducing a Lagrange mul-
tiplier λ to enforce the constraint on the average
energy, the constrained maximization of S[Pch] be-
comes equivalent to the maximization of the La-
grangian S[Pch] − λHav[Pch]. The solution to this
problem is the distribution
Pch(x0, . . . , xn) = 1Z exp [− λT n−1∑`=0 H`(x`+1, x`)] ,
(G4)
where Z is the normalization factor.
Notice that Pch in Eq. (G4) can be written as a
product of factors
Pch(x0, . . . , xn) = 1
Z
n−1∏`=0 F`(x`+1, x`). (G5)
Without loss of generality, we can choose the factors
as
F`(x`+1, x`) = 1∣A∣ exp [− λT H`(x`+1, x`)] , (G6)
with ∣A∣ = √2piT/mλ, so Z = Z/∣A∣n in Eq. (G5).
2. Quantum-like formulation of stochastic
processes via the cavity method
a. Cavity messages as imaginary-time wave functions
Here we show how the belief propagation algorithm
obtained via the cavity method [39] (ch. 14) can
be formally written in terms of the imaginary-time
Schro¨dinger equation and its conjugate. First, notice
that by marginalizing the probability distribution de-
fined in Eq. (G5) over all variables except x` and x`+1
we obtain
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FIG. 10: Cavity method. (A) Factor graph associated to a Markov chain (see Eq. (G5)). (B) Graphical expression
for the pairwise marginal P`(x`+1, x`) (see Eq. (G7)); the partial partition functions Z→`(x`) (blue; see Eq. (G9))
and Z`+1←(x`+1) (red; see Eq. (G10)) correspond to the sum over all variables on the cavity graphs inside the dashed
rectangles, except for x` and x`+1 which are clamped to be able to recover the whole graphical model by multiplying
for F`(x`+1, x`). (C) The partial partition function Z→`+1(x`+1) (red) can be recursively computed by multiplying the
partial function Z→`(x`) and the factor F`(x`+1, x`) and tracing over x` (see Eq. (G11)). This is the content of the
belief propagation algorithm [39] specified by Eqs. (G11) and (G12).
P`(x`+1, x`) = 1
Z
F`(x`+1, x`)Z→`(x`)Z`+1←(x`+1), (G7)
p`(x`) = ∑
x`+1
P`(x`+1, x`) = 1
Z
Z→`(x`)Z`←(x`), (G8)
where the partial partition functions Z→`(x`) and
Z`←(x`) of the original factor graph are given by the
partition functions of the modified factor graphs that
contain all factors F`′ to the left (i.e. `′ < `) and to
the right (i.e. `′ ≥ `) of variable x`, respectively; i.e.
(see Fig. 10A,B; cf. Eq. (14.2) in Ref. [39]).
Z→`(x`) = ∫ `−1∏`′=0F`′(x`′+1, x`′)dx`′ , (G9)
Z`←(x`) = ∫ n−1∏`′=`F`′(x`′+1, x`′)dx`′+1. (G10)
Z→`(x`) and Z`←(x`) can be interpreted as informa-
tion that arrives to variable ` from the left and from
the right side of the graph, respectively.
By separating factor F`−1 and F` in Eqs. (G9) and
(G10), respectively, we can write these equations in
a recursive way as (see Fig. 10C; cf. Eq. (14.5) in
Ref. [39])
Z→`(x`) = ∫ F`−1(x`, x`−1)Z→`−1(x`−1)dx`−1,(G11)
Z`←(x`) = ∫ Z`+1←(x`+1)F`(x`+1, x`)dx`+1.(G12)
These recursive equations are usually referred to as
the belief propagation algorithm. Since the partial
partition functions are typically exponentially large,
Eqs. (G11) and (G12) are commonly written in terms
of normalized cavity messages ν→`(x) = Z→`(x)/Z→`
and ν`←(x) = Z`←(x)/Z`←, where Z→` and Z`← are
the corresponding normalization constants. This
choice of normalization has at least two advantages:
(i) it allows us to interpret the messages as proba-
bility distributions and (ii) it keeps the information
traveling from left to right separated from the infor-
mation traveling from right to left.
We will now show that a different choice of normal-
ization, i.e.
µ→`(x) = Z→`(x)√
Z
, µ`←(x) = Z`←(x)√
Z
, (G13)
which violates the features (i) and (ii) mentioned
above, allows us to connect the BP equations, i.e.
Eqs. (G11) and (G12), with those of Euclidean quan-
tum mechanics. Indeed, let us write
µ→`(x)µ`←(x) = p`(x), (G14)
µ→`(x)
µ`←(x) = e2φ`(x), (G15)
where Eq. (G14) comes from Eq. (G8) and Eq. (G15)
is a definition of the “effective field” or “phase”
φ`. Equations (G14) and (G15) imply that we can
parametrize the cavity messages in terms of p` and
φ` as
µ→`(x) = √p`(x)eφ`(x), (G16)
µ`←(x) = √p`(x)e−φ`(x), (G17)
which are the analogue of a “wave function” in imag-
inary time.
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b. Belief propagation as imaginary-time quantum
dynamics
In terms of the messages µ→` and µ`← in Eq. (G13),
the belief propagation equations (G11) and (G12) be-
come
µ→`(x) = ∫ F`−1(x,x′)µ→`−1(x′)dx′, (G18)
µ`←(x) = ∫ µ`+1←(x′)F`(x′, x)dx′, (G19)
where we have done x` = x, x`−1 = x′ in Eq. (G18),
and x`+1 = x′ in Eq. (G19). This contrasts with the
standard formulation in terms of the ν-messages de-
scribed after Eq. (G12), where the messages must be
renormalized at each iteration of the belief propaga-
tion equations (cf. Eq. (14.2) in Ref. [39]). Such iter-
ative renormalization is avoided here because the nor-
malization constant
√
Z is the same for all quantum-
like cavity messages. Equations (G18) and (G19) are
formally analogous to Eq. (2.16) in Ref. [40] and its
adjoint, respectively, which describe imaginary-time
quantum dynamics.
For concreteness let us consider the energy function
H`(x,x′) = m
2
(x − x′

)2 + V (x). (G20)
Due to the Gaussian term in the corresponding fac-
tors F` in Eq. (G6), the integrals in Eqs. (G18)
and (G19) can be approximated to first order in 
(cf. Appendix D 5 a). Indeed, since  → 0, the real
Gaussian factor associated to the quadratic term in
Eq. (G20) is exponentially small except in the re-
gion where ∣x − x′∣ = O(√h̵/m). This allow us to
estimate the integral to first order in  by expand-
ing the µ terms in Eqs. (G18) and (G19) around x
up to second order in x − x′. Consistent with this
approximation to first order in , we can also do
exp [−V (x)/h̵] = 1 − V (x)/h̵ + O(2) in factors F`.
In this way we get the equations
µ→`(x) = µ`−1(x) − λ
T
V`(x)µ→`(x) + T
2mλ
∂2µ→`(x)
∂x2
+O(2), (G21)
µ`←(x) = µ`+1←(x) − λ
T
V`(x)µ`←(x) + T
2mλ
∂2µ`←(x)
∂x2
+O(2). (G22)
Now, to get the continuous-time limit, let
µ→(x, `) = µ→`(x) and µ←(x, `) = µ`←(x), and ex-
pand µ→(x, t − ) = µ→(x, t) − µ˙→(x, t) as well as
µ←(x, t + ) = µ← + µ˙←(x, t), where t = ` and the dot
operator stands for time derivative. So, taking  → 0
we obtain
−T
λ
∂µ→(x, t)
∂t
= − T 2
2mλ2
∂2µ→(x, t)
∂x2
+ V (x, t)µ→(x, t), (G23)
T
λ
∂µ←(x, t)
∂t
= − T 2
2mλ2
∂2µ←(x, t)
∂x2
+ V (x, t)µ←(x, t), (G24)
which yields precisely the imaginary-time
Schro¨dinger equation and its adjoint, with h̵Y = T /λ
playing the role of Planck constant h̵. Indeed,
Eqs. (G23) and (G24) are formally analogous to Eqs.
(2.1) and (2.17) in Ref. [38]; the analogous of θ and
θ∗ therein are here µ← and µ→, respectively (but see
Appendix G 3).
3. Euclidean quantum mechanics: From linear
chains to cycles
Although Eqs. (G23) and (G24) look like
imaginary-time quantum dynamics, things are not
so interesting for chains. Indeed, the messages µ→0
and µn←, which correspond to the leaves of the chain
and serve as the initial conditions for Eqs. (G18) and
(G19), can always be chosen constant. The reason is
that there are no factors before F0 nor after Fn. In
contrast, imaginary-time quantum dynamics involve
more interesting initial and final conditions. Indeed,
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FIG. 11: Belief propagation on cycles. (A) Factor graph
with circular topology, in which belief propagation does
not generally lead to the correct marginals [71]. (B) By
conditioning on x0 and xn (black filled circles) we ef-
fectively turn the cycle into two chains—one “external”
(purple) and another “internal” (green)—with x0 and xn
clamped to some given values x∗0 and x∗n. Such clamp-
ing can be implemented via initial and final marginals
p0(x0) = δ(x0 − x∗0) and pn(xn) = δ(xn − x∗n). More gen-
erally, we can fix generic marginals p0 and pn and search
for solutions consistent with them.
besides Eqs. (G23) and (G24), the imaginary-time
quantum dynamics described in Ref. [38] is charac-
terized by general initial and final conditions (see
Eq. (2.14) therein). Moreover, belief propagation is
not exact on cycles [71].
To have some initial insight, notice that the prob-
ability distribution for a chain can be written as (see
Fig. 10a)
Pch(x0, . . . , xn) = p̃0(x0)n−1∏`=0 P̃`(x`+1∣x`), (G25)
where p̃0(x0) is the probability for the initial state
to be x0 and P̃`(x`+1∣x`) is the probability for the
system to perform a transition from state x` to state
x`+1 at time step `. This implies that we can gener-
ate a path or “history” (x0, . . . , xn) consistent withPch by first sampling from p̃0(x0) and then subse-
quently sampling from the conditional distributionsP̃`(x`+1∣x`), which leads to a Markov chain in states
x`. In analogy with physics, p̃0 could be said to be
the initial state that is propagated forward in time
according to the “mechanism” or “law” P̃`. In prin-
ciple, we can change the initial state p̃0 → p0 without
changing the “mechanism”, so the probability of a
path changes accordingly by replacing p̃0 by p0 in
Eq. (G25).
In contrast, for a cycle (see Fig. 11A)
P̃(x̃) = 1
Z
k−1∏`=0 F`(x`+1, x`), (G26)
this is not necessarily true. Here k = 2n, xk = x0
and x̃ = (x0, . . . , xn, . . . , xk−1). Consider the marginalP(x) = ∑xn+1,...,xk−1 P̃(x̃), where x = (x0, . . . , xn). In
general, we have
P(x0, . . . , xn) = p(x0, xn)n−2∏`=0 P`(x`+1∣x`, xn), (G27)
which has the structure of a Bernstein process (see,
e.g., the integrand in Eq. (2.7) in Ref. [38], where
p(x0, xn) → m(x, y) therein and P` → h therein).
Equation (G27) is related to the fact that we can
turn a cycle into two chains by conditioning on two
variables, say x0 = x∗0 and xn = x∗n (see Fig. 11b).
This yields the factorization
P(x1, . . . , xn−1∣x∗0, x∗n) = n−2∏`=0 P (x∗0,x∗n)` (x`+1∣x`),
(G28)
where
P(x∗0,x∗n)` (x`+1∣x`) = P`(x`+1∣x`, x∗0, x∗n) = P`(x`+1∣x`, x∗n),
(G29)
which is not a Markov chain in variables x` alone.
So, we cannot generate a path or history (x0, . . . , xn)
consistent with P by first sampling from a single vari-
able marginal p̃0(x0) and a Markovian “mechanism”
or “law” P̃`(x`+1∣x`) on variables x`. We certainly
can use a Markov chain to sample from P, but it
would have to be run for a time long enough to build
up the required correlations; it would not do the job
in a single pass. So, while Markov processes could be
said to naturally represent linear causality, so com-
mon in physics, Bernstein processes and its quantum-
like features (see below) could be considered as nat-
ural examples of reciprocal causality, so common in
cognitive science.
However, even though the system is not Markov
with respect to a chain on variables x` [37] (p. 16),
we can still describe it by multiple “Markov chains”
on x`, i.e., one per each choice of x
∗
0 and x
∗
n (see
Eq. (G28)). Colloquially, if we say that a “world” is
characterized by a chain of cause-effect relationships,
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cycles could be said to induce a kind of “many-world”
description of phenomena. Notice that the need to
condition on initial and final variables parallels the
need to fix initial and final conditions in physics, e.g.,
in the least action principle of classical mechanics or
the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics.
We now show that, even though the BP algorithm
is not exact on cycles [71], the dynamics can still
be naturally formulated in terms of imaginary-time
quantum dynamics. Assume that we know the initial
and final single-variable marginals, p0 and pn. Con-
ditioning on the initial and final variables turns the
cycle into two chains (see Fig. 11 B): an “external”
chain going from time step 0 to time step n (pur-
ple) and an “internal” chain going from time step n
to time step k = 2n (green). So, BP can become
exact again on each chain, as long as the messages
are consistent with the initial and final conditions.
We will see that if the “external” dynamics are given
by the probability matrix P ext0 then the “internal”
dynamics are given by the transposed matrix, i.e.,
P int` = [P ext` ]T . For generic initial and final condi-
tions, we have that P ext0 and P
ext
n are not necessarily
symmetric and can be given by “pure states”, yet still
satisfy an imaginary-time quantum dynamics. So,
the results presented in the main text can in princi-
ple be extended to general probability matrices.
Indeed, we can formulate the dynamics on the “ex-
ternal” chain in terms of messages µ→` and µ`← satis-
fying Eqs. (G18) and (G19) as well as the initial and
final conditions (cf. Eq. (2.14) in Ref. [38])
p0(x) = µ→0(x)µ0←(x)= µ→0(x)∫ µn←(x′)F̃0(x′, x)dx′, (G30)
pn(x) = µ→n(x)µn←(x)= [∫ F̃0(x,x′)µ→0(x′)dx′]µn←(x),(G31)
where F̃0 = Fn−1⋯F0. In the continuous-time limit,
this yields the formal analogue of the imaginary-time
quantum dynamics presented in Ref. [38].
We can also formulate the dynamics of the “inter-
nal” chain, which goes from time step n to time step
k = 2n, in an analogous way. It is convenient to use
k − `, with ` = 0, . . . , n − 1, as time step index. The
dynamics of the messages ν→k−` and νk−`← for the
“internal” chain satisfy
ν→k−`(x) = ∫ Fk−`−1(x,x′)ν→k−`−1(x′)dx′,(G32)
νk−`←(x) = ∫ νk−`+1←(x′)Fk−`(x′, x)dx′, (G33)
which are analogous to Eqs. (G19) and (G18). Fur-
thermore, the ν-messages must satisfy the boundary
conditions
pn(x) = ν→n(x)νn←(x)= ν→n(x)∫ νk←(x′)F̃n(x′, x)dx′, (G34)
pk(x) = ν→k(x)νk←(x)= [∫ F̃n(x,x′)ν→n(x′)dx′]νk←(x),(G35)
which are analogous to Eqs. (G30) and (G31). Here
F̃n = Fk−1⋯Fn and pk = p0 as they refer to the same
variable, x0.
Now, taking into account that Fk−`−1 = FT` (see
Eq. (F7)), Eqs. (G32) and (G33) become
ν→k−`(x) = ∫ FT` (x,x′)ν→k−`−1(x′)dx′, (G36)= ∫ ν→k−`−1(x′)F`(x′, x)dx′
νk−`←(x) = ∫ νk−`+1←(x′)FT`−1(x′, x)dx′,(G37)= ∫ F`−1(x,x′)νk−`+1←(x′)dx′.
Equations (G36) and (G37) are equivalent to
Eqs. (G19) and (G18), respectively. We can see this
by doing (notice that arrows point in opposite direc-
tions)
ν→k−` = µ`←, (G38)
νk−`← = µ→`. (G39)
So, every solution to the “external” chain
dynamics—characterized by a probability ma-
trix P ext` (x,x′) = µ→`(x)µ`←(x′)—yields, through
Eqs. (G38) and (G39), a solution to the “internal”
chain dynamics—characterized by a probability ma-
trix P intk−`(x,x′) = ν→k−`(x)νk−`←(x′) = P ext` (x′, x).
Using matrix notation, P intk` = [P ext` ]T is given by
the transpose of P ext` . In particular, P
int
k = [P ext0 ]T
and P intn = [P extn ]T . So, both solutions satisfy the
corresponding boundary conditions since p0(x) =
P ext0 (x,x) = P intk (x,x) and pn(x) = P extn (x,x) =
P intn (x,x). In analogy with the case of a chain stud-
ied at the beginning of this subsection, p0 and pn
could be considered as fixed initial and final states
connected via the “mechanism” or “law” F`. So, in
this case we also obtain an imaginary-time quantum
dynamics and its transposed for the “external” and
“internal” chains, respectively. Furthermore, the ini-
tial state is also related by the transposed operation,
which allows for the implementation of the SRC in
the main text to yield a quantum dynamics (see Ap-
pendix D 3).
There are proofs of existence and uniqueness of
the positive solutions of Eqs. (G18) and (G19) with
the boundary conditions in Eqs. (G30) and (G31),
for p0 and pn without zeros, with various degrees
of generality (see, e.g., Refs. [38, 40] and references
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therein). Clearly, the same applies to Eqs (G32) and
(G33) with the boundary conditions in Eqs. (G34)
and (G35). In particular, they hold for the Hamilto-
nian in Eq. (7) in the main text. However, after im-
plementing the SRC we obtain a dynamics formally
analogous to quantum dynamics, which is not any-
more equivalent to the imaginary-time version.
In our approach, the two dynamics only have to
coincide on the initial state of the system. The
imaginary-time quantum formalism is only an inter-
mediate step regarding how things would look to an
imaginary external scientist. The real-time quantum
formalism is associated to how things actually look
to a genuine scientist from her own intrinsic perspec-
tive, the only perspective she has as far as we know.
So, we might not need to be concerned with the ex-
istence of solutions for the imaginary-time quantum
dynamics, but rather with the existence of solutions
for the real-time quantum formalism that results af-
ter the SRC is implemented—although this may be
connected via a Wick rotation [38].
The joint marginal (see Eq. (G27); cf. Eq. (G7))
p(x0, xn) = µn←(xn)F̃0(xn, x0)µ→0(x0)= νk←(xk)F̃n(xk, xn)ν→n(xn), (G40)
where xk = x0 and the second equality comes from
Eqs. (G38) and (G39) and the fact that F̃n = F̃T0 .
This joint marginal is associated to a Bernstein pro-
cess that is also Markovian (cf. Eq. (2.9) in Ref. [38];
µ→0, µn←, and F̃0 here correspond, respectively, to
θ∗, θ, and h therein). Indeed, using Eqs. (G7), (G8)
and (G13) we can write
P +`(x`+1∣x`) = P`(x`+1, x`)
p`(x`)= F`(x`+1, x`)µ`+1←(x`+1)
µ`←(x`) , (G41)P −`(x`∣x`+1) = P`(x`+1, x`)
p`+1(x`+1)= F`(x`+1, x`) µ→`(x`)
µ→`+1(x`+1) , (G42)
for the forward and backward transition probabilities
of Markov process equivalent to the Bernstein process
(cf. Eqs. (2.12) and (2.11) in Ref. [38]; P +` and P −`
here correspond, respectively, to q and q∗ therein.).
So, in this case, we can generate paths or histories
consistent with the whole distribution, Eq. (G27), by
first sampling from p0 and propagating the sample
forward with P +` as in a standard Markov chain—
information about pn is already encoded in the BP
messages. Similarly, we can first sample from pn and
propagate the sample backwards with P −`.
More generally, following the analogy with quan-
tum mechanics, we could in principle search for
“mixed” solutions where p0(x) = ∑α λαpα0 (x) and
pn(x) = ∑α λαpαn(x)—the index α could be real, in
which case the sum turns into an integral. Here, for
each “pure state” α, pα0 and p
α
n are connected through
BP messages, {µα→`, µα`←} and {να→k−`, ναk−`←}, via the
“external” and “internal” chains, respectively. Fur-
thermore, λα ≥ 0 denotes the probability (or proba-
bility density) associated to α. This expands the set
of possible solutions since these “mixed” solutions in-
clude the “pure” ones when λα ≠ 0 for only one value
of α. However, we are not aware of formal results on
this more general setting.
The approach discussed here can in principle ex-
tend the results of the main text to initial asymmetric
probability matrices. However, these do not seem to
lead to initial density matrices consistent with stan-
dard quantum theory.
Consider a two-state system with initial pure prob-
ability matrix (cf. Eqs. (G16) and (G17))
P0 = ( √peφ1√
1 − peφ2)(√pe−φ1 √1 − pe−φ2)
= ( p √p(1 − p)e∆φ√
p(1 − p)e−∆φ 1 − p ) ,
(G43)
where ∆φ = φ1−φ2. The corresponding initial density
matrix ρ = (P +PT )/2+(P −PT )/2i is not necessarily
a standard quantum pure state, unless P0 = PT0 is
symmetric, i.e., ∆φ = 0.
Moreover, a generic mixed density matrix for a two-
state system can be written as
ρ =∑
α
λαρ
α, (G44)
where
ρα = ( pα √pα(1 − pα)ei∆ϕα√
pα(1 − pα)e−i∆ϕα 1 − pα ) ,
(G45)
is a pure density matrix, ∆ϕ is the phase difference,
0 ≤ λα and ∑α λα = 1. The magnitudes of the off-
diagonal elements are given by
∣∑
α
λα
√
pα(1 − pα)e±i∆ϕα ∣ ≤∑
α
λα
√
pα(1 − pα) ≤ 1,
(G46)
which are not larger than one because they are an
average of quantities
√
pα(1 − pα) whose magnitudes
are smaller than one. In contrast, the off-diagonal el-
ements in Eq. (G43) can be larger than one if ∆φ ≠ 0.
The analysis above suggests that only initial probabil-
ity matrices that are symmetric can be associated to
a standard density matrix. This is consistent with the
presentation in the main text, since P0 = F̃T0 F̃0 = PT0
therein. The question of whether the more general
case can have a physical interpretation is left for the
future.
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4. Standard Markov chains in terms of square
roots of probabilities
In the previous subsection we argued that asym-
metric initial probability matrices cannot in general
be mapped to an standard density matrix. So, a con-
sistent starting pure state in our approach must take
the form ρ0(x,x′) = √p(x)p(x′). That is, it should
be given by the square roots of the starting marginals
p(x). Here we discuss how such square roots of prob-
abilities can naturally appear in standard Markov
chains. Indeed, using the product rule of probabil-
ity theory we can write the pairwise marginals in the
three different waysP`(x`, x`+1) = P +`(x`+1∣x`)p`(x`)= P −`(x`∣x`+1)p`+1(x`+1)= θ`+1(x`+1)K`(x`+1, x`)θ`(x`) (G47)
where P +` and P −` denote the forward and backward
transition probabilities, respectively, and
θ`(x`) = √p`(x`), (G48)
K`(x`, x`+1) = √P +`(x`+1∣x`)P −`(x`∣x`+1).(G49)
The less common, more symmetric alternative in the
third line of Eq. (G47) is obtained by multiplying the
first two lines in Eq. (G47) and taking the square
root.
Equation (G49) can be written as
K`(x`+1, x`) =P +`(x`+1∣x`)¿ÁÁÀ p`(x`)
p`+1(x`+1)
=P +`(x`+1∣x`) θ`(x`)
θ`+1(x`+1) ,
(G50)
by using Bayes rule to change P −` in Eq. (G49) forP +`. Using Eqs. (G48), (G50), and
p`+1(x`+1) = ∫ P +`(x`+1∣x`)p`(x`)dx`, (G51)
we can readily see that
θ`+1(x`+1) = ∫ K`(x`+1, x`)θ`(x`)dx`. (G52)
Equation (G49) can also be written as
K`(x`+1, x`) =P −`(x`∣x`+1)¿ÁÁÀp`+1(x`+1)
p`(x`)
=P −`(x`∣x`+1)θ`+1(x`+1)
θ`(x`) ,
(G53)
by using Bayes rule to change P +` in Eq. (G49) for P −`,
instead. Using Eqs. (G48), (G53), and the reverse of
(G51), i.e.
p`(x`) = ∫ P −`(x`∣x`+1)p`+1(x`+1)dx`+1, (G54)
we can readily see that
θ`(x`) = ∫ θ`+1(x`+1)K`(x`+1, x`)dx`. (G55)
Equations (G50) and (G53) are similar to
Eqs. (G18) and (G19) as well as to Eqs. (2.12) and
(2.11) in Ref. [38], respectively, where K` here plays
the role of h therein. There is a difference, though,
in that here the wave-like functions θ` do not have
a phase; they are strictly equal to the square root of
the corresponding probability.
5. A potential alternative road to classical
mechanics
Here we show that the “classical” limit of
imaginary-time quantum dynamics, i.e., h̵Y → 0, can
follow a dynamics formally analogous to imaginary-
time classical dynamics. We focus on energy func-
tions of the form (cf. Eq. (1) in the main text)
H(x,x′) =m(x − x′)2/2 + V (x). (G56)
From an extrinsic perspective, the system com-
posed of observer and experimental system is de-
scribed by the probability distribution P(x) to ob-
serve a path x = (x0, . . . , xn)—see Fig. 1 and Eqs. (2)
and (4) in the main text. In the h̵Y → 0 limit,
the system follows the most probable path, which
is the one that minimizes the total energy function∑`H(x`+1, x`), given initial and final conditions, x0
and xn. Such optimal path satisfies therefore the
equations
∂H(x`+1, x`)
∂x`
+ ∂H(x`, x`−1)
∂x`
= 0 (G57)
for 0 < ` < n−1, except that the end points, ` = 0 and
` = n − 1 are fixed. Using Eq. (G56) this yields
m [x`+1 − 2x` + x`−1
2
] = ∂V (x`)
∂x`
. (G58)
Since in the continuous-time limit,  → 0, the term
in square brackets in the left hand side of Eq. (G58)
is the acceleration, this is Newton equation in an in-
verted potential −V . Under a Wick rotation,  → i,
Eq. (G58) turns into the actual Newton equation in
the potential V with the correct sign (cf. Eqs. (D8)
and (D9) in Appendix D 1).
We see that the need to condition on initial
and final states, so common in physics—e.g., the
least action principle formulation of classical mechan-
ics and the path integral formulation of quantum
mechanics—arises naturally here as a way to break
the underlying circularity (see Appendix G 3). Such
a circularity can also be broken by conditioning on
two consecutive variables x0 and x1, which amounts
at conditioning on initial position and velocity. This
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suggests that the reciprocal causality, associated to
the embodied observer, might be responsible for the
fact that the fundamental equations of physics are
typically second-order differential equations in terms
of a kind of physical variable, e.g., position only, in-
stead of the more parsimonious, first-order equations.
Now, imaginary-time classical dynamics turns into
real-time classical dynamics after a Wick rotation,
acquiring a symplectic structure associated to “en-
ergy” function H`. Furthermore, the SRC in the
main text effectively implements a Wick rotation that
turns imaginary-time into real-time quantum dynam-
ics. So, it is natural to expect that a suitably adapted
version of the SRC coupling could turn imaginary-
time into real-time classical dynamics too. The Wick
rotation is common in special and general relativ-
ity too. So, while reciprocal causality might be the
reason for the fundamental equations of physics to
be second-order, the SRC, associated to the intrinsic
perspective, might be the reason such equations ac-
quire a symplectic structure associated to an energy
function when these laws are written in terms of a
pair of conjugated variables.
Appendix H: Self-reference and science
Here we discuss how self-reference may play a key
role in science in general, and physics in particular for
the reader that may not be familiar with this concept
that plays a central role in our approach. Our goal
is to facilitate the review of the literature on self-
reference and to provide some initial ideas on how
this concept might help us build a more encompass-
ing, manifestly self-referential (or reflexive) scientific
framework [26–29] (see also Ref. [55], ch. 17,18).
We first briefly describe some common strategies
to deal with self-referential systems in biology, com-
puter science, and logic. These strategies are usually
based on a pair of objects that either mutually refer
to each other or are initially treated as two generic
objects that end up referring to the same system.
In particular, we discuss Kleene’s recursion theorem,
which formalizes self-reference using the former type
of strategy. In the main text we build on these ideas
to implement the intrinsic perspective.
Afterwards, we argue that science may greatly ben-
efit by following the example of computation that
fully embraces self-reference, rather than trying to
avoid it—as scientists have usually done perhaps
due to the puzzling phenomena associated to self-
reference. Indeed, computation—whose power is in-
trinsically tied to self-reference—is a concrete, well-
defined mathematical example of the viability and
potential advantages of embracing self-reference. A
manifestly self-referential scientific framework would
be in line with neurophenomenology, which combines
refined first- and third-person methods for investigat-
ing consciousness (see Appendix C). Finally, consis-
tent with our approach, we discuss some potential
relationships between quantum theory and some as-
pects of self-reference.
1. Some aspects of self-reference
Here we discuss some aspects of self-reference with
the aim to provide some intuition to the readers that
may not be familiar with it. The main point we want
to highlight is that the strategies to deal with self-
reference often involve pairs of elements that, in a
sense, play complementary roles by mutually refer-
ring to each other or by representing the same ob-
ject in two different ways. In particular, we discuss
Kleene’s recursion theorem which could be considered
as a mathematical formalization of these ideas. A
similar strategy is used in the main text to build mod-
els of observers that can refer to themselves. Here we
also highlight that self-reference is associated with
both strength, e.g., universality, and weakness, e.g.,
incompleteness and undecidability.
a. A kind of “complementarity”
A common example of self-referential system is
the DNA molecule, which can help produce a copy
of itself. Key in achieving this is an architecture
composed of two complementary subsystems, two
strands, that enable the production of a copy of each
other. In doing so, each strand plays dual roles, ac-
tive and passive, when participating in the replication
of and when being replicated by the other strand, re-
spectively. A computational analog, though less sym-
metric, is the Python 3 program in Fig. 2B in the
main text which prints out a copy of its own code.
Again, key in achieving this is an architecture com-
posed of two strings. The top string passively refers
to the string below, while the bottom string actively
prints out the top string. This complementary ar-
chitecture of Turing machines that can refer to them-
selves is formalized in Kleene’s recursion theorem (see
Appendix H 1 d). The Python 3 code in Fig. 2B cor-
responds to the particular case of a Turing machine
TM that, for any input w, prints its own code “TM”,
i.e. TM(w) = “TM”.
Generally, a self-referential system plays both an
active role, as the “subject” that is doing the act of
referring (to itself), and a passive role, as the “object”
that is being referred to (by itself). In particular,
the self-referential capabilities of computer programs
sprout from the possibility to assign to each program
(an active “subject”) a string of characters (a passive
“object”), i.e., the code that generates it. Since pro-
grams output and take as input strings of characters,
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they can in particular output or take as input their
own code. Indeed, it is possible to formulate com-
putation in a manifestly self-referential way, e.g., via
λ-Calculus (see Appendix H 2 a).
b. Universality
In computation, self-reference is closely related
to universality. In particular, without self-reference
there cannot be universal Turing machines [54] (ch.
7). One way in which a Turing machine can refer to
itself relies on a Universal Turing machine
U(“TM”,w) = TM(w). (H1)
This is a two-input Turing machine which builds the
Turing machine TM whose code is given by the first
input, “TM”’, runs it on the second input w, and
outputs the result, TM(w). In this sense, the first
and second inputs of U in Eq. (H1) play active and
passive roles, respectively. Since w can be any string
of characters, it can be w = “TM” which yields
U(“TM”, “TM”) = TM(“TM”), i.e. a Turing ma-
chine TM running on (a description of) itself.
c. Undecidability and incompleteness
Self-reference can lead to puzzling phenomena like
undecidability and incompleteness. Here we briefly
discuss these two consequences of self-reference. In
Appendix H 3 we briefly discuss some potential
analogies of these phenomena in the case of (self-
referential) observers, which may have implications
for the ideas developed in the main text.
The strategy of using functions of two vari-
ables playing effectively dual roles, such as U in
Eq. (H1), to study self-referential systems is rather
common [110]. We now consider two additional ex-
amples associated to undecidability and incomplete-
ness.
First, assume there exists a special Turing ma-
chine [54]
Halts(“TM”,w) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩1, if TM halts on w,0, otherwise, (H2)
that determines whether an arbitrary Turing ma-
chine TM, whose code is given by the first input
“TM”, halts when run on the second input, w. It
would then be possible to build another special Tur-
ing machine, Catch22(“TM”), which loops forever
if Halts (“TM”, “TM”) = 1 and outputs 1 other-
wise. Then Halts(“Catch22”, “Catch22”) would
be undefined since Catch22(“Catch22”) halts if
and only if it does not. So, the halting problem is
undecidable.
Now, consider a formal system that makes state-
ments about natural numbers. Examples of state-
ments are axioms and theorems. Proofs of theo-
rems are also statements, made of sequences of state-
ments, connecting axioms to theorems. Statements
and numbers are the analog of Turing machines and
the strings of characters on which they operate, re-
spectively. As with Turing machines, it is also pos-
sible to assign to each statement S (an active “sub-
ject”) a natural number “S” (a passive “object”), i.e.,
the so-called Go¨del number of the statement. This al-
lows statements to refer to themselves. For instance,
let [110]
Prov(x, y) ≡ “y is the Go¨del number of a proof of a statement whose Go¨del number is x.” (H3)
and consider the statement S(x) ≡ (∀y)¬Prov(x, y),
which contains a numeric variable x. In words,S(x) states that there is no proof for the statement
whose Go¨del number is x. It is possible to find a
natural number x∗ which equals the Go¨del number
“S(x∗)” of the corresponding statement S(x∗), i.e.
x∗ = “S(x∗)”. The statement S(x∗) is referring to it-
self: it states that there is no proof for the statement
whose Go¨del number is “S(x∗)”, i.e. that there is no
proof for itself. So, the formal system is incomplete.
d. Kleene’s recursion theorem
Here we briefly discuss the recursion theorem of
computer science, which can be considered as a math-
ematical formalization of the concept of self-reference.
Figure 2B in the main text illustrates the core con-
cept underlying the recursion theorem using the spe-
cific case of a self-printing program, or quine. A self-
printing program is composed of two complementary
sub-programs, say Alice and Bob, that, like the up-
per and lower strings in the Python 3 program in
Fig. 2B, essentially print each other.
Interestingly, since Turing machines can be
implemented using Recurrent Neural Networks
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A
Qw fQ(w) = "PRINTw"
B
FIG. 12: Inferring the description of a printing machine. (A) Cartoon example of a Turing machine (represented here
by a computer) that, given some input (here a face), prints the description of a Turing machine (represented here by a
Tablet within quotation marks) that prints the given input. (B) A more formal representation of the Turing machine in
(A), here called Q. Ref. [43] uses Q to proof the recursion theorem. The input is a string w of characters from a suitable
alphabet, and the Turing machine that prints w is called Printw. The Turing machine Q basically infers Printw,
effectively implementing the function fQ that maps w into “Printw”. Proving the existence of Q is straightforward
(see Ref. [43], ch. 6).
ALICE BOB"BOB" "ΡRINT"TM"∘TM""TM"
BOB "PRINT"BOB"∘BOB" = "ALICE∘BOB" ALICE
"BOB"
A
C
B
= "SELF" 
FIG. 13: Self-printing Turing machine. (A) The Turing machine Alice = Print“Bob” prints a description of the
Turing machine Bob. But how is Bob defined? (B) Bob takes as input the description “TM” of a generic Turing
machine TM and infers, via Q (see Fig. 12), the description of a Turing machine Print“TM” that prints “TM”. Bob
then composes the Turing machine Print“TM” with the Turing machine TM and outputs the corresponding description,
i.e. “Print“TM” ○TM”; composition is represented here by the symbol ○. (C) The Turing machine Self = Alice○Bob
that results from the composition of Alice and Bob outputs a description of itself, as it can be seen by doing TM =
Bob in (B) and using Alice = Print“Bob”.
(RNNs) [51, 51, 53, 111], we can expect that a RNN
that can refer to itself should have a similar archi-
tecture. That is, a self-referential RNN, say NSelf =NAlice ○ NBob, should be composed of two subnet-
works, NAlice and NBob, that mutually refer to (e.g.,
model) each other (see below). Since RNNs also serve
as models of biological neural networks, this suggests
that double-hemisphere architecture of the brain and
the global architecture of the central nervous system,
which is composed of the right and left neural sub-
networks, may be a way for this neural system to im-
plement or enhance self-reference. For instance, since
neural networks are usually interpreted as encoding
models of data, this architecture of the brain and ner-
vous system may be a way to acquire or enhance self-
modeling capabilities. It is natural to expect, though,
that such capabilities are encoded at different scales
to enhance the resilience of the system to failures and
the like, as suggested by patients who have a single
functional brain hemisphere or whose corpus callosum
has been severed [112, 113].
We now formalize the recursion theorem following
Ref. [43] (chapter 6; see also Ref. [114]). Let Σ be
an alphabet, i.e. a finite set of characters, and let
Σ∗ denote the set of all possible strings of charac-
ters from alphabet Σ, here referred to as words. A
Turing machine is an abstract machine with no mem-
ory constraints which can manipulate the characters
in an alphabet Σ according to a pre-specified set of
rules. In other words, a Turing machine is the im-
plementation of an abstract mechanical process that
transforms a given string of characters into another,
effectively computing a given function f ∶ Σ∗ → Σ∗.
It is possible to associate to every Turing machine
TM a unique string of characters “TM” ∈ Σ∗, which
is referred to as the description of the Turing machine;
the quotation marks “ ” can be considered here as an
operator that transform Turing machines into strings
in Σ∗. A Turing machine TM is the abstract version
of a program, e.g. a search engine, that can run on
a computer to perform a given task, e.g. search for
websites related to a specific keyword. A description
of a Turing machine “TM”, instead, is the abstract
version of the code written in a specific programming
language that is used to compile the corresponding
program. This ability to associate a unique string
of characters to a Turing machine is what allows a
Turing machine to implement self-reference. Indeed,
from this perspective we can think of a Turing ma-
chine TM as a string of characters, i.e. its description
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“TM”, that can manipulate any string of characters
w ∈ Σ∗, including its own description, i.e. w = “TM”.
In this sense, it can manipulate (a description of) it-
self.
An example relevant for our discussion is the Tur-
ing machine Q represented as a computer in Fig. 12A.
Given some input (e.g. the image of a face in
Fig. 12A), the Turing machine Q prints the descrip-
tion of another Turing machine, represented by a
tablet within quotation marks in Fig. 12A, that prints
the given input. More formally, the Turing machine
Q implements a function fQ, represented by a box
in Fig. 12B, that takes as input any word w ∈ Σ∗
and prints the description “Printw” of another Tur-
ing machine Printw that ignores its input and just
prints w. The existence of such a Turing machine is
proven in the
Lemma 6.1 of Ref. [43]: There is a computable
function fQ ∶ Σ∗ → Σ∗ such that, for any string w,
fQ(w) = “Printw” is the description of a Turing ma-
chine Printw that ignores its input, just print w and
halts.
The Turing machine Q is useful to build self-
printing Turing machines, as illustrated in Fig. 13.
As we said above, a self-printing Turing machine
Self = Alice ○Bob, (H4)
is composed of two Turing machines, Alice and Bob,
that essentially print each other. Figure 13A shows
the Turing machine
Alice = Print“Bob”, (H5)
which ignores its input, prints a description “Bob”
of the Turing machine Bob, and halts. Now, if
Bob
?= Print“Alice” were to similarly ignore its in-
put, just print a description of Alice, and halt, we
would have a circular definition were the definition of
Alice depends on who Bob is, and vice versa.
To avoid such circular definition, Bob essentially
works backwards by inferring the description of Al-
ice from the output she produces, which is “Bob”
(see Fig. 13B). This is precisely what the Turing ma-
chine Q does: given an input w = “Bob” it prints
the description “Print“Bob”” of a Turing machine
Print“Bob” that ignores its input, prints w = “Bob”,
and halts.
So, when Q takes the input “Bob” it out-
puts precisely “Alice”, since Print“Bob” = Alice.
But the full self-printing machine actually is
Self = Alice ○Bob (see Fig. 13C), so Bob is de-
signed such that (see Fig. 13B): (i) it takes as input
the description “TM” of an arbitrary Turing machine
TM and infers via Q the description of a Turing ma-
chine that prints “TM”; (ii) it then generates the
composition Print“TM”○TM of the Turing machines
associated to the description “Print“TM””, that it
inferred via Q from the given input “TM”, and to
the description “TM” it receives as input; (iii) it
finally prints the description “Print“TM” ○TM” of
such composition. This fully specifies Bob in a way
that is independent of who Alice is, i.e.
Bob = “TM”Print“Print“TM”○TM”. (H6)
Notice that the first Print operator in the definition
of Bob in Eq. (H6) has also a left subscript “TM”,
which indicates its input; this contrasts with the def-
inition of Alice which does not have such a left sub-
script indicating that it always ignores its input.
So, we can now fully specify Alice by replacing
Bob in Eq. (H5) by the left hand side of Eq. (H6).
With both Alice and Bob fully specified, we can
fully specify Self in Eq. (H4) too. See Fig. 13 and
Ref. [43] (ch. 6) for further details.
Now, a Turing machine not only can print its own
description, it can also use it as an input and perform
general computational operations with it. Further-
more, a Turing machine (illustrated in Fig. 14A by a
big computer) can take a combined input composed of
external data (e.g. the imagine of a face in Fig. 14A)
and its own description (illustrated in Fig. 14A by
a small computer printed within quotation marks on
the screen of the big computer) and perform general
computational operations with it. Figure 14A illus-
trates this by a computer that takes as external input
the image of a face and print a description of a ro-
tated version of itself printing a rotated version of the
face.
The architecture of such general Turing machine,
that we call here Recursion, is composed of three
Turing machines (see Fig. 14b): Alice and Bob,
which together generate the description of Recur-
sion, and another 2-argument Turing machine RT
that takes as inputs both an arbitrary word w ∈ Σ∗
provided from the outside and the description of Re-
cursion generated from the inside of Recursion it-
self by the composition of Alice and Bob, i.e.
Recursion = Alice ○Bob○RT; (H7)
here the superscript ○ indicates the output of Bob is
passed to the upper input channel of RT.
The definition of Alice is slightly modified to
take into account the new Turing machine RT (see
Fig. 14C), i.e.
Alice = Print“Bob○RT”. (H8)
The definition of Bob instead remains the same as
in Eq. (H6) since it was defined in terms of a generic
Turing machine TM (see Fig. 14D). The 2-argument
Turing machine RT implements the actual computa-
tions according to a given 2-argument function fRT;
it is similarly defined in terms of a generic Turing
machine TM whose description enters through the
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upper input channel, leaving its lower input channel
free to receive external data w ∈ Σ∗ (see Fig. 14E,F).
This proves the (see Fig. 14 and chapter 6 in Ref. [43]
for further details)
Recursion theorem (Theorem 6.3 in Ref. [43]):
Let RT be a Turing machine that computes a 2-
argument function fRT ∶ Σ∗ ×Σ∗ → Σ∗. Then there is
another Turing machine Recursion that computes a
function fRecursion ∶ Σ∗ → Σ∗, where for every w ∈ Σ∗,
fRecursion(w) = fRT(“Recursion”,w).
2. Self-reference, relationalism, and non-duality
Self-reference is both powerful and puzzling. On
the one hand, without self-reference universal Tur-
ing machines cannot exist. On the other hand, self-
reference can lead to puzzling phenomena such as in-
completeness and undecidability. The latter feature
has historically made scientists and mathematicians
try to avoid self-reference. We start by briefly dis-
cussing why this may not be the most scientifically
useful attitude and how self-reference has been actu-
ally fully embraced in some domains of mathematics
in a rigorous and systematic way. Based on this ini-
tial discussion, we argue next that similar considera-
tions may apply to the case of science in general, and
that there may indeed be a close relationship between
self-reference and relationalism, which has played a
relevant role in scientific progress. Finally, we dis-
cuss the particular case of the potential relationalism
between subject and object, or “subject/object non-
duality”. This opens up the possibility of enlarging
science to incorporate “self-referential experiments”,
where scientists could rigorously and systematically
both investigate themselves and agree on their per-
sonal experiences, e.g., via meditative techniques. In
Appendix H 3, we briefly discuss quantum indetermi-
nacy and how it might be related to incompleteness
and undecidability.
a. Manifestly self-referential frameworks
Historically, mathematics tried to avoid self-
reference by holding a strict hierarchy with numbers
at the bottom and functions above them—and func-
tionals above functions, etc. In this hierarchy, func-
tions can operate on numbers but not the other way
around. However, Go¨del’s theorem and Turing’s halt-
ing problem show that, at least in the case of arith-
metics and computation, this hierarchical structure
is rather artificial and cannot avoid self-reference (see
Fig. 15A and Appendix H 1 c). Moreover, the power
of axiomatic systems and Turing machines are inti-
mately related to self-reference [54] (ch. 7).
So, why not rather embrace self-reference? There
is at least one mathematical formalism that fully em-
braces self-reference. Church’s λ-Calculus is a neat
formulation of computation in what we here call a
manifestly self-referential way—i.e., in a way that
makes its self-referential nature easy to see. In λ-
Calculus there are no hierarchies, only strings oper-
ating on strings [54] (ch. 7.4). So, strings are both
the elements of the domain and the transformations
on that same domain (see Fig 15B). There are no
a priori assumptions that strings cannot operate on
themselves nor that some strings play special roles.
To provide some intuition to readers that may not
be familiar with λ-Calculus, let us consider the follow-
ing toy example involving single-argument functions
operating on numbers. To put numbers and func-
tions on an equal footing, we can represent numbers
with constant functions [54] (ch. 7.4.2). For instance,
the number two can be represented with the function
Two() which, for any value of its argument, always
returns the value two. This example is limited in
that the ultimate interpretation of functions is the
standard interpretation, i.e., the way they operate on
numbers. Again, its sole purpose is to provide some
intuition.
Now, the function Square() returns the square
of its argument. When a function takes another
function as argument it returns the composition of
the two functions. For instance, Square(Two()) ≡[Square ○Two](), which is equivalent to the func-
tion Four() since Two() returns two for any ar-
gument and Square() with argument two returns
four. Now, in this representation, numbers can also
operate on functions. For instance, we can have
Two(Square()) = [Two ○ Square]() which equals
Two(), since Square() yields the square of any
number it takes as argument, but Two() will return
the value two no matter what value Square() passes
to it. λ-Calculus is simpler in that it is based solely
on strings of characters, but more powerful in that
it naturally allows for recursion, which can lead to
self-reference.
b. Self-reference and relationalism
In science self-reference has been traditionally
avoided by strictly relying on third-person methods.
For instance, according to Rovelli (emphasis ours):
If we want to describe [observer] O itself
quantum mechanically, we can, but we have to
pick a different system O′ as the observer, and
describe the way O interacts with O′. In this de-
scription, the quantum properties of O are taken
into account, but not the ones of O′, because this
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FIG. 14: Recursion theorem. (A) The recursion theorem essentially states that a Turing machine (here a computer)
can access a description of itself and manipulate it, along with the input (here a face), to produce a certain output
(here a description of a rotated copy of itself printing a rotated face). (B) The architecture of a generic Turing machine,
Recursion, that implements this idea is composed of three sub-machines: Alice and Bob, similar to those in Fig. 13,
along with a 2-input Turing machine RT. We can write this Turing machine as Recursion = Alice○Bob○RT, where
the superindex ○ refers to composition along the upper input channel of RT. But how exactly are Alice, Bob, and
RT defined? (C) Alice = Print“Bob○RT” prints a description of the composition of Bob and RT along the upper input
channel of RT. (D) Bob is defined in the same way as in Fig. 13B, only that now TM is a 2-input Turing machine. (E)
RT takes as inputs the description “TM” of a Turing machine TM and a string w and implements a general computable
function fRT(“TM”, w), that operates on both the description of TM and the input w to produce an output. (F) Proof
of the recursion theorem by putting all pieces together and using the definitions of the Turing machines in (C-E).
Since Recursion = Alice○Bob○RT and Alice = Print“Bob○RT”, we can see that the whole Turing machine Recursion
implements a function fRT(“Recursion”,w) that can use its own description, “Recursion”, during the computation.
description describes the effects of the rest of the
world on O′. (Ref. [75], Sec. 5.6.2)
Granted, scientists are usually considered physical
systems that can be investigated with the same kind
of tools other physical systems are investigated. How-
ever, there has been a hierarchy wherein scientists are
implicitly assumed to have the special status of being
able to investigate other physical systems from out-
side, as if they were not physical systems themselves
that therefore necessarily interact with the systems
they investigate. Whether such an interaction can
be neglected or not is another question that to our
knowledge has not been systematically investigated
as we try to do here.
Furthermore, a strict adherence to third-person
methods a priori prevents us from even exploring the
possibility that physical systems, like scientists, could
investigate themselves (see below). That we currently
may not be aware of reliable methods to do so does
not necessarily imply they cannot exist [27, 28, 60, 85]
(see Appendix C). The existence of manifestly self-
referential frameworks like Church’s λ-Calculus sug-
gests it should be possible to develop a similarly man-
ifestly self-referential scientific framework, if we do
not insist in pushing away the puzzling phenomena
that can come along with the strengths associated to
self-reference.
Moreover, self-reference is closely related to rela-
tionalism, which has been key in scientific progress.
Unlike absolute notions, which tend to single out
some things as special, e.g., the Earth in the Ptole-
maic model of the solar system, time in Newtonian
mechanics, spacetime in the special theory of rela-
tivity, etc., relational notions tend to be more demo-
cratic and put things on an equal footing. This is pre-
cisely what λ-Calculus does, for instance, by putting
on equal footing not only all strings of a given do-
main but also the elements of such a domain with
the transformations on it. In a sense, λ-Calculus is
about relationships between strings.
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As another example, consider a dictionary [115–
117] out of which we are supposed to learn the mean-
ing of every word. Now, to understand the mean-
ing of a word we need to look up in the dictionary
the meaning of the words used to define it, and so
on recursively. However, if we continue doing this
sooner or later we will come full circle, unless there
are some words whose meaning is grounded from out-
side the dictionary, e.g., from direct experience [115].
But this would give an absolute, special status to
some words. If we insist instead that every word
in the dictionary can only be learned from inside it,
i.e., that the dictionary is complete, we will never be
able to learn the meaning of any word in an absolute
sense. A complete dictionary is a collection of seman-
tic loops [116] which can only provide the relationship
between words, not their meaning in any absolute or
inherent way.
In line with one of the main messages of Einstein’s
relativity, i.e., relationalism, some Eastern traditions
maintain that the existence of all natural phenom-
ena in the universe, like the meaning of words in
a complete dictionary, is relational or dependently
arisen [27, 60]. This does not imply that natural phe-
nomena do not exist, in the same way that Einstein’s
relativity does not imply either that time does not ex-
ist. This rather implies that natural phenomena, like
time, do not exists in an absolute or inherent way—
this lack of absolute existence is sometimes referred
to as emptiness [27, 28, 60, 82] (see Appendix C).
c. Self-reference and non-duality
As we already mentioned, the hierarchy between
numbers and functions, or between strings (data) and
Turing machines (code), do not avoid self-reference.
λ-Calculus shows this distinction is rather artificial
and provides an explicit example of how dual or
complementary roles can be both present in self-
referential systems (see Fig. 15). In other words,
self-referential systems could be considered as single
units that integrate dual roles. In common terminol-
ogy this may be referred to as “data/code duality”
to emphasize that the same system can play either
role. In the language used by some Eastern tradi-
tions this might be considered a kind of non-duality
(between data and code), emphasizing that data and
code are not two separate entities. Now, within this
context, data are data in the sense that, like passive
objects, they are manipulated by codes. Similarly,
codes are codes in the sense that, like active subjects,
they manipulate data. In this sense, data and codes
are relational to each other.
The fully relational view embraced by some East-
ern traditions implies that, like data and codes, the
objects of observation and the observing subject are
also relational to each other. This relational nature
win wout "TM"
TM
STRINGS OR NUMBERS
("PASSIVE OBJECTS")
PROGRAMS OR FORMULAS
("ACTIVE SUBJECTS")
a b c
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FIG. 15: Self-reference and data-code duality: (A) Tur-
ing machines manipulate strings while formulas in ax-
iomatic systems make statements about numbers (see Ap-
pendix H 1). In this sense, Turing machines and formulas
play active roles while strings and numbers play passive
roles. Like subjects manipulating or talking about ob-
jects. However, both Turing machines and formulas can
be mapped one-to-one to strings and numbers, respec-
tively (dashed arrow). This property, usually referred
to as “data/code duality”, allows Turing machines and
formulas to refer to themselves. (B) The existence of
data/code duality suggests the hierarchy between Turing
machines and strings, on the one hand, and formulas and
numbers, on the other hand, is rather artificial. Indeed,
Church’s λ-Calculus is a neat formulation of computation
in terms of strings only, which makes the self-referential
abilities of computation clearly manifest. For instance,
there are strings (like “e”) that can take themselves as in-
put and output another string, and others (like “g”) that,
for any string they take as input, output themselves.
implies, in particular, that neither object nor sub-
ject exists in an absolute or inherent way (see Ap-
pendix C). Granted, like the relative nature of time,
this appears to contradict common sense. However,
much like the relativity of time becomes apparent at
unusually very high speeds, these Eastern traditions
maintain that the relationalism between subject and
object—or subject/object non-duality, as it is com-
monly referred to—becomes apparent at unusually
very high mental concentrations [27, 60].
This is not necessarily as strange as it may sound.
There is experimental evidence that the experience
both of perceiving external objects and of being a
subject that perceives them are associated to neu-
ral correlates within the same organism (cf. Fig. 4).
Although such experiences can be generated by ex-
ternal physical processes, according to mainstream
consciousness neuroscience the organism’s experience
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is intrinsically tied to the internal neural correlates
such processes generate. For instance, a brain dead
person would not experience such external processes
even though they may be “out there”. And the other
way around, the experience of such external processes
can be manipulated via direct interventions of the
organism’s neural system, e.g., via brain stimulation
techniques, without changing the external processes
themselves.
If the experience of subject and object takes place
within the same unit, i.e., the organism, there is the
possibility that the organism could experience them
as such, as not being two separate entities—see Fig. 4
and Appendix C 2 for an analogous situation that can
happen in the case of a lucid dream. Under nor-
mal conditions the experience of subject and object
typically involve the integration of a wide variety of
stimuli. However, according to some Eastern tradi-
tions, it is possible to reach unusually very high lev-
els of mental concentration that can allow people to
focus single-pointedly on essentially one single stim-
ulus, e.g., the sensation of the breath going in and
out through the nose. These can potentially remove
most of the cognitive complexity of the perception
process, leaving effectively one single object of obser-
vation that could in principle facilitate the experience
of subject/object non-duality.
These kinds of self-referential experiments, where
subjects investigate themselves, are qualitatively dif-
ferent from the kind of experiments traditionally per-
formed in science [26, 55]. However, it is in principle
possible to compare the resulting subjective reports
with traditional third-person investigations of the
subjects’ neural activity, for instance. Furthermore,
these Eastern traditions have been exploring per cen-
turies methods with the potential to rigorously train
the mind to systematically experience these kinds of
phenomena. They have also been exploring rigorous
communication protocols that can potentially allow
peers to reach inter-subjective agreements on their in-
ternal experiences, as done in mathematics—indeed,
although it is not possible to show a mathematical
theorem in the same way that we show a pointer in an
experimental device, mathematicians can still agree
on the proof of a theorem via the internal reason-
ing they carry out in their minds [85]. So, there is
previous work suggesting it may be possible to relax
the a priori restriction that physical systems cannot
refer to themselves and, in the spirit of λ-Calculus,
build a manifestly self-referential scientific framework
that combines third- and first-person methods, as it
is being currently explored in the field of neurophe-
nomenology (see Appendix C).
3. Incompleteness, undecidability, and quantum
indeterminacy
As we have discussed in Appendix H 1 c, self-
reference can lead to puzzling phenomena like incom-
pleteness and undecidability. If self-reference plays
a key role in the derivation of the quantum formal-
ism, as our approach suggests, it is natural to ex-
pect similar puzzling phenomena in quantum the-
ory. Indeed, there have already been explorations of
these ideas [118–122]. In particular, relationships be-
tween quantum randomness/uncertainty and incom-
pleteness have been suggested [119, 121]. Here we
provide a brief informal discussion of this possibility.
Conceptually, the proofs of both undecidability and
incompleteness are based on a binary relationship en-
coded in terms of a two-variable function (see Ap-
pendix H 1 c). The proof of undecidability is based on
the function Halts(“TM”, w), which encodes the
relationship whether the Turing machine with code
“TM” halts on input w or not (see Eq. (H2)). Sim-
ilarly, the proof of incompleteness is based on the
function Prov(x, y), which encodes the relationship
whether y refers to a proof of the statement referred
to by x (see Eq. (H3)). A new object is then con-
structed in terms of these very relationships. For
instance, the program Catch22, introduced after
Eq. (H2), is defined in terms of the function Halts,
and the statement S, introduced after Eq. (H3), is
defined in terms of the function Prov. Finally, it is
shown that these new objects do not satisfy the very
relationship in terms of which they are defined. More
precisely, it is not possible to decide whether program
Catch would halt nor to find a proof for the state-
ment S.
Analogously, the key relationship in our work is
observation. So, it is natural to expect that there
may be some physical processes, defined in terms of
this very relationship, which cannot be observed. Al-
though we do not have a formal proof of this at the
moment, there is indeed evidence that “it is impossi-
ble for an observer to distinguish all present states of
a system in which he or she is contained, irrespective
of whether this system is a classical or a quantum me-
chanical one and irrespective whether the time evolu-
tion is deterministic or stochastic” [120]. According
to this result, observations of systems that contain
the observer would always be inaccurate, there would
always be an uncertainty associated.
There is also a kind of unobservability in
the nuerophenomenological framework discussed at
length in Appendix C. In this framework the most
fundamental level of consciousness is considered to
be non-dual awareness, which can be contentless and
the very precondition for an observer to become aware
of any content. Being the very precondition for any
content to manifest in awareness, non-dual awareness
cannot be objectified as a content of awareness itself.
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A toy model of this is an eye which is a precondition
to see any visual object but it cannot directly see
itself. Since the SRC implements the bare intrinsic
perspective, it could be related to non-dual awareness
(see Appendix C 5).
Appendix I: On non-stoquastic Hamiltonians
The analysis in the main text was restricted to fac-
tors F` with non-negative entries, which can be inter-
preted in probabilistic terms. Genuine quantum dy-
namics does not seem to have this restriction, though,
since Hamiltonians can have negative, non-negative,
and complex entries, which would lead to generic fac-
tors through the mapping F` = 1I − (Hs,` +Ha,`)/h̵,
where Hs,` and Ha,` are the real and imaginary
parts of the Hamiltonian (see main text and Appen-
dices D 3 and E 2 c). In Appendices D 4 b and D 5 b we
present a well known example of a quantum dynamics
with a complex Hamiltonian that can be written in
terms of real non-negative kernels with a probabilis-
tic interpretation. Here we argue that our approach is
not necessarily restricted to factors with non-negative
entries either. This is relevant because it could be
useful to compare our approach to the genuine (non-
relativistic) quantum formalism (see below).
We first discuss how Hamiltonians that directly
lead to real kernels with negative entries can be ob-
tained by truncating Hamiltonians on larger spaces
associated to real kernels with non-negative entries.
We will discuss a well-known example of an infinite-
dimensional quantum system that can originally be
described with factors with non-negative entries,
which can therefore be interpreted in probabilistic
terms. After a standard truncation of the original
model to its first two energy levels, however, it turns
into an effective two-dimensional system described by
factors with negative entries. Thus it seems as if the
original probabilistic interpretation is lost. However,
it is the former system which is actually implemented
in the lab, where the experimenter has to make sure
certain near resonance conditions are met for the ef-
fective two-dimensional model to be a good approxi-
mation of the actual system.
We then discuss a simple example of a coin toss
process, where negative numbers in probabilistic ex-
pressions can be given an operational meaning along
this line. Afterwards, we briefly discuss how com-
plex Hamiltonians could be understood as effective
descriptions of more fundamental real Hamiltonians,
at least in the examples we focus on here.
In summary, here we discuss a few examples of so-
called “non-stoquastic” Hamiltonians that, if phys-
ically realizable, turn out to be derivable as trun-
cations or approximations of “stoquastic” Hamilto-
nians. Whether or not physically realizable (non-
relativistic) non-stoquastic Hamiltonians can be de-
rived in general from real non-negative kernels is an
open question we leave for the future. This is in-
teresting in that it may suggests deviations between
our approach and the full quantum formalism. So,
better understanding this may help test whether our
approach indeed coincides with quantum theory and,
if not, whether there may be some previously over-
looked physical constraints that should be added to
the quantum formalism. Indeed, the full quantum
formalism presupposes that we can physically imple-
ment any unitary transformation. However, as the
examples we briefly discuss here suggest, taking into
account the actual physical implementation of such
unitary operators may lead to some additional con-
straints.
Importantly, this discussion is restricted to non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. In relativistic quan-
tum mechanics there might be some intrinsic sources
of non-stoquasticity which may not be associated to
non-negative real kernels. We leave the extension of
these ideas to relativistic quantum mechanics for fu-
ture work.
1. Hamiltonians with positive entries
a. Effective two-level atom
Here we discuss the example of an infinite-
dimensional quantum system described by factors
with non-negative entries which, after truncation to
its first two energy levels, turns into an effective sys-
tem described by factors with negative entries. The
latter is known as a two-level atom interacting with
a coherent radiation field [45] (see Sec. 15.3 therein).
Indeed, consider the Hamiltonian of an atom mod-
elled as an electron, described by the momentum op-
erator ih̵∇r, moving in a potential field V (r) pro-
duced by the nucleus,
H0 = − h̵2
2m
∇2r + V (r) = ∞∑
n=0En ∣n⟩ ⟨n∣ . (I1)
In the second equality we have expanded the Hamil-
tonian in terms of its eigenvalues En and its eigen-
vectors ∣n⟩, where n ∈ Z, n ≥ 0.
Now consider a perturbation
U(r, t) = er ⋅E(t) = er ⋅E0 cos(ωt), (I2)
so the perturbed Hamiltonian becomes H =H0 +U .
Notice that the full Hamiltonian operator, H, can be
derived via a path integral with Lagrangian
L = m
2
r˙2 − V (r) −U(r, t). (I3)
Using the same ideas of Appendices D 4 and D 5, we
can also derive H via a real non-negative kernel
K(r′, r) = e−H(r′,r)/h̵ ≥ 0, (I4)
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where
H(r′, r) = m
2
(r′ − r

)2 + V ( ∣r′ + r∣
2
) +U(t), (I5)
is essentially the Wick rotation  → −i of the La-
grangian L in Eq. (I3) (apart from an irrelevant global
minus sign).
We will now see that, after a standard truncation
of the full Hamiltonian H =H0+U (see Eqs. (I1) and
(I2)) into an effective two-level system, we lose the
equivalence with the positive kernel given by Eqs. (I4)
and (I5). Indeed, in the derivation of the Hamiltonian
of a two-level atom it is usually assumed that the per-
turbation defined in Eq. (I2) is near resonance with
two relevant energy levels of the Hamiltonian H0, say
E0 and E1, i.e. ∣ω − ω0∣ ⋘ ω0, where h̵ω0 = E1 −E0.
In this case, it is usually assumed that only the dy-
namics of these two energy levels matter. So, we can
write
H =E0 ∣0⟩ ⟨0∣ +E1 ∣1⟩ ⟨1∣ +U01 (∣0⟩ ⟨1∣ + ∣1⟩ ⟨0∣)+HR, (I6)
where the first three terms in the right hand side of
Eq. (I6) correspond to the transitions taking place
within the subspace spanned by {∣0⟩ , ∣1⟩}, and
HR = ∞∑
n=2En ∣n⟩ ⟨n∣+ ∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n>m,n≠0,1 (Umn ∣m⟩ ⟨n∣ +Unm ∣n⟩ ⟨m∣) ,
(I7)
collects all the remaining transitions. Here we have
written
Umn = U∗nm = ⟨m∣U(t) ∣n⟩ , (I8)
for m,n ∈ Z, m,n ≥ 0. For the sake of illustration,
we are restricting here to the case where U01 = U∗01
can be chosen to be real and U00 = U11 = 0 [45] (see
Sec. 15.3 therein); this explains the form of Eq. (I6).
At this point it is argued that we can neglect HR
since the system is near resonance. This yields the
effective two-level Hamiltonian
Heff = E1I(01) − h̵ω0
2
σ
(01)
Z +D cos(ωt)σ01X , (I9)
where E = (E0 +E1)/2, D = ⟨0∣ r ⋅E0 ∣1⟩, and
1I(01) = ∣0⟩ ⟨0∣ + ∣1⟩ ⟨1∣ , (I10)
σ
(01)
X = ∣0⟩ ⟨1∣ + ∣1⟩ ⟨0∣ , (I11)
σ
(01)
Z = ∣0⟩ ⟨0∣ − ∣1⟩ ⟨1∣ . (I12)
If we now try to write this as a real kernel in the
way we did in Appendices D 3-D 5
Feff = 1I + Jeff , (I13)
with Jeff = −Heff/h̵, we end up with off-diagonal neg-
ative entries due to the factor cos(ωt) accompanying
σX in Eq. (I9). So, the full Hamiltonian H = H0 +U
in Eq. (I6) can be represented in terms of the real
positive kernel given by Eqs. (I4) and (I5), but the
truncated effective Hamiltonian Heff in Eq. (I9) can-
not. What happened? The full factor F = 1I − H/h̵
associated to kernel K (see Eqs. (I4) and (I6)), which
has only positive entries, can be written as
F =R + Feff . (I14)
So, even though the effective factor Feff in Eq. (I13)
can have negative entries, those would be “corrected”
by the “reference” term R = −HR/h̵ yielding only
positive quantities with a clear probabilistic interpre-
tation. In the next section we show a simple example
of a similar situation.
b. Toy example: “negative probabilities” in a coin toss
In the previous subsection we discussed a physi-
cal system commonly studied in theoretical and ex-
perimental physics, which seemingly leads to nega-
tive numbers in probabilistic expressions. However,
we showed that a description of the full system con-
tains only positive numbers that can be clearly in-
terpreted in probabilistic terms, and that negative
numbers only appear after part of the system is ne-
glected. We now discuss a simple example of a coin
toss that has a similar structure to the example of
the two-level atom presented above. Our aim is to
provide some conceptual insight as to why negative
numbers in probabilistic expressions do not need to
be an issue more generally.
Consider a biased coin which, when tossed, lands
heads or tails with probability 1 − p and p, respec-
tively. So, the coin is described by the probability
vector (cf. Eq. (I14))
Pcoin = (1 − p
p
) =Rcoin +Ncoin, (I15)
where the first and second entries of the vectors in-
volved refer to heads and tails, respectively, and
Rcoin = 1
2
(1
1
) , (I16)
Ncoin = 1 − 2p
2
( 1−1) . (I17)
The rightmost side in Eq. (I15) can be formally un-
derstood as an abstract change of basis. We have
done this to show that, even though we cannot di-
rectly interpret Ncoin in probabilistic terms because
it contains negative numbers, we can still give it a
probabilistic interpretation relative to the reference
probability Rcoin.
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Indeed, we can generate a sample from Pcoin by
first sampling from the flat reference probability dis-
tribution Rcoin and then correcting the sample gener-
ated according to Ncoin. More precisely, Ncoin can be
interpreted as encoding transitions from states associ-
ated to negative entries in Ncoin into states associated
to positive entries. For concreteness, let 1 − 2p > 0.
In this case, if the sample generated from Rcoin is in
state tails, we have to flip it with probability 1 − 2p.
If it is in state heads, instead, we do nothing. So, the
total probability for a sample to be heads is the prob-
ability for a sample to be heads in the first stage (i.e.,
1/2) plus the probability that it was tails in the first
stage (i.e., 1/2) and was flipped in the second stage
(i.e., 1 − 2p). Therefore, the probability for the sam-
ple to be in the heads state is 1 − p = 1/2 + (1 − 2p)/2
as required. Similarly, for tails.
2. Hamiltonians with complex entries
In Appendices D 4 b and D 5 b we present a well-
known example of a Hamiltonian with complex en-
tries which can nonetheless be interpreted in prob-
abilistic terms. In Appendix E 2 a we also discuss
the example of a quantum free particle which can
originally be described in terms of real non-negative
kernels. However, after a change of coordinates,
the same free particle can be described in terms of
a Hamiltonian operator with complex entries. An-
other example is a real Hamiltonian describing super-
conducting flux qubits which, under certain circum-
stances, can be approximated by an effective complex
Hamiltonian [46] (see Eqs. (1) and (11) therein).
As a last example, consider the case of many in-
teracting charged particles which can be described,
in the non-relativistic limit, by the so-called Darwin
Hamiltonian [123] (see Eq. (62) therein). The Darwin
Hamiltonian is real and so symmetric because it only
contains terms quadratic in the canonical momenta,
pˆj = −ih̵∇xj . However, the case of a single charged
particle in an electromagnetic field, which could in
principle be generated by the remaining particles in
the Darwin Hamiltonian, can be effectively described
by a complex Hamiltonian (see Eq. (D30)). Relativis-
tic correction might also yield complex Hamiltonians,
but we are limiting here to non-relativistic systems.
Let us now briefly discuss the case of more general
complex Hamiltonians, H =Hs+Ha/i, which are asso-
ciated to asymmetric dynamical matrices J = Js + Ja
(see Appendices E, D 3, D 4 b and D 5 b). The anti-
symmetric part Ja = −Ha/h is in principle asso-
ciated to phenomena with an extrinsic directional-
ity (see main text and Appendix E 2) or that are
irreversible—in the sense that the factor F`(x`+1, x`)
associated to the transition x` → x`+1 differs from
the factor F`(x`, x`+1) associated to the reverse tran-
sition x`+1 → x` only if the antisymmetric part of F`
is non-zero (see Appendix F 3 d). In the main text we
have discussed how complex Hamiltonians can arise
from the need to get rid of the part with extrinsic
directionality before implementing the SRC because
it only make sense for an observer external to the
corresponding C-observer (cf. property (C3) in the
main text). An alternative may be possible if we
could understood irreversible phenomena as an effec-
tive description that arises when we do not take all
dynamical variables into account, e.g. when we ne-
glect the dynamics of the environment. In this case,
when all phenomena are taken into account, there
should not be irreversible phenomena. If so, complex
Hamiltonians might be effective descriptions of more
fundamental real (and so symmetric) Hamiltonians,
as in the examples of superconducting flux qubits and
the Darwin Hamiltonian above.
Appendix J: Quantum observables and quantum
measurements
In this work we have mostly focused on one ob-
servable: position. However, genuine quantum theory
deals with different kinds of observables, e.g., momen-
tum or energy (see Appendix D 1). This naturally
leads to consider other, sometimes counter-intuitive
states different from position. For instance, it is com-
mon to speak of the momentum or energy eigenstates
as if they physically exists as such, in the abstract.
However, strictly speaking, this overlooks the fact
that such abstract notions have to be implemented
in the laboratory in terms of things we are familiar
with, e.g., the position of a pointer in a measuring
device. As pointed out by Feynman (emphasis ours):
[A]ll measurements of quantum-mechanical
systems could be made to reduce eventually to
position and time measurements (e.g., the posi-
tion of the needle on a meter or the time of flight
of a particle). Because of this possibility a theory
formulated in terms of position measurements is
complete enough in principle to describe all phe-
nomena. Nevertheless, it is convenient to try to
answer directly a question involving, say, a mea-
surement of momentum without insisting that
the ultimate recording of the equipment must
be a position measurement and without having
to analyze in detail that part of the apparatus
which converts momentum to a recorded posi-
tion. (Ref. [47], p. 96).
So, our focus on position variables only should
in principle allow for the description of all (non-
relativistic) phenomena [47] (p. 96).
Now, the view that a quantum measurement has
to be implemented via a physical interaction of the
system of interest with the measuring device is in line
with our approach as it relies on the explicit modeling
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of all the parts of an experiment. Not only the system
dynamics, as traditionally done, but also the prepa-
ration and the measurement steps, as well as the sci-
entists involved. From this perspective, the abstract
notion of quantum eigenstates different from position
can pragmatically be considered as a shorthand no-
tation for the kind of physical manipulations we have
to do in a laboratory in order to measure such quan-
tities. Again, strictly speaking, such physical manip-
ulations can only be done in terms of things we are
familiar with, like the position of a knob, a spatial
pattern of lighting pixels in a display that we may in-
terpret as digits, the angle between two mirrors, etc.
Here we first briefly discuss some aspects of quan-
tum measurement theory using the measurement of
momentum of a free particle as an illustration. In par-
ticular, we briefly discuss how the formalism of quan-
tum measurements of momentum eigenstates arise
from measurements of position of a pointer in a mea-
suring device suitably interacting with the system.
Afterwards, we discuss how the Hamiltonian oper-
ators required to implement the quantum measure-
ment naturally arise from non-negative real kernels.
This discussion is somehow informal as it is only for
the sake of illustration. We leave a more formal dis-
cussion for future work.
Now, in quantum measurement theory it is often
assumed that the interaction between the measuring
device and the observed system is almost instanta-
neous and the motion of the system during that time
is ignored—this limit is usually referred to as impul-
sive measurement [124, 125]. This usually requires
the coupling constant between system and device to
be large. However, as pointed out by Asher Peres:
“This drastic simplification is not always justified.
Coupling constants occurring in nature are finite, and
sometimes very small. It may therefore be necessary
to couple the system and the measuring apparatus
during a finite, possibly long time” [124] (ch. 12.6).
In line with this, the coupling constants that we ob-
tain from non-negative real kernels seem to be weak.
It is not clear at this point whether this is necessarily
so, or it is only an artifact of the preliminary ap-
proach we have taken here. We foresee two possible
outcomes of a future more formal treatment, both of
which are interesting in their own right.
First, if the weakness of such coupling constants is
indeed just an artifact, it may disappear in a more for-
mal treatment of general measurements in our formal-
ism. In this case our approach may be fully consis-
tent with the standard formalism of (non-relativistic)
quantum theory. Second, if the weakness of such
coupling constants is not an artifact, our approach
might be inconsistent with the full standard formal-
ism of quantum theory. Such inconsistency may sug-
gest some experiments to choose between the two.
If the result of such experiments were to favor our
formalism, we may learn about some physical con-
straints that we may have overlooked in the standard
quantum formalism.
1. Some aspects of quantum measurement
theory
Here we briefly review some aspects of quantum
measurement theory [124, 125] (see chapters 12 and
7-9, respectively, therein). For concreteness and sim-
plicity, we here consider the measurement of the mo-
mentum operator
p = −ih̵ ∂
∂x
(J1)
of a one dimensional free particle of mass m, whose
Hamiltonian operator is
Hsys = p2
2m
= − h̵2
2m
∂2
∂x2
. (J2)
One way to implement a measurement in the lab-
oratory is via a suitable physical interaction of the
system of interest with another system, i.e., a mea-
suring device, which has a property we can directly
see, e.g., the position of a pointer. As measuring
device, let us consider another one dimensional free
particle of mass M , whose Hamiltonian operator is
Hdev = − h̵2
2M
∂2
∂X2
, (J3)
and whose position, X, plays the role of the pointer.
The corresponding momentum operator
P = −ih̵ ∂
∂X
(J4)
is the generator of translations of the pointer state,
i.e., of the position X of the device particle. So, to
generate translations of the pointer state according to
the momentum p of the system particle, which is what
we want to measure, we can consider an interaction
given by the Hamiltonian operator (cf. Eq. (7.5) in
Ref. [125])
Hint = gpP. (J5)
So, the total Hamiltonian of the coupled system and
device particles is
Hmeas =Hsys +Hdev +Hint. (J6)
Assume the joint state of the system and device
particles is initially uncorrelated, i.e., Ψ0(x,X) =
ψsys(x)ψdev(X). Assume also that the initial state
of the system particle is
ψsys(x) = 1A ∫ ck eikx√2pidk, (J7)
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where ∣A∣2 is a normalization constant and eikx/√2pi
are the eigenstates of p in Eq. (J1), which are also
the eigenstates of Hsys in Eq. (J2) as this is specified
solely by p.
Equation (J7) and the well known result
∫ eix(k−k′)
2pi
dx = δ(k − k′), (J8)
imply that
∫ ∣ψsys(x)∣2dx = 1∣A∣2 ∫ ∣ck ∣2dk = 1; (J9)
here we have used the fact that ψsys is normalized to
get the rightmost result.
Now, assume that the initial state of the device
particle is
ψdev(X) = e−X2/4σ24√
2piσ2
. (J10)
That is, the position of the device particle is initially
centered around zero with an uncertainty character-
ized by σ.
Following Refs. [124, 125] (see chapters 12 and 7-9,
respectively, therein), let us neglect for simplicity the
free particle Hamiltonians Hsys and Hdev in Eq. (J6).
So, the joint state of the system and device particles
at time τ is given by
Ψτ(x,X) = e−iτgpP /h̵Ψ0(x,X)= ∫ ckeikx [e−τgh̵k ∂∂X ψdev(X)]dk
= ∫ ckeikx e−(X−τgh̵k)2/4σ24√
2piσ2
dk.
(J11)
We have obtained this expression as follows. First,
we have used Eq. (D3) in Appendix D 1 with U =
e−iHintτ/h̵, where Hint is given by Eq. (J5). Second,
we have replaced ψsys(x) and ψdev(X) in Ψ0(x,X) =
ψsys(x)ψdev(X) by the right hand side of Eqs. (J7)
and (J10), respectively. Third, inside the integral
defining ψsys(x), we have replaced the momentum
operator p = −ih̵∂/∂x by its eigenvalues h̵k because
eikx/√2pi are the corresponding eigenfunctions. Fi-
nally, we have used the fact that e−ξ ∂∂X ψdev(X) =
ψdev(X − ξ), since the exponential of a derivative im-
plements a Taylor expansion.
Now, the probability to observe at time τ the sys-
tem and device particle in positions x and X, respec-
tively, is P(x,X) = ∣Ψτ(x,X)∣2. However, we are not
interested in directly observing the position of the
system particle, x. Indeed, the whole point of using
a measuring device is to indirectly infer the momen-
tum of the system by observing only the pointer state.
So, the probability we are interested in is actually the
marginal
Pdev(X) = ∫ P(x,X)dx = ∣ck ∣2∣A∣2 e−(X−τgh̵k)
2/2σ2√
2piσ2
,
(J12)
where we have used Eq. (J8).
Since the Gaussian distribution tends to a Dirac
delta function when σ2 → 0, for σ small enough we
have
Pdev(X) ≈ ∣ck ∣2∣A∣2 δ(X − τgh̵k). (J13)
This means that with probability ∣ck ∣2/∣A∣2 the posi-
tion of the pointer is X = gτ h̵k, which is proportional
to the momentum eigenstate h̵k. So, the momentum
of the particle h̵k = X/gτ can indeed be measured
from the position X of the pointer, according to the
measurement postulate of quantum theory (see Ap-
pendix D 1; see, e.g., Refs. [124–127]).
2. Implementation via real non-negative kernels
Here we briefly discuss how the quantum measure-
ments discussed in the previous subsection can be im-
plemented via real non-negative kernels, following the
framework described in Appendices D 3-D 5. Con-
sider again the example of measuring the momentum
of a one dimensional free particle of mass m by cou-
pling it to another one dimensional free particle of
mass M , which plays the role of measuring device.
As in the previous section, the position of the device
particle plays the role of the pointer.
As we shall see below, the total Hamiltonian-like
function for this system is
Hmeas(x,x′;X,X ′) =Hsys(x,x′) +Hdev(X,X ′) +Hint(x,x′;X,X ′) (J14)
where
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Hsys(x,x′) = m
2(1 − a2) (x − x′ )2 , (J15)
Hdev(X,X ′) = M
2(1 − a2) (X −X ′ )2 , (J16)
Hint(x,x′;X,X ′) = −a√mM
1 − a2 (x − x′ )(X −X ′ ) . (J17)
The factor (1 − a2)−1, with ∣a∣ < 1, renormalizing the
mass of the system and device particles is important
to cancel out the effect of the interaction (see below).
Using Eqs. (J15)-(J17), Eq. (J14) can be written
as
Hmeas(x,x′;X,X ′) = M
2
(∆X

)2 + m
2(1 − a2)2 ⎛⎝δx − a
√
M
m
∆X
⎞⎠
2
, (J18)
where ∆X =X−X ′ and δx = x−x′. So, the implemen-
tation of the momentum measurement could be inter-
preted as a perturbation of the system average change
in position—from ⟨δx⟩ = 0 to ⟨δx⟩ = a√M/m∆X.
There is also a renormalization of the mass of the
system—from m to m/(1 − a2). Furthermore, in the
spirit of the theory of quantum measurements briefly
outline in the previous subsection, the size of the per-
turbation depends on the change in the position of the
device’s pointer.
We now show that the Hamiltonian function in
Eq. (J14) indeed leads to the corresponding Hamil-
tonian operator in Eq. (J6). Using Eqs. (J14)-(J17),
the corresponding transition kernel
Kmeas(x,x′;X,X ′) = e−Hmeas(x,x′;X,X′)/h̵
Z
, (J19)
where Z is a suitable normalization factor, can be
written as
Kmeas(δx; ∆X) = e−(δx,∆X)C−1(δx,∆X)T /2√(2pi)2 detC . (J20)
Here δx = x − x′ and ∆X =X −X ′; furthermore,
C−1 = 1
h̵(1 − a2) ( m −a
√
mM−a√mM M ) (J21)
is the inverse of the covariance matrix
C ≡ ⎛⎝ ⟨δx2⟩ ⟨δx∆X⟩⟨δx∆X⟩ ⟨∆X2⟩ ⎞⎠ = h̵⎛⎝ 1m a√mMa√
mM
1
M
⎞⎠ .
(J22)
So, if the joint state of the system and device par-
ticles at time t is Ψt(x,X) the corresponding joint
state at time t + , with 0 < ≪ 1, is given by
Ψt+(x,X) = ∫ Kmeas(x,x′;X,X ′)Ψt(x′,X ′)dx′dX ′
= ∫ Kmeas(δx; ∆X)Ψt(x − δx,X −∆X)dδxd∆X
= Ψt(x,X) + h̵
2m
∂2
∂x2
Ψt(x,X) + h̵
2M
∂2
∂X2
Ψt(x,X) + h̵a√
mM
∂2
∂x∂X
Ψt(x,X),
(J23)
where we have written x′ = x − δx and X ′ =X −∆X.
To get the third line in Eq. (J23) we expanded
Ψt(x−δx,X−∆X) up to second order in δx and ∆X.
Furthermore, we used the fact that the first-order
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moments of the Gaussian in Eq. (J20) are zero and
the corresponding second-order moments are given by
Eq. (J22) (cf. Eq. (D41) in Appendix D 5 a).
Now, we can build a Schro¨dinger equation from
Eq. (J23) by implementing the analogue of Eq. (D42)
in Appendix D 5 a, which effectively implements the
SRC. This yields

∂Ψt(x,X)
∂t
= i [∫ Kmeas(δx; ∆X)Ψt(x − δx,X −∆X)dδx∆X −Ψt(x,X)]
= −i 
h̵
HmeasΨt(x,X), (J24)
where Hmeas is given precisely by Eq. (J6) with
g = −a/√mM . However, since ∣a∣ < 1 the cou-
pling constant, g = −a/√mM , is somewhat weak,
which contrasts with the impulsive limit commonly
assumed in the theory of quantum measurements
(see chapters 12 and 7-9 in Refs. [124, 125], respec-
tively). Finally, multiplying both sides by ih̵/ we
get the standard form of Schro¨dinger equation, i.e.,
ih̵∂Ψt/∂t =HmeasΨt.
Appendix K: Comparison to some related
approaches to quantum theory
Here we briefly discuss two prominent approaches
to quantum theory—QBism [31, 72] and a recent
derivation from information principles [73]. We also
briefly discuss a different approach [74] to model the
observer based on algorithmic information theory.
Although still at a toy-model level, this recent al-
gorithmic approach also points to some quantum-like
phenomenology. We focus on how we currently un-
derstand these alternative approaches relate to ours.
In particular, we describe some of the main similar-
ities and differences with QBism in the next section.
Afterwards, we argue that the “purification princi-
ple”, which singles out quantum theory in the deriva-
tion from information principles [73], may be related
to the self-referential coupling combined with the pos-
sibility to turn classical non-Markovian models into
Markovian ones by enlarging the state space. Finally,
we argue that the definition of “first-person perspec-
tive” in the algorithmic information approach K 3,
which plays a central role in that theory, is not the
genuine first-person perspective as experienced by the
observer itself. It is rather a description of how such a
“first-person perspective” should look from the third-
person perspective of another, external observer—
more like a non-relational version of Fig. 1A in the
main text.
As far as we know, though, these approaches stay
mute about the potential origin of Planck’s constant.
In contrast, our approach suggests that its origin is
rooted in the physics of the observer (see main text).
1. QBism
QBism is defined in Ref. [72] as “an interpretation
of quantum mechanics in which the ideas of agent
and experience are fundamental. A ‘quantum mea-
surement’ is an act that an agent performs on the
external world. A ‘quantum state’ is an agent’s en-
coding of her own personal expectations for what she
might experience as a consequence of her actions.
Moreover, each measurement outcome is a personal
event, an experience specific to the agent who incites
it. Subjective judgments thus comprise much of the
quantum machinery, but the formalism of the theory
establishes the standard to which agents should strive
to hold their expectations, and that standard for the
relations among beliefs is as objective as any other
physical theory.”
Our approach shares with QBism the central role
given to experience and the users of the quantum for-
malism, i.e., the scientists. Because this is the key
fact in most of the resolutions proposed by QBism to
the conceptual difficulties of quantum theory, such
resolutions would be valid in our framework too.
There are, however, some significant differences with
QBism too.
On a conceptual side, QBism treats scientists as
rather abstract agents immersed in a publicly shared
physical universe. The quantum formalism is seen as
a normative criterion [72] (see Sec. 18 therein) set-
ting “the standard to which agents should strive to
hold their expectations”. Such agents are betting,
implicitly or explicitly, on their subsequent experi-
ences, based on earlier ones, and the quantum for-
malism is a tool to help them place better bets [128]
(p. 8). In contrast, we treat both scientists and the
rest of the universe as physical systems with a dy-
namical role to play. As such, we explicitly model
agents, using tools from cognitive science, as physical
systems learning from their interactions with the ex-
ternal world. So, we see quantum measurements as
specific physical interactions between agents and the
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world, and quantum states as physically encoding an
agent’s “expectations for what she might experience
as a consequence of her actions”.
On a technical side, QBism focuses on finite-
dimensional systems and singles out, for any
given dimension, a particular reference measurement
as special—the so-called symmetric informationally
complete measurements [31, 72]. A proof of existence
of such measurements for any finite dimension to our
knowledge is still to be found. In contrast, we derive
a quantum formalism directly by explicitly modeling
scientist interacting with experimental systems, using
standard probability theory as a starting point, with
no restrictions on dimensionality. We hope our ap-
proach may suggest some alternative perspectives for
the ongoing effort of the QBism community to derive
the quantum formalism.
2. An informational derivation of the quantum
formalism
The abstract formalism of quantum theory has
been derived from sixth informational principles [73].
Only one of these principles, the so-called purifica-
tion principle, is highlighted by the authors as the
distinctive axiom of quantum theory. This principle
is interpreted as expressing a law of conservation of
information, i.e., as the fact that every irreversible
physical process can be regarded as arising from a
reversible interaction of the system with an environ-
ment, which is eventually discarded [129, 130] (see
also ch. 1.4 in Ref. [73]).
An irreversible transformation of a system S in
state ρ can be written as ρ′ = ∑kEkρE†k, where Ek are
suitable operators (see, e.g., chapter 8.2 in Ref. [127]).
This contrasts with the reversible transformations
that we have focused on in this work, which can
be written in terms of a single unitary operator U ,
i.e., ρ′ = UρU † with UU † = 1I (see Appendix D 1).
Roughly, the purification principle essentially states
that any irreversible transformation on a system S,
characterized by a set of operators {Ek}k, can al-
ways be implemented via a suitable reversible (uni-
tary) transformation USE acting on the system S plus
an environment E. More precisely, if ρ′ = ∑kEkρEk
then we can always write ρ′ = TrE [USE (ρ⊗ σ)U †SE],
where the partial trace TrE marginalizes over the en-
vironment, effectively discarding its degrees of free-
dom. Here σ is the initial state of the environment
and the tensor product ρ⊗σ specifies that the system
and the environment are initially uncorrelated. See
Ref. [73] for a more precise description of the purifi-
cation principle.
In our approach the purification principle seems
to be closely related to the SRC combined with the
possibility to embed classical non-Markovian pro-
cesses into classical Markovian ones with a larger
state space. As a simple example of the latter, con-
sider the non-Markovian process where the probabil-
ity, PnM(x`+1∣x`, x`−1), for the system to transition
into state x`+1 at time steps ` + 1 depends on the
states, x` and x`−1, at the previous two time steps.
We can define a new variable y` = (x`, x`−1), which
takes values in a state space with twice the dimension
of the original state space. In terms of these new vari-
ables, the process becomes Markovian with transition
probability PM(y`+1∣y`).
Indeed, our approach starts with classical
Markovian-like processes, which are encoded by us-
ing either real probability matrices or BP messages
(see Eq. (6) in the main text and Appendix G 3).
The role of the transition kernels is played by fac-
tors F`(x`+1, x`), which only depend on the state of
the system at two consecutive states (see Eq. (4) in
the main text). A unitary, time-reversible quantum
formalism only arises after implementing the SRC
between two Markov processes (see Fig. 2C,F and
Eqs. (14)-(18)).
Now, if we have a factor that depends on more
than two consecutive states, we would not get a time-
reversible quantum formalism after implementing the
SRC—at least not in the way we have implemented
it here. However, we could in principle follow an ap-
proach similar to that described above. For instance,
a factor like F nM` (x`+1, x`, x`−1), which is analogous
to the non-Markovian transition probability PnM
above, could be rewritten in terms of the same kind
of variables, y` = (x`, x`−1), as a Markovian-like fac-
tor FM` (y`+1, y`). Implementing the SRC in terms
of the new variables would therefore lead to a time-
reversible quantum formalism on such a larger state
space. In this way our approach might lead to a
derivation of the purification principle.
3. An attempt to model the observer via
algorithmic information theory
A different, algorithmic-information theoretic ap-
proach introduced by Mu¨ller [74] to investigate
the observer also suggests the emergence of some
quantum-like phenomena. However, as acknowledged
by Mu¨ller [74], in its current version this approach
does not attempt to derive actual known laws of mo-
tion. Our approach focuses instead on actual laws of
nature, like Schro¨dinger or von Neumann equations.
Mu¨ller characterizes the state of the observer with
a binary string s, designate it as the observer’s “first-
person perspective”, and assigns a conditional (algo-
rithmic) probability Palgo(s′∣s) for the state of the
observer to transition from s to s′ [74] (see, e.g.,
Eqs. (1), (3) and (4) therein). However, this looks to
us much like a non-relational version of the external
or third-person perspective described in Fig. 1A in
the main text, where the observer is Wigner’s friend
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but the external scientist (Wigner) who describes her
is neglected (see Appendix B).
Our approach suggests that this could indeed lead
to some (imaginary-time) quantum-like features (see,
e.g., Eqs. (7) and (8)), but it contrasts with the self-
referential intrinsic perspective described in Fig. 2 in
the main text, which has been both non-trivial to
implement and key to obtain a (real-time) quantum
dynamics. So, it is not clear to us that, in its current
version, Mu¨ller’s approach can lead to a fully fledged
quantum-like formalism. It is a very promising ap-
proach, though, because its computational roots may
facilitate the implementation of self-reference, and
therefore the intrinsic perspective as defined here. In
particular, it should be possible to incorporate Palgo
as part of the state of the observer using ideas similar
to those we have used in this work.
Mu¨ller [74] mentions that his approach, in its cur-
rent version, has a rather solipsistic flavor. At the
moment it is not clear to us how to interpret this.
However, our approach attempts to place both the
phenomenal and the physical worlds on an equal but
non-dual—i.e., relational—footing (see Appendix C).
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